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Introduction: What is Online  
Social Capital?
In 2014, Jonny Byrne, a 19 year old from Ireland, drowned in the River Barrow 
after participating in the NekNominate social media game: an online version 
of a chain letter style challenge to drink copious amounts of alcohol in peril-
ous situations in an effort to gain ‘likes.’ This was followed by the death of Ross 
Cummins (22) of Dublin, who was also said to have taken up the challenge.
In the run-up to the US 2016 presidential election, Donald Trump made 
extensive use of Twitter to attack his political opponents, media companies, 
and various celebrities critical of him as a means of bolstering his base of sup-
porters. As President, Trump has continued to make use of this medium, and 
on various occasions has pointed to his number of followers as proof of his 
popularity and political legitimacy.
In May of 2017, a Russian reporter recorded a few short videos of a sophisti-
cated click farm in China where over 10,000 smartphones were placed in docks 
connected to a network with the single purpose of providing ‘likes’ and com-
ments to social media content.
What these examples have in common is the subject of this book: the pursuit 
and accumulation of online social capital, and what implications these have for 
political economy and critical media studies. With the nearly ubiquitous pres-
ence of social media, there has also arisen a great deal of emphasis on online 
social capital. The number of articles on how to improve online branding 
strategies, the growing use of click farms, and orchestrated botnet campaigns 
to artificially inflate social proof are testament to the increasingly perceived 
importance of acquiring likes and followers on social media. What significantly 
differs from a time before digital social media is that popularity can now be bet-
ter measured, as well as displayed as a form of status. And, despite the awareness 
that some of these numbers may be inflated by the use of automating features, 
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there may still be a sense of assuming the value of an individual online user via 
an appeal to the numbers associated with her or his profile. And for those who 
do not garner higher numbers, there is the risk that others will assume they 
have lesser value as social beings.
Beginning with the very personal and individual experience when using 
social media, I want you to picture yourself having posted an interesting piece 
of experiential content on your social media profile, such as photos of a recent 
vacation, notice of a new publication, or the birth of a nephew. A few hours 
pass and you decide to log back into the account. You are reasonably sure that 
many of the people in your network will have checked the newsfeed since then, 
and you are looking forward to comments and possibly seeing a few likes and 
comments. However, no one has interacted with your content. If you reflect on 
how you feel at that moment, it might vary from indifference to disappoint-
ment. So you log back off. Assume in this hypothetical example that one of your 
app-enabled digital devices is synced with your social media account, and that 
it is programmed to provide you an alert any time someone interacts with your 
content. A few more hours pass and you see a small ‘7’ on the top right corner 
of the icon for your social media app. How would you describe how you feel? 
Excited with anticipation and eager to tap into your account to see what others 
have said? A few days pass, and using our hypothetical example, would it make 
a difference to your mood if there were 10 likes? 100 likes? 10,000 likes?
For some people, these numbers may not be important, whereas for others 
it is a reflection of personal value that may increase in making those numbers 
rise. Some will find ways of sharing their content more broadly in the hopes of 
garnering more likes, while others may even alter their online performance and 
content tailored to what will be perceived as more popular. Just as avid market 
watchers may gain gratification in watching their stock portfolios increase by 
large amounts, or be disappointed when the increase is lower than anticipated, 
it may be a similar situation for those who invest a great deal of value in these 
social media counters. If the pursuit of such numbers were unimportant, then 
we could ask why a Google search for ‘how can I increase likes on Facebook’ 
produces a result of over 427 million hits.
If this book were just about the individual and her or his accumulation of 
online social capital, it might not warrant lengthy treatment; however, the 
processes that occur behind the visible world of social media, the ideological 
implications of how online social capital is positioned as a deliberate strategy 
by major social media networks to encourage participation for profit, and the 
immiseration of labour on click farms do justify bracketing out online social 
capital for closer analysis.
What is online social capital? How does it differ from more traditional forms 
of social capital? Why does the term seem to enjoy some degree of consensus 
without an operational definition? What are the implications that arise from a 
focus on accumulating likes and leveraging our online profiles through acts of 
conspicuous display? Who essentially profits by these actions, and how do they 
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do it? Where does online social capital fit in a broader context of capitalism? 
At this point, a provisional working definition may serve as a bridge toward a 
much closer analysis:
1) At the user-end, online social capital is a product of online exchanges that 
in many cases can be expressed in some numeric form, which may or may 
not be correlated with a perception of an online user’s value in a digitally 
networked community. Online social capital becomes a kind of offering 
to the social marketplace when users attempt to leverage the quantifiable 
measures of friends, followers, views, and likes for some goal.
2) On the network owner’s end, online social capital is the labour of users 
that can be mined as a data commodity and converted into profit, while 
also existing as a strategy to keep a digitally networked community active 
in providing their unpaid labour.
This statement (1) does not imply that all forms of online social capital have 
a numeric basis (likes, followers), as it may also include non-numeric forms 
(knowledge sharing, community building). The basis by which we furnish 
this provisional definition will become clearer as we proceed, particularly in 
unpacking the competing and complementary definitions of social capital in 
the first chapter, and later speaking directly to metrification,1 the ‘like economy,’ 
and platform capitalism in the chapters that follow.
As we delve deeper into this topic, a variety of other issues will arise that 
challenge some of the more basic assumptions we might hold as to what online 
social capital is, and how this intriguing ‘like economy’ functions. To this end, 
the book seeks to answer the four following questions:
1) How does the process of acquiring online social capital align with the 
goals of capitalist accumulation?
2) How does this process lead to alienation?
3) In what way does this process echo the goals of neoliberal capitalism 
specifically?
4) What ties this accumulation to some of the unfortunate by-products of 
social media, such as aggression and narcissism?
It is important to have some grounding in what social capital is, and how online 
social capital is both similar and different from it. In both instances, social capi-
tal involves social networks, with online social capital having the added dimen-
sion of residing within the structural ecosystem of digital networks. This is not 
to say that the affordances of digital networks does not permit considerable 
overlap between the two types of social capital, but that these digital networks 
upon which ever more social interaction occurs, manifest a whole new host of 
opportunities and problems that are unique to the nature of online interaction. 
Notwithstanding the pioneering work of those such as Pierre Bourdieu (1984), 
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James Coleman (1988), and Robert Putnam (2001) in particular on the concept 
of social capital (which we will cover in the first chapter), the rise of big data, 
commodified social networks, and platformisation has created new conditions 
through which we come to understand social capital.
In the past few decades, the concept of social capital has received a consider-
able amount of attention, expanding into the disciplines of the social sciences, 
critical media studies, history, economics, managerial literature, and as a policy 
instrument. Although its initial mention can be traced to Alexis de Tocqueville 
(1960 [1835]) and was later more popularly reprised in the 1960s by Jane Jacobs 
(1961) to signify the power of a social collective to spur change at the political 
level, social capital as a term has enjoyed a few surges of recent interest: in new 
public management theory, social theory and policy, and with respect to online 
social networks. In the common parlance of the day, social capital generally 
refers to two somewhat different, yet also similar, phenomena that relate to 
networks in general.
Three main theoretical approaches are used:
1) Social capital as a resource acquired and/or mobilized by social actors. 
This resources is derived through social relations and the creation or 
maintenance of social connections in some form of community (Putnam, 
Bourdieu).
2) Social capital as part of the broader system of capital and its inherent con-
tradictions where labour is socialized, and the potential for exploitation 
and alienation arises (classical Marxism).
3) Social capital as the social product of immaterial labour that, in turn, (re)
produces social relations (Autonomist Marxism).
For the purposes of this book, I define online social capital as wrapped up in 
an artificial economy, represented by numeric counters in a ‘like’ and ‘atten-
tion’ economy, facilitated by social buttons and operated by social media sites 
to encourage more participation for their own real economic interests (data 
collection, targeted advertising, and the exploitation of digital labour). Online 
social capital operates in such a way that it follows a market-based logic of 
instrumental rationality for the accumulation of a resource that cannot be 
directly converted into other forms of capital. It is an ideological product of 
neoliberal-informationism that champions competitive individualism rather 
than community-based collaboration within a broader network spectacle, fos-
tering the conditions of conspicuous prosumption, status display, and a metric 
by which to falsely compare social value with other users. The social media site 
leverages users’ pursuit of online social capital for exploitation, while also fur-
ther alienating those users according to Marx’s four main aspects of alienation.
My definition follows Marx’s concept of capital, and views this pursuit of 
online social capital as part of the commodification of the online self through 
a form of digital labour on social media from which surplus value is extracted. 
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The definition deviates from Marx on the basis of the price relation between 
commodified selves as it does not lead to any reliable exchange. Online social 
capital operates as a false economy of conspicuous status display within a real 
economy, and it is for that reason Marxist insights will be appended to the 
insights of Veblen and Debord.
Definitional Problems
There is little consensus about social capital beyond a few assumptions: that it 
is relatively tangible, generally positive, that it can be associated to economics 
and rationalising the production performed on social networks, and that more 
of it is better than less (Mikiewicz 2011). In the hands of those promoting 
particular political and economic agendas, it becomes a somewhat nebulous 
motherhood statement with a positive cachet. The main cleavage of the term is 
whether it refers primarily to sociological or economic phenomena. Moreover, 
there is considerable debate as to whether or not social capital should be under-
stood as either the result of our interpersonal relationships, or as an economic 
term. Those who favour the first interpretation (Robison et al. 2002) reject the 
capital(ist) metaphor.
If we abandon the metaphor of capital in the term of social capital, we may 
risk being blind to the underlying ideological and economic processes that 
condition online social capital as a form of accumulation and alienation, par-
ticularly through the reification of interpersonal communicative relations as a 
source for profit by network hosts, and the reality of a potentially infinite sur-
plus value that may be extracted from these acts of communicative exchange – 
a point well covered in many of the works of those such as Christian Fuchs. As 
I will argue throughout this book, it is not possible to entirely separate social 
capital in its online context from the enclosure of capitalist ideology and the 
strategies of instrumental rationality particularly endemic to neoliberal capi-
talism. Online social capital and the environment in which it is accumulated 
and measured is inextricably bound up in many of the same assumptions 
that underpin capitalist accumulation. The pursuit of numeric social capital 
in our social media context – the ‘like economy’ – is built on a foundation 
of conflict minerals, super-exploited sweatshop labour, precarious ICT ser-
vices labour, rampant commodification and exploitation of user-generated 
content, data extraction and sale. In other words, the pursuit of likes is not 
entirely benign.
Another sense of social capital as it is referred to in popular culture quickly 
degrades into a placeholder for ease or efficiency of connectivity and com-
munication, and this largely resting on digital networks. Online social capital 
becomes a substance which may be measured in terms of number of friends/
followers and approbation cues, such as likes and retweets, or on a more granu-
lar basis (especially among search engine optimization specialists and social 
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media strategists, demographic reach and engagement). In this way, online 
social capital is something to be built through strategies of accumulation, ide-
ally by means of reaching a critical digital mass whereby the capital increases 
autonomously with little intervention apart from an adjustment to a social 
media campaign, content refreshing, and incentives to other digital users to 
carry on the task of increasing capital (sharing, digital word-of-mouth, etc.).
Networks
It is important to consider the ecosystem in which it operates: networks, social 
buttons, and platforms. When we speak of networks, there are two senses by 
which we should understand them: as structural (digital network architecture) 
and social (human interaction, group dynamics, and – in the case of social 
media – computer-mediated communication).
The structural nature of digital networks facilitates the online functions of 
the social aspect of networking, but the structural nature is what appears to 
make the social ‘measurable,’ and thus of value to those who would seek to 
exploit networks for a wide variety of purposes.
Social networks in their own right became an object of study by the psycho-
therapist, Jacob L. Moreno (1934), particularly in developing a way to measure 
them using sociometry, out of which one could plot a visual diagram of a social 
network in what is called a ‘sociogram’. Social network analysis (SNA) can 
show us how actors, nodes, or entities in social networks are connected; how 
information flow occurs in the affinities between nodes, as well as the particu-
lar affordances of each node pending placement within a network configura-
tion; we can measure degrees of separation (or steps along a pathway) between 
nodes and their ability to transmit information; and we can determine if the 
ties between nodes are weak or strong, and what probable implications emerge 
from this. This bears some resemblance to other attempts to theorise and quan-
tify networks in terms of systems theory, whereby we study objects (people, 
channels, procedures) that have attributes, and relationships in a broader envi-
ronment (or a series of nested systems within systems). The holy grail of such 
approaches has been the promise, implicit or otherwise, that social relations 
can be measured, can be explained and possibly predicted in an analytic and 
objective way. This has opened up new vistas for potentially predicting behav-
iour, and has been used in areas as diverse as understanding group dynamics in 
organisational behaviour studies, the use of Game Theory during the Cold War, 
combatting terrorist networks, and to aid political and marketing decisions. In 
its more unfortunate applications, it has played a role in the use of racial and 
cultural profiling.
Since the earlier days of SNA (Moreno 1934, Barnes 1972, Granovetter, 
1973, Krackhardt 1987) and actor-network theory (Law & Lodge 1984, Latour 
1987, Latour 2005), more sophisticated approaches have integrated the use of 
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probabilistic algorithms, whereby data collection and analysis can be rendered 
more automated and changes to a network can be deployed more efficiently in 
real-time. This has presented enormous benefits for social media platforms and 
their commercial partners. For example, even the use of loyalty cards provided 
by retail stores has permitted the collection of consumer data based on various 
inputs (geographical location, demographic information, and purchase data) 
in order to create a consumer profile for more effective targeted marketing in 
the form of coupons or email alerts recommending products that the algorithm 
‘predicts’ will have a higher probability of resulting in appealing to a consumer’s 
interests based on an algorithmically-constructed profile and past purchasing 
behaviour. Algorithms have also served in potentially identifying influencers 
who are more likely to adopt and disseminate political or consumerist messages 
through interpersonal persuasion. What began somewhat innocently with the 
use of SNA, the Mass Observation movement (Madge & Harrisson 1937), and 
focus groups would eventually become ever more efficient in delivering per-
suasive events by tracking individuals, social interactions, and social context. 
What remained was some way to ‘eavesdrop’ on these social interactions, if 
not also encourage more interaction so that the data could be obtained. The 
first step was to find a medium or venue where such social interactions could 
occur which would allow unobtrusive surveillance. The second step would be 
to harvest this data and find a means to analyse it efficiently and effectively 
using computers rather than rely on the slower and more labour intensive pro-
cess of human beings. The last step was to develop a way to incentivise these 
social interactions without prodding, and this development would be actuated 
partially through the use of social buttons.
Social Buttons
The integration of social buttons on popular social media platforms such as 
Facebook has introduced a whole new dimension to online social interaction. 
Social buttons include a range of possible and prescribed interactions such as 
sharing content, commenting, voting, recommending, and various approba-
tion cues such as likes, hearts, and stars. With the introduction of these buttons, 
these activities could be measured and, in some cases, result in the earning of 
digital badges to recognise a user’s content as being popular or informative 
by a community. In the earlier days of Facebook, certain cues and push ques-
tions were used, such as asking ‘what is going on?’ in the status update field to 
encourage the user to supply that content, which would then be disseminated 
to that user’s network. Since then, social buttons may include incremental fea-
tures such as liking where each click adds one to a numeric counter. However, 
as Gerlitz and Helmond note, the use of social buttons is not innocuous as they 
provide a wealth of data to the social media platform for the purposes of data 
mining and the sale of this data to third-party entities. It was understood that 
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‘[u]ser activities are of economic value because they produce valuable user data 
that can enter multiple relations of exchange and are set up to multiply them-
selves’ (Gerlitz and Helmond 2013, 1360). At the user level, the like economy of 
the social web functions to metrify and intensify user activity and engagement 
which perpetuates more activity and engagement, while on the back end these 
social media platforms have been successful in moving from a centralized data 
collection model to one that opts for decentralised flows (Gerlitz and Helmond 
2013, 1361). This model for encouraging social participation quickly becomes 
user-perpetuated and feeds Big Data as the process becomes decentralised. 
This seems on the surface at odds with any dreams of command and control – 
the province of cybernetics. Yet, despite this decentralising process, data flows 
could still be subject to centralised processing, almost like a global scale feed-
back loop that would then be channelled to a number of other network systems 
for various purposes.
On the more technical and less social end of understanding networks, emerg-
ing out of statistical electrical systems, we might credit the rise of computing 
and cybernetics in the 1940s. Claude Shannon’s (1948) mathematical theory 
of communication became a foundational model for the development of the 
first technical communication systems, while the work of cyberneticists such 
as Norbert Wiener (1948) began to have an appreciable impact on several other 
non-technical disciplines. The value of feedback systems could be seen in new 
ideas explored in the domains of anthropology, linguistics, biology, education, 
and management studies. We might even credit the earliest days of ecology – 
and the coining of the term ‘ecosystem’ – to the influence of cybernetics and 
its principles. Understanding networked systems as a kind of struggle between 
information as coherence and entropy as noise may be useful on its own, but it 
is far from the whole story.
Today when we speak of the rise of the network society, this generally refers 
to a span of time from the development of the personal computer, the internet, 
to the situation in which we find ourselves today where so much of the world’s 
technical and economic processes depend exclusively on digital networks. And 
within this digital ecosystem resides our online social networks. If social capital 
itself applies to non-digital networks of our social relations, it must therefore 
exist wherever there are social relations in a digital context.
Platforms
Social media platforms shape the affordances of our online social lives not 
only by devolving the work of social media upon its users according to specific 
micro-tasks of ‘liking’ etc., but also function as a broker of our online commu-
nications. More perniciously, they structure and govern our online activity in 
less than visible ways. Benjamin H. Bratton describes platforms as something 
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institutional, fixed, yet at the same time operating by a form of distributed 
control:
It is important as well to recognize that ‘platforms’ are not only a techni-
cal architecture; they are also an institutional form. They centralize (like 
states), scaffolding the terms of participation according to rigid but uni-
versal protocols, even as they decentralize (like markets), coordinating 
economies not through the superimposition of fixed plans but through 
interoperable and emergent interaction. Next to states and markets, 
platforms are a third form, coordinating through fixed protocols while 
scattering free-range Users watched over in loving, if also disconcert-
ingly omniscient, grace. (Bratton, 2014, n.p.)
Nick Srnicek tells us that platforms can be characterised:
by providing the infrastructure to intermediate between different user 
groups, by displaying monopoly tendencies driven by network effects, 
by employing cross-subsidization to draw in different user groups, and 
by having a designed core architecture that governs the interaction pos-
sibilities. (Srnicek 2016, n.p.)
In other words, Srnicek points to how the new model of platform capitalism 
no longer requires the creation of a marketplace: it is simply the infrastructure 
upon which, say, users on a social network interact. The network effects facili-
tate the perpetual growth of a user-base, while direct costs need not be paid by 
users to access the service, due to cross-subsidisation which means money can 
be made in other areas (such as the sale of user data to other companies in the 
form of ad space).
The merger of network effects and new forms of digital capitalism can be said 
to function as an enclosure around our online social ecosystem. The integra-
tion of social buttons not only encourages more user participation with the 
promise of intangible, numeric reward, but is one of the most effective tools 
for social network platforms to extract data for the purposes of monetisation 
while still providing a ‘free’ service to its users who perform a kind of unwaged 
labour for the network. Gamifying the process through social buttons and their 
incremental counters does not banish the spectre of exploitation or eliminate 
alienation; it merely provides a venue for real accumulation for the platform 
and non-monetary accumulation for the user. The problem is that such data 
extraction for profit is masked by the incentive to ‘play’ the games of accu-
mulation using these social buttons designed by the social network platforms. 
Unlike a traditional arcade game or pinball machine where players will insert 
a quarter in exchange for an experience and possibly achieve a high score for 
some social cachet, in this instance it is the arcade game that is ‘free’ for the user 
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to play, but in exchange for having every one of her or his movements tracked, 
traced, recorded, and sold as data.
As we operate these ‘machines’ for social play, we obtain a kind of token cur-
rency. What is the nature of this currency? What we call online social capital is 
not isolated from other forms of social capital. How online social capital and 
traditional forms of social capital intersect creates the conditions of an inter-
connected problem.
Management and Accumulation of a Resource
We notice how the two senses treat of social capital as a resource. In man-
agement theory literature, it is an existing resource that needs to be properly 
managed, whereas in digital culture it is something to be aggregated or col-
lected before it can be properly managed. The question then turns on how to 
understand online social capital. Should we define it as a resource that can be 
capitalised and thus part of an economy of exchange, or is it a process more 
aligned with building community? If we take the former view, it is not difficult 
to see how social capital becomes reduced to, and motivated by, an economic 
understanding. More to the point, the use value of social interaction becomes 
subordinate to the economic rationality of accumulation.
With the emergence of the internet, and specifically the participatory frame-
work of Web 2.0 which allows users to produce and share content, the utopian 
ideal of an entirely decentralised network of media producers and consumers 
(or prosumers) has been lionised as an inclusive and democratising antidote 
to top-down, largely unilateral media hierarchies that dictate content to a pas-
sive audience on a one-to-many basis. However, this new media arrangement 
narrows options to ever fewer media conglomerates and hosting services that 
extract surplus value from our online participation. The idea that we can pur-
sue our own rational-individual or collectivist agenda using an array of online 
tools, boosting our social capital, conceals the marketisation and privatisa-
tion of online social activity. The affordances of social media promise a kind 
of ‘sovereignty’ by our ability to create, connect, and build social capital any-
time and anywhere, but the only sovereignty of social media appears to privi-
lege consumption. While we pay the entrance fee for joining cheap or ‘free’ 
online social services by volunteering our personal data, which is then sold 
to advertisers for pinpoint marketing, ultimately the concept of social capital 
takes on a largely economic definition as most of what we share, produce, or 
say in the digital milieus is commodified, along with the social network user as 
a worker-commodity.2
Given the (techno-)optimistic excitement surrounding the notion of social 
capital as a source of liberation and self-actualisation that circumvents authori-
tarian controls, be those of the state, big business, or medical and educational 
institutions, subjecting the term to an appropriate interrogation and critical 
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analysis has all but been drowned out by the chorus of those who praise the 
apparent benefits of increasing one’s social capital almost as an end in itself.
The leveraging of social capital may be said to increase access to information 
and opportunities for collective social action (Ellison et al. 2007). We might 
note here that there is no guarantee that such outcomes will arise, but may 
be a function of several factors, including the current state of popular atten-
tion migration, content viability for an audience, network reach, effective 
persona and message management, and so forth. Yet what is overlooked in 
many attempts to describe the movement and accumulation of social capital 
is precisely the structures that enable, inhibit, and ultimately exert control over 
online social behaviours. Beyond being merely a concern for network analysts 
and social software engineering, we may grasp this control of data in terms of 
power, and the trade-off being a user’s potential to accumulate social capital as 
one of the markers of status.
One of the central premises of Thorstein Veblen’s (2010 [1899]) notion of 
conspicuous consumption involves the display of status as resulting in a pro-
portionate increase in social preference. Arguably, online behaviour as a func-
tion of conspicuous consumption is indeed highly conspicuous in its nature, 
but also involves some degree of conspicuous production, especially with 
regard to the construction of the digital self as something ‘unique’ and ego-
idealistic, at least insofar as there is an attempt to bracket off the digital self as 
something of a singularity that will ‘stand out.’ It is for this reason that we might 
revise Veblen’s insights to speak of conspicuous prosumption, and how this fac-
tors in our current ‘like economy’ of social capital.
The very nature of the most popular online social networking sites seem to 
actively encourage a kind of entrepreneurial self-promotionalism in creating 
branded identities linked to consumer tastes that make it much easier to extract 
sellable data. The seeds of this shift – largely a blend of neoliberal economics 
and the rise of personal digital technologies – can be recognised in an article by 
Tom Peters who argues the one way with competing with large multinational 
companies is to become its ‘micro-equivalent’: ‘We are CEOs of our own com-
panies: Me Inc. To be in business today, our most important job is to be head 
marketer for the brand called You’ (Peters, 1997, n.p.). Peters goes on to provide 
advice on how to make use of the affordances of the web at that time – website 
creation and emails – as a means by which to influence others to associate value 
with one’s ‘brand.’ Peters declares that self-branding is an inevitable necessity 
in the future of work, and that one must be a mix of leader, teacher, visionary, 
and businessperson. One may note that such an argument speaks to a range of 
strategies of converting the non-commercial aspects of the self into something 
marketable and profitable. The self becomes the very locus of investment for 
the specific purposes of deriving profit, and it is the ‘miracle’ of digital technol-
ogy to actualize this potential. It is in this way that neoliberalism perpetuates 
a major shift of the self as Homo juridicus (a legal entity of the state) to an eco-
nomic subject where entrepreneurialism becomes key to this new relationship 
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(Read 2008, 28). This self-branding activity is part of the social factory, and this 
factory ‘seeks to involve the worker’s personality and subjectivity within the 
production of value’ (Lazzarato 1996, 3) whilst there is ‘the transformation of 
social human activities into directly productive work’ (Morini, 2007, 45).
Inasmuch as self-branding in the pursuit of online social capital appears to 
appeal to the freedom of an entrepreneurial self, in true neoliberal fashion it 
is the downshifting of responsibility and risk-taking to the user, while profit 
is extracted by the social network platform from this labour. As Alison Hearn 
defines it, ‘the branded self must be understood as a distinct kind of labour; 
involving an outer-directed process of highly stylized self-construction, directly 
tied to the promotional mechanisms of the post-Fordist market’ (2008, 167).
We can already see how there are two forms of accumulation taking place: 
one at the site of the self-branded user operating within the affordances of the 
network structure to accumulate friends, followers and likes; and the second 
situated within the platform itself to have a ready searchable database of active 
online users performing the labour of broadcasting their consumer preferences 
for easier data accumulation and sale. As Hearn argues, the online user’s push 
for accumulation of these resources is a mirror of post-Fordist capitalism:
Arguably, these sites produce inventories of branded selves; their logic 
encourages users to see themselves and others as commodity-signs to be 
collected and consumed in the social marketplace. How else to under-
stand the accumulation of hundreds of virtual ‘friends’ (usually people 
one barely knows) and the view that this constitutes ‘popularity’ than as 
the channelling of age-old human desires into the hollow, promotional 
terms of post-Fordist capitalist acquisition? (Hearn 2008, 177).
This exploitation also extends to those users who have no interest in accu-
mulating more ‘likes.’ In clicking on these social buttons, this not only cross-
syndicates content, but also functions as data for the algorithm to tailor and 
‘personalise’ what content will be made available. The more we are encouraged 
to ‘like’ content, the more of our data is being collected and used to deliver 
related content, and the more of our data can be matched against advertising. 
Every click of a social button is a speech statement, and as social media users 
are encouraged to partake of ever more social interaction online, it is surely the 
social networking sites that profit from every exchange, be it in the production 
of new content to accumulate more likes, or in liking someone else’s content.
Theoretical Approach
In taking a Marxist view, the wealth of social capital can be viewed as a his-
torically developed form powered by circulation and nesting circuits. Marxist 
analysis will be the proper fit given the macro-level emphasis on class structure 
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and the exploitation of labour in the creation of the surplus value on social 
networking sites. By contrast, an emphasis on human capital focuses on 
micro-level analyses of family, gender, etc., which speak to how these networks 
inform individual access and mobilisation of social capital. There will also be 
occasion to bring cultural capital into this discussion given that it also places 
emphasis on class divisions, in bringing the insights of Thorstein Veblen to 
discuss the nature of conspicuous forms of display as an instrument of socially 
reproducing status.
What remains is to examine the social relations that underpin social capital, 
and what sort of social relation it is when we speak of a distinctly digital form of 
social capital, and how this is situated in an encompassing framework of capi-
talism itself. Capital as accumulation is historically grounded in the circulation 
of commodities that lend themselves to the money relation; i.e., that which 
mediates the relation of value between commodities, but in such a way that the 
money relation leads to the purchase of some commodity for the purposes of 
selling it (such as, for example, someone who buys houses for the purpose of 
flipping them for profit). The apparent absence of any clear money relation to 
mediate social capital in the ‘like economy’ problematizes our return to Marx 
for guidance, and so it is incumbent upon us to reconstruct this newer relation.
What makes this task more challenging is rooted in the very term of social 
capital itself, and its numerous (sometimes contradictory) definitions. Social 
capital has no apparent quantifiable measure.3 That is, how would one measure 
one’s social capital on Facebook or Instagram? One might say that the number 
of connections, likes, comments, and other approbation cues have a numeric 
value, and thus represents social capital with a unit of measurement. However, 
there are a few problems with this view. Despite some services that claim to 
measure social capital or one’s social media profile value, there is no consensus, 
with monetary values ranging from effectively zero to hundreds if not thou-
sands of dollars. Recalling Marx’s definition of capital, it is not an inert ‘thing’; 
that is, simply totting up the number of connections or retweets associated with 
a user profile does not translate into capital unless it is in circulation. This sig-
nals a second major issue: in the acquisition of likes, followers, connections, 
etc., is there a direct line from this acquisition as an increase in capital toward 
the ‘sale’ of such things to increase profit? In other words, can one sell their 
accumulated ‘social capital’ to a buyer, and thus increase personal profit?
If there is a commodity relation to online social capital, it will not be neces-
sarily determined by a numeric value indicating likes and such, but within the 
less visible sphere of data in the hands of the social network host. It is here that 
real circulation is exceedingly important, for the profit increases of many of 
the most popular social networks depends on their user bases: the number of 
users who join and actively participate and share content, when volunteering 
their time and personal information to these sites in exchange for access. An 
increase in the number of service subscribers is also an increase in data, which 
can be accumulated and curated, and then sold as a commodity to advertisers. 
xxiv Social Capital Online
This increases revenue, and in the case of publicly traded companies such as 
Facebook and Twitter, potentially increases share price. What we might term 
a ‘critical mass’ of prosumers or the exploitation of a mass general intellect is 
well-suited to the business model of these social network sites that exploit users 
and exercise control to extract surplus value from users’ labour.
Plan of This Book
If one could summarise the goal of this book, it would be that the social net-
working sites by design may function as a bridge between accumulation of online 
social capital and alienation that results from this activity, and this is enabled 
by platform capitalism and the network spectacle. The question of online social 
capital involves issues beyond user exploitation, as it also contends with aliena-
tion that is the result of this conspicuous form of accumulation. In order to 
achieve this objective it will be essential to ground the discussion by exploring 
the context of online social capital.
In chapter 1, I trace the contours of what is precisely social about online social 
capital, and how it compares to cultural capital. For this contextual chapter, it 
will be our goal to take stock of some of the movements within the literature 
of social capital itself, and what bearing this may have on better understand-
ing online social capital. Due to the fact that social media is both a structural 
and social phenomenon, powered by digital network architecture with its affor-
dances as well as a space of social interaction, beginning with what is social 
about these networked environments will provide us with a bridge between 
how social capital has been traditionally understood in the literature and how 
it compares to a distinctly online form of social capital.
In chapter 2, I pivot to understanding online social capital from a more eco-
nomic standpoint as a ‘capital’ resource to prepare us for understanding how 
strategies of economic accumulation may seem to colour the social aspects of 
accumulation. There is certainly a precedent for this connection given how 
closely aligned economic and cultural considerations may be in the broader 
understanding of social capital and community.
In chapter 3, attention will be paid to how capital accumulation occurs in 
the process of acquiring online social capital. I explore the role communicative 
and platform capitalism plays as a bridge that unites the social and economic 
aspects of online social capital. This will function as a means to better assess 
such aspects as the mobile ‘prosumer’ and the system ‘gaming’ use of social 
buttons. What are the implications of capitalism’s co-opting of social functions 
in the online social media environment?
In chapter 4 I determine how this process of accumulation is alienating by 
recourse to the works of Marx and Veblen. Both figures have a view of aliena-
tion that is in some ways similar, but differ in terms of the outcomes of increased 
alienation due to their respective views of capitalist society. The importance will 
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be stressing how the pursuit of online social capital can not only be considered 
a form of work, but that there are consequences to such a pursuit as it may 
increase our alienation from each other, ourselves, other workers, and the world.
In chapter 5, I follow this line of alienation to explore some of the less savoury 
consequences of a highly competitive social media environment, spotlighting 
two major strains that seem emblematic of a pursuit of online social capital: 
the narcissistic turn, and a potential increase in online aggression. By explor-
ing some of the foundational work in narcissism, it will be important to stress 
that social media may enable more apparent narcissistic behaviours, but it may 
not be the case that users are generally more narcissistic. Instead, the nature of 
online social capital competition may appear to compel users to adopt a more 
narcissistic form of content production as might be expected from this environ-
ment. In terms of aggression, I will explore some – but not all –  disinhibition 
effects that can be considered aggressive and hostile, and how it is linked with 
an increasing perception of needing to be heard on social media in order to 
accumulate more stake in the online attention economy.
In chapter 6, I delineate how the specific form of online social capital and 
its transactional framework resides within what one might call the network 
spectacle, allowing us to revisit many of the insights of Guy Debord’s Society of 
the Spectacle. In some ways, there is something far more literal about this form 
of spectacle. If Debord’s description of the spectacle says it is all encompassing, 
and that any attempt to critique the spectacle must rely on the language of the 
spectacle, what can be said of a network spectacle? Is it all-encompassing – 
an enclosed social ecosystem with its echo chamber effects where what we are 
permitted to say (prescribed by the affordances of the social media platform) 
is conditioned by the language of this network spectacle? Would the gamifying 
aspects of social buttons prove somewhat reductive of our social interactive 
capabilities, economising communication in such a way that social exchange is 
Taylorised for easier and more efficiently channelled data extraction? Is what 
we as users see just the wide mouth of the funnel, while the platform can incre-
mentally narrow our social exchanges into those that fit the requirements of 
this network spectacle? How does our pursuit of online social capital, enabled 
and surreptitiously used as an instrument of profit and control, serve the ends 
of a network spectacle, which is to grow in perpetuity?
In the concluding chapter, I explore some of the more urgent implications of 
where the process from online social capital accumulation to alienation can lead 
us as researchers, advocates, and critical users of social media. It is not simply 
a case of ‘unplugging’ from social media, nor of simply adopting wholesale the 
optimistic rhetoric surrounding social media usage as emancipatory. Instead, 
it will be of the utmost importance that we continue to be diligent and criti-
cal on a go-forward basis and continue finding new ways of resisting capitalist 
appropriation of what perhaps ought to be our shared, global, public commons.

CHAPTER 1
Online Social Capital as Social
Let’s start with an example: The Fossil Forum (www.thefossilforum.com) is a dis-
cussion board-based global forum that specialises in the collection, study, and 
appreciation of fossils. With nearly 25,000 members from around the world, the 
forum serves the function of uniting an otherwise disparate group according to 
a passion for palaeontology – professional and avocational. Registered members 
will have varying degrees of expertise, from amateurs to established researchers. 
The forum does not rely on advertising revenue, and instead funds its operations 
through direct donations and member-created auctions. The forum also prohib-
its the posting of commercial links, and does not provide commercial appraisal 
of fossils. Members have the opportunity to post their finds for the community 
to assist in proper identification, engage in a wide range of fossil-related topics, 
exchange advice on preparation and collecting, share open access documents, 
and allows members to post personal galleries. In terms of online social capital, 
the only visible metric is the accumulation of ‘informative points’ awarded by 
the community when a member posts content that is considered informative. 
The non-metric forms of online social capital in this community can be con-
sidered the shared assets of expertise, experience, and informative resources. In 
addition, members who initially met on this forum have organised collecting 
trips offline. Members can be awarded forum badges for being ‘member of the 
month’ (decided by staff), ‘fossil of the month’ (chosen among several competi-
tors by community voting), and ‘paleo partner’ (awarded to any member who 
has contributed meaningfully to palaeontology, such as publishing an article, 
volunteering at a museum or donating a specimen of scientific significance).
Like many social media sites, The Fossil Forum is a high-trust network. Its 
narrow focus affords greater consensus on vision, mission, and values. New 
members are not granted immediate access to some features until a number 
of posts of substance have been made. The community is moderated by a team 
of volunteers to prevent spammers, provide positive encouragement to new 
members and ensure that the forum’s policies are enforced. A forum such as 
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this serves as an example of an ideal form of social capital whereby it is the 
development and sharing of social assets for community benefit.
In adopting a critical stance with respect to online social capital, it would 
be folly to simply focus on the negative, as there are several examples like the 
one discussed above where online social capital does align with individual and 
community empowerment. Of note would be groups that have been unfairly 
marginalised who can congregate in a virtual space to organise, mobilise, and 
provide mutual support. In addition, if we consider the Autonomist Marxist 
tradition, social media can function as a tool for breaking down barriers 
between otherwise disparate groups to form new alliances along shared lines. 
However, even before considering the matter of online social capital as part 
of – or as a possible resistance to – the circuits of capitalism, it will prove ben-
eficial to backtrack and consider the core concept of social capital. This chapter 
explores the foundations of social capital and moves toward identifying some 
of the more problematic aspects that arise in its migration to an online context.
Social Capital and Cultural Capital
The word ‘social’ is liable to conjure up many associations that speak to our 
condition as ‘social beings,’ the collaborative benefits of community, and poten-
tial for self-expression. However, when left on its own, the term may leave one 
gasping for more precision; namely, when we use the word social are we refer-
ring to sociality? Social interaction? Media in general (as all media is a form 
of social exchange and are techno-social systems)? It may serve us better to 
adopt a neutral understanding of what is considered social exchange rather 
than assume one that is positive or negative given that social interactions have 
the potential to be constructive or non-constructive.
We can credit Pierre Bourdieu (1997) with identifying four types of capital: 
economic, cultural, symbolic, and social. By separating these forms of capital, it 
is not as though Bourdieu was setting up a cordon between them, for he under-
stood that there were interrelated dynamics that would influence the abilities 
and opportunities of social agents to gain and distribute different forms of capi-
tal. Bourdieu defines social capital as:
[T]he aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to 
possession of a durable network of more or less institutionalized rela-
tionships of mutual acquaintance and recognition – or in other words, 
to membership in a group – which provides each of its members with the 
backing of the collectivity-owned capital, a ‘credential’ which entitles them 
to credit, in the various senses of the word. (51)
Bourdieu further explains that the volume of social capital is dependent upon 
some conditions, such as network size, effective use of connections, and the 
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volume of other forms of capital each of the individuals in the network pos-
sesses (1997, 51). In other words, social capital does not generate itself indepen-
dently of its relations with other forms of capital: the economic, symbolic and 
cultural are entwined. Moreover, maintaining or increasing one’s social capital 
requires considerable and perpetual effort as it has a tendency to devalue over 
time. What Bourdieu’s definition implies is that other forms of capital have the 
potential to be converted into social capital, but what may be missing here is 
how the relation of labour features in the production of social capital in the 
first place and the effort required to convert one form into another. We might 
here consider an illustrative example of energy and effort required to convert 
one form of capital into another, a form of exchange where there is some form 
of investment to make this conversion possible. For instance, assuming some 
individual of financial means (economic capital) wished to create name rec-
ognition in a bid to run for a city council position, that person would need to 
leverage his or her standing in the community as well as invest in political cam-
paign specialists. The candidate would likely ‘press the flesh’ at various events, 
canvass voters, launch a social media campaign, schedule media appearances 
and so forth to create more awareness of the candidate and her or his viabil-
ity for office. In this process, the candidate may have to leverage other human 
assets to obtain endorsements from those whose standing in the community 
is respected. In this instance, economic capital is used to gain political capital.
Instead of providing an optimistic definition of social capital, Bourdieu 
includes it as part of a worldview where capital is the totality of all social exist-
ence that plays a role in reproducing inequality while preserving dominance 
and class hierarchies. Social capital has little to do with open inclusion: it is 
an instrument of exclusion, to build walls not bridges. For example, a country 
club may use membership fees to exclude those without significant wealth from 
joining, excluding certain people that are statistically less likely to possess the 
financial means; a political party’s anti-immigrant message may function as a 
barrier to entry by those who may wish to dispute those values; stakeholder 
influence in a community may be negatively impacted for those whose precari-
ous employment situations may mean frequent job-changes and uprooting to 
new communities for employment, if not also the lack of financial security to 
afford home ownership; and even specialist language by technical profession-
als and academics can be an insurmountable obstacle for those not specifically 
trained in those disciplines. Bourdieu claims that these are the given facts of 
our social reality that govern who can join particular networks.
Bourdieu’s view is more aligned with that of cultural capital; namely, that 
capitalisation is a process of social reproduction, with the most institution-
alised form being education whereby ‘objective’ culture is internalised and 
reproduced by social actors. What appears to emerge as consensus, such as 
norms and values, are the product of social training via respected institutions. 
If there is ‘profit’ to be gained by this form of cultural capital participation, it 
is a measure of how well an individual conforms to the established norms and 
4 Social Capital Online
values of a society in order to obtain its opportunities and benefits. If we were to 
map this on to social media, there are implicit values and norms there as well; 
for instance, proper forms of netiquette that allow for the use of web-specific 
acronyms, the value of reciprocity in liking and following, the ‘taboo’ of using 
all capital letters as akin to shouting, and so forth. What may be considered 
socially reproduced also results in the creation of divisions on the basis of age, 
class, and even language.
It is worth remarking that Bourdieu’s valuable contributions to our under-
standing of social capital were written prior to the rise of mainstream social 
media. Although the internet at the time did possess affordances for some 
online for and email, arguably a great deal of social networking and the accu-
mulation of social capital was still being done in more traditional, analogue 
ways. The exploitation of distinctly digital social networks had yet to become 
a more viable option, and the eventual arrival of such networked forms of 
communication would have an appreciable effect on social relations. In some 
cases, the emergence of popular social media served to break down barriers 
of distance and class, yet at the same time social media would serve to exacer-
bate differences of class, ethnicity, ideology, gender and income. I do not view 
Bourdieu’s conception of social capital as no longer viable, but that instead 
there are several aspects of his analysis that can be retained or modified in what 
would otherwise be considered a new social situation of network effects that are 
tied to acceleration and scale.
A contemporary of Bourdieu, James Coleman (1988), provides a defini-
tion of social capital that is less conditioned by economics and class struc-
ture, and instead provides potential for empowerment – particularly for 
marginalised, disenfranchised groups. For Coleman, we ought not to con-
sider social existence simply one of economic conditioning whereby we are 
selfish beings of instrumental rationality, but that social aspects on their 
own merit much more focus. Coleman critiques the purely economic under-
standing of social capital:
The economic stream […] flies in the face of empirical reality: persons’ 
actions are shaped, redirected, constrained by the social context; norms, 
interpersonal trust, social networks, and social organization are important 
in the functioning not only of the society but also of the economy. (96)
It is not that Coleman entirely disregards the importance of economic con-
siderations in social organisation, but that over-emphasis on this point would 
imply that human beings are but passive beings whose agency is determined 
exclusively by economic capital. This might be the case under particular con-
ditions, but I take the slightly more pessimistic view that the digital network 
structures themselves cater more to the creation of passive consumers and 
producers of content on these platforms, implicitly encouraged by the broader 
ideological apparatus of social media to simply accept its affordances as ‘good’ 
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without question. That so much social interaction becomes more dependent 
on valuing through actual metrics as a kind of ‘reward’, or that interaction is 
prompted by a series of incessant notifications, speaks more to a kind of reac-
tive and passive form of social activity that is based on digital stimulus and 
pseudo-economic reward.
In Coleman’s interpretation, social capital is not something that is privately 
owned like property, but is instead an available resource that emerges as the 
by-product of social relationships. Coleman’s understanding of social capital 
opened the way to viewing it as something not unlike a property held in com-
mon by a community, akin to other forms such as heritage assets and the idea 
of the tightly knit neighbourhood community. Under this view, the ideal for 
maximising the volume of social capital as a shared asset might be a small 
town given the closer and long-standing ties the community may possess.4 
In sociology, the term Gemeinschaft refers to this kind of kinship structure 
and unity that arises from such a scenario, as opposed to Gesellschaft, which 
refers to individuals tied to larger structures in a more vertical, less horizontal, 
model. What engaged thinkers such as Ferdinand Tönnies (2002 [1887]) – who 
adopted the terms of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft in his pioneering work, – 
resonates ever more strongly today with the decline of rural communities at 
the expense of increased (sub)urbanisation, the ideological emphasis on the 
individual as an economic rather than social actor, and the rise of social media. 
The net result of these changes in the way community-mindedness has given 
way to an increase in individualisation is a view advanced by Robert Putnam 
in his book, Bowling Alone.
With this newer focus on social capital as a community asset, we find Robert 
Putnam taking up the baton in exploring this in more detail. For him, social 
capital involves trust, reciprocity, information, the possibilities for collective 
action and the transition from individualist identity to a community identity. In 
his most influential work, Bowling Alone (2001), Putnam identifies the threats 
to social capital and community engagement – be it the stealthy hijacking of 
social capital by financial capital, indifference to community and civic engage-
ment, a decline in volunteer service group memberships, and changes in the 
techno-social systems of media. Although Putnam does seem to sound a note 
of optimism that computer-mediated communication may somehow renew the 
value of social capital, this is in no way guaranteed. Phenomena such as slack-
tivism (Christensen 2011, Morozov 2012), for example, may only provide the 
token appearance of deeper engagement. And, although some barriers to entry 
have been lowered for many in the formation of communities and access, class 
divisions are in many ways still reproduced in a digital form: the urban-rural 
split with respect to reliable access to digital networks and the heavy represen-
tation of those with wealth and status still dominate the social web.
Putnam’s view suggests the growth of online social networks may better 
facilitate more bridging social capital, and that these digital networks will 
increase our exposure – and possibly create more incentive – in developing 
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social relations with those who hold very different views. Bonding social capital 
relies more on homophily and preferential attachment: our tendency to group 
with those who are like us. Being exposed to a multiple variety of viewpoints 
and perspectives seems to present a very real benefit, but this is jeopardised by 
selective exposure to content, algorithmic sorting at the network end, and the 
ability for users to customise their relations according to homophily.
The Dark Side of Social Capital
There are unintended negative consequences in the application of social capi-
tal. For example, Putnam references the Oklahoma City Bomber, Timothy 
McVeigh, who actively networked in discussing tactics with other radical right-
wing conspirators (2001, 21–2). For Putnam, the concept of social capital itself 
is benign (and can be beneficial), but there is a possibility that others may use 
their cooperative social linkages for malevolent purposes – which may include 
strengthening hate groups, engaging in astroturfing campaigns or in commit-
ting crimes. Furthermore, the use of social capital among certain groups can 
exacerbate cliquish behaviours, marginalise or exclude outsiders, and thus pro-
mote rather than eliminate inequalities. Unscrupulous corporations or politi-
cians, hate groups, and so forth are just as capable of leveraging social capital in 
their networks for their own collective gain at the expense of – or the explicit 
goal of harming – the interests of others.
Francis Fukuyama (1995) also acknowledges the potential abuse of social 
capital in producing these kinds of negative externalities, but he introduces the 
notion of broadening the radius of trust among all actors: the wider the radius, 
the more others will gain access to the benefits of those social capital resources. 
However, we might ask what happens in the event of there being a large reserve 
of trust among several actors, while surreptitious forms of covert surveillance, 
exploitation, and a ‘profit over people’ model is still in place. A corporately run 
digital social network like Facebook would be a prime example of a high-trust 
culture that engages in practices that may not be in the best interests of its users.5 
And, just as social capital has the capacity to increase trust as per Putnam and 
Fukuyama’s respective understanding, it has the capacity to increase distrust – 
particularly of out-groups or in networks where internal competitive values can 
foster suspicion or sabotage in an effort to gain advantage.
The one clear way bridging social capital is endangered in online social net-
works is precisely what is made visible by the algorithm used by the platform 
to deliver content. This ‘filter bubble’ – a term coined by Eli Pariser (2012) – 
speaks to how our use of the web delivers ever more ‘personalised’ experiences 
that will conform to our interests and values while limiting exposure to alter-
native viewpoints. And it is not just on social media where this occurs. In five 
experiments conducted by Epstein and Robertson (2014) to track how voting 
preferences can be manipulated by the use of search engines. SEME – search 
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engine manipulation effect – was shown to have an appreciable impact on how 
internet users’ opinions are shaped by what the search engine results produce, 
and that a higher value is attributed by these users overall to those search 
results that are higher ranked. When we contrast this against Putnam’s view 
of increased bridging social capital, it would appear that there are significant 
obstacles thrown up by the very platforms we use. Already, there has been a 
profusion of fake news outlets who are able to capitalise on narrowcasting to 
niche groups. For instance, the rise of Breitbart and Alex Jones’ Infowars have 
been able to unify various far-right extremist groups in the proliferation of 
conspiracy theories such as claiming the tragic Sandy Hook shootings were a 
staged false flag event orchestrated by the Obama administration to take away 
citizens’ guns, and Pizzagate which claimed that the Clinton campaign was 
engaged in running a paedophile ring out of a pizzeria. As more people would 
click on these stories, the more similar stories would appear in their newsfeeds.
As concern has mounted over the impact of filter bubbles in creating a 
warped world scenario in manipulating our perceptions through algorithmic 
sorting, more studies have been done to trace the causes and implications of 
social media content filtration. Such filters on visible content may be said to 
contribute to a kind of digital tribalism, hostile divisiveness, and an outright 
‘balkanization’ of the social web. In his farewell address, then-President Barack 
Obama pointed to the threat these filter bubbles presented to democracy when 
people retreat into these polarising bubbles:
[…] especially our social media feeds, surrounded by people who look 
like us and share the same political outlook and never challenge our 
assumptions. The rise of naked partisanship, and increasing economic 
and regional stratification, the splintering of our media into a channel 
for every taste — all this makes this great sorting seem natural, even 
inevitable. And increasingly we become so secure in our bubbles that 
we start accepting only information, whether it’s true or not, that fits 
our opinions, instead of basing our opinions on the evidence that is out 
there (Obama 2017)
We may turn to other more recent examples of how the impact of social media 
can increase social capital for malevolent purposes. The terrorist organisation 
ISIS has been remarkably effective in their use of social media for the use of 
recruitment and branding:
The Islamic State maximized its reach by exploiting a variety of plat-
forms: social media networks such as Twitter and Facebook, peer-to-
peer messaging apps like Telegram and Surespot, and content sharing 
systems like JustPaste.it. More important, it decentralized its media 
operations, keeping its feeds flush with content made by autonomous 
production units from West Africa to the Caucasus—a geographical 
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range that illustrates why it is no longer accurate to refer to the group 
merely as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), a moniker that 
undersells its current breadth (Koerner 2016).
As much as Western media has focused on how ISIS has broadcast its atrocities 
on social media, this only makes up a small part of its social media branding 
activity. Propagandistic content indexed on infrastructure improvement and 
economic development are used to portray the positive benefits of ISIS’ activi-
ties. Moreover, ISIS’ use of social media is quick to capitalise on current events 
to target marginalised groups for recruitment.
A second example originates largely from the uncensored social media plat-
form, 4Chan, a successor to Something Awful. The causes of the rise of the 
alt-right is still a matter of speculation but we might credit 4Chan and various 
subreddits in essentially playing a prank with its long history of the commu-
nity’s sometimes cynical or controversial embrace of various movements such 
as Occupy, Anonymous and as the origin of the infamous Gamergate scandal. 
It would only be later adopted by various far-right groups as a symbol of unity 
against political correctness, globalisation, and multiculturalism. Sparked, in 
part, by economic conditions and a surge of refugees, the alt-right movement, 
which focuses on a kind of retrograde nationalism, protectionism and xeno-
phobia, surged. But it was 4Chan and the co-opting of a cartoon frog, Pepe – 
created by Matt Furie in his Boy’s Club and never intended as a symbol of hate 
– that precipitated the spread of a now recognisable meme (memes being one 
of the preferred methods of 4Chan). As Dale Beran writes,
Pepe symbolizes embracing your loserdom, owning it. That is to say, it 
is what all the millions of forum-goers of 4chan met to commune about. 
It is, in other words, a value system, one revelling in deplorableness and 
being pridefully dispossessed. It is a culture of hopelessness, of knowing 
‘the system is rigged’. But instead of fight the response is flight, know-
ing you’re trapped in your circumstances is cause to celebrate. For these 
young men, voting Trump is not a solution, but a new spiteful prank 
(Beran, 2017).
Subsequent memes circulated throughout the 2016 US presidential campaign. 
In one instance, Democrat candidate Hilary Clinton denounced Trump sup-
porters as ‘deplorable,’ which then resulted in the creation and proliferation of 
memes by alt-right supporters embracing the term as a badge of honour. Memes 
making use of Pepe and the term ‘deplorables’ became a rallying point for alt-
right, neo-Nazi and other white nationalist groups, being used in a variety of 
contexts, including supporters of UKIP, the Dutch Party for Freedom under 
Geert Wilders, Marine Le Pen’s National Front, and the populist Alternative for 
Germany (AfD) party. It has also been brandished in response to any criticisms 
of extremist nationalist views, and against political moderates. This has been 
Online Social Capital as Social 9
joined by other associated epithets such as ‘librul tears,’ ‘deep state,’ ‘cultural 
Marxism,’ and ‘cuck’ (short for cuckold, and in reference to the cuckold por-
nographic genre where the narrative clearly defines ‘alpha’ and ‘beta’ males – 
terms employed frequently by the alt-right and originating on 4Chan).
On the other side of the political divide would be the efforts of #Resist, a pro-
liferation of Twitter accounts functioning as subversive alt-government agency 
operatives, and antifa. The result has been an increasing polarisation along the 
ideological axis of far left and far right. Examples such as these underscore the 
negative forms of online social capital.
Such efforts at extreme polarisation seek to escalate discord and instability. 
What is needed is to re-appropriate the tools of social media to insist on civil 
discourse, dialling down hostilities.
Online Social Capital: Measurement
As social capital can be considered a resource that is generated, accumulated 
and distributed in a social network, it is important to keep in mind the net-
worked environment in which the exchange of social capital occurs. Given the 
networked communicative capitalist aspects of social media, with its goals of 
extracting surplus value, exploiting free labour, and in automating social func-
tions for data and profit with the smokescreen of ‘customisation,’ these char-
acteristics will have serious implications for the prospect of what social capital 
means in a digitally networked environment.
Operating behind the social aspects of social networks is the ongoing engine 
of generating profit from user sharing and participation, and this through 
advertising (John 2013). The appearance of the social functions as a kind of 
shell around a mechanistic, almost cybernetic process by merging the tech-
nical with the social, creating a form of social engineering (van Dijck 2013). 
Moreover, various theorists have found evidence and made compelling argu-
ments that the real outcome of online social activity tends toward extracting 
the surplus value from creative activities (Fuchs 2008), and to thus perpetuate a 
cycle of exploitation of free labour (Terranova 2000, 2004). These acts of exploi-
tation by large, corporately owned and controlled social media render moot 
many of the supposed empowering benefits of social media usage.
There is no shortage of those, such as Clay Shirky (2008) or danah boyd 
(2007) who will sing the praises of social media as being an empowering force 
for those who might not otherwise have as many social opportunities in offline 
life.6 What unites many of these ideas in their more optimistic portrayal of social 
media in terms of its affordances, opportunities and benefits is an emphasis on 
its social character, largely at the exclusion of a critical political economy per-
spective. Yet at the same time, it will not serve to be dismissive of the empower-
ing effects of social media. As the example of The Fossil Forum at the beginning 
of this chapter demonstrates, it is possible to create and participate in digital 
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spaces that are community-centred and empowering rather than exploitative 
and alienating.
In smaller networks that do not make use of social buttons for the purpose 
of accumulating likes, online social capital may operate differently. Rather than 
numeric markers, social capital may be gained in a more narrative form such 
as repeated demonstration of expertise about a subject, kindness, reciprocity 
and sharing. In such cases it is difficult to apply a numeric measurement to the 
online social capital that is generated in communicative interactions.
When it comes to online social capital, some industries and organisations pre-
fer to have something more tangible they can measure, and possibly exploit for 
the purposes of manipulation. Those who seek to invest in strategies and tactics 
to optimise online social capital growth as linked with human capital (particu-
larly in management studies) may prefer to have an empirical basis upon which 
to base their decisions. The relational perspective in social scientific research 
attempts to bridge the gap between understanding the social dynamics of a 
community and in having usable and rigorous empirical tools to map, meas-
ure and apply predictions to any changes in social structure and develop new 
mechanisms or methods to improve connectedness, and enhance trust within 
a community. However, even a more empirical approach still banks on several 
assumptions, not least of which being if social capital is itself amenable to meas-
urement at all. What needs to be asked at every instance is how online social 
capital is measured, and why. If online social capital can be measured, then there 
is a basis upon which it might be managed. The use of metrics provides a tool for 
optimising strategies for the accumulation of online social capital.
If social capital is a resource embedded in our social relations that can be 
mobilised, the ease and speed by which developing connections and sharing 
information occurs in these networks may very well result in a larger volume 
of social capital resources from which to draw upon and mobilise. A greater 
return on temporal investment can potentially be realised due to the viral 
nature of some forms of content sharing.
Online Social Capital: Ownership
Who has ownership of online social capital as a resource? Is it held by individu-
als, in the relations between individuals, or collectively held in common? Is 
online social capital simply a synonym for the influence one can exert as a func-
tion of one’s status, and thus aligned with a discourse on class and power? If so, 
we are back at the foot of the circle whereby social capital’s economic power 
subsumes that of the social, and that the social is purely an instrumentalist 
means of preserving or increasing power.
The social is precisely what it pretends to be: a calculated opportunity in 
times of distributed communication. In the end, the social turns out to 
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be a graph, a more or less random collection of contacts on your screen 
that blabber on and on—until you intervene and put your own statement 
out there. (Lovink 2012, n.p)
Geert Lovink castigates those who have propped up an overly idealistic defini-
tion of the social in social media when it has simply been an effort to inject 
some humanistic notions in something that is properly cybernetic. The chal-
lenge he presents us is not to expand the number of digital humanities pro-
grams, multiply the number of tools or fall back into a nostalgic form of soft 
deconstruction, but to place critical theorists at the helm of enormous tech-
nological programs. Lovink’s bold proposal has considerable merit as it would 
make it possible to address ethical issues right at the design stage, but the reali-
ties seem to mitigate against this as it would mean a relinquishing of control by 
those whose pecuniary interests govern the creation and maintenance of our 
social media network platforms.
In order to better address these questions, it will be necessary to consider the 
other side of the term: social capital from an economic standpoint. From there, 
we will be able to view social capital as part of a nuanced economic and social 
system as social capitalism.
A Social Tool or Numbers Game?
Bourdieu’s definition of social capital is indexed on the social reproduction of 
inequality, set in the broader context of all other forms of capital, whereas for 
Coleman social capital is an available non-financial resource that empowers 
individual agency. Operating between the two definitions would be Putnam, 
who also notes some of the unintended consequences of social capital, particu-
larly among those who have malevolent designs.
As Bourdieu argues, social capital exists in a broader context of other forms 
of capital, but there is now the additional aspect of how online social capital 
operates differently due to the affordances of a digital network structure owned 
and operated by corporate interests. The nature of the online environment does 
seem to allow for a more accelerated accumulation of social capital resources 
due to wider audience reach and the way online social capital can be facilitated 
by social buttons, and in being able to measure our online ‘performance’.
Social media sites have an appreciable impact on what types of online social 
capital we accumulate, and how much. Through algorithms that deliver con-
tent on the basis of a proprietary formula, there is cause for concern that we 
are being served with a very selective worldview based on our interactions in 
these spaces, a form of selective exposure that narrows and filters our perspec-
tives. Moreover, where the accumulation of online social capital becomes an 
end in itself through the pursuit of more friends, followers, retweets, and likes, 
it seems to be less about the social aspects and more about playing a numbers 
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game, competing with others to obtain a high score as proof of popularity and 
social value.
The use of visible metrics obscures the more substantive value of online social 
capital as a truly cooperative and collaborative shared social asset. By ignoring – 
or insisting – on removing the numeric bias, focus might be restored to the 
truly social benefits of interaction and participation by shifting the importance 
away from individuals and back unto a community.
Main Points
•	Pierre Bourdieu’s understanding of social capital is closely aligned with 
cultural capital, and its function is as an instrument of exclusion given its 
connection to economics, and an agent of social reproduction through edu-
cation and broader cultural forces.
•	James Coleman’s definition of social capital places less emphasis on eco-
nomics, and more on the prospects for community empowerment.
•	Both Robert Putnam and Francis Fukuyama indicate where social capital 
can have negative aspects due particularly to groups who disseminate hate 
and exclusion.
•	The algorithmic sorting of our online information on social media sites 
would appear to exacerbate the creation of cliques, as well as produce the 
conditions for selective exposure.
•	Online social capital seems to tend toward quantizing our social rela-
tions while social media sites continue to extract surplus value from these 
exchanges. This presents a parallel series of economic circuits: the online 
social interactions resembling a model of capitalist accumulation, while the 
social media sites that own user content are able to capitalise on these user 
interactions.
•	Although some traditional theories of social capital focus on non-economic 
forms of capital, such as trust and reciprocity, online social capital makes 
those secondary to economic relations.
CHAPTER 2
Online Social Capital as Capital
What is the monetary value of a ‘like’, and how does this factor in our discussion 
of online social capital? In this chapter we examine the economic dimension of 
online social capital and address this issue through the lens of the circuits of 
capitalism.
In Nikolai Gogol’s Dead Souls, the main character Chichikov traverses the 
Russian countryside and offers to buy up the deeds to serfs who had died since 
the last census. Given that the census only occurred every five years, the feudal 
landowners were expected to pay a property tax on the number of serfs they 
owned. Whether or not the serfs lived during those five intervening years, the 
tax was to be paid according to what was reported in the last census. Chichikov, 
who seeks to wed above his social station, lacks sufficient land to win the hand 
of the woman he has chosen. To rectify that situation, he concocts a scheme to 
purchase the deeds to the deceased serfs at a discounted rate and to assume the 
tax obligation. From a purely financial perspective, this makes a lot of sense to 
the landowners who would gladly be rid of the tax burden on deceased prop-
erty. Chichikov’s plan meets some resistance from landowners who find the 
request odd, but eventually he acquires enough virtual property to approach a 
bank and use it to secure a loan to purchase land. What Chichikov has done is 
to leverage artificial wealth to obtain real wealth.
If we were to adapt Gogol’s classic novel for the digital age, Chichikov might 
be in the market for purchasing the services of a sophisticated botnet or click 
farms to boost his online status similar to someone who has many supportive 
followers and numerous likes. Today, click farms are a booming business for 
those seeking to get automated high volume web traffic and click-throughs on 
ad banners. Click Monkeys, a Ukrainian company, specialises in running a ser-
vice that they claim cannot be detected by DoubleClick or Google, and boast-
ing a workforce of about 20,000 who work in four shifts of 5,000, 24 hours a day, 
producing over 84 million page views or clicks.
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Click Monkeys, operating from a tanker ship, claim their services are legal: 
‘the giant tanker ship click farm we have stationed just outside U.S. waters off 
the coast of San Francisco is registered at a Ukrainian berth so we’re not subject 
to any U.S. laws!’ This is but one of hundreds of click farm services, including 
iBuyFans, BoostLikes and Buy Cheap Social. However, with more sophisticated 
detection software, click farms could not as easily rely on computer automated 
clicking, and so resort to using low-paid human labour in major click farm 
hubs in the Philippines, Malaysia, China, India, Bangladesh and Pakistan. A 
random name generator (RNG) produces a list for social media account crea-
tion, and the workers are given their orders for the day, be it to click on a par-
ticular Facebook business page, boost the number of followers of a candidate 
running for office or post comments on popular news sites in large numbers to 
sway public opinion. An article in the Guardian paints a dire portrait of the real 
human cost of purchasing click farming services:
For the workers, though, it is miserable work, sitting at screens in dingy 
rooms facing a blank wall, with windows covered by bars, and some-
times working through the night. For that, they could have to generate 
1,000 likes or follow 1,000 people on Twitter to earn a single US dollar 
(Arthur 2013).
The amount of money generated by click farms globally is not accurately 
known given that many of these farms operate outside of the law and may be 
paid in untraceable cryptocurrency transactions, but the amount would not 
be trivial.
In an updated regulatory filing in 2012, Facebook reported that 83 million – 
or 8.7 per cent of its then-955 million users – were fake or surplus accounts 
(United States Securities and Exchange Commission 2012).7 Not only does this 
potentially point to a rise in the number of services and size of operations in 
managing fake accounts, but it has an impact on Facebook’s credibility in terms 
of selling advertising space. If a certain percentage of Facebook accounts are 
fake, then advertisers may have doubts about the effectiveness of purchasing 
Facebook’s services. Moreover, with the ease by which one can acquire artificial 
followers and likes, this places inflationary pressure on the value of these num-
bers in a ‘like economy’.
As ever more businesses and individuals seek to increase profit, status, 
and brand positioning using social media, the competition for likes, follow-
ers and an abundance of five-star ratings has become a necessity. It is almost 
unthinkable for a business not to operate one or several social media accounts 
to directly connect with customers and conduct its business in the rapidly 
expanding e-commerce market. Moreover, the need to maintain online 
 presence becomes ever more an apparent necessity for artists, musicians, vid-
eographers, designers, and for attaining some degree of social popularity. Our 
Social Capital as Capital 15
Chichikov might acquire a million new (fake) followers, which may attract the 
attention of other users to consider Chichikov someone worthy of following. 
Once Chichikov has achieved his critical mass of followers – many similar to 
the dead serfs purchased in the original novel – he could leverage this artifi-
cial wealth to become a paid influencer to endorse products and services as a 
source of real wealth.
Fungibility: What is the Exchange Rate on a ‘Like’?
When focusing on the ‘capital’ aspect of social capital, in one form or another 
reference is made to an economic understanding of the term. With respect to 
capital, there is always some form of fungibility: the means by which capital 
has a element to be transferred between entities as part of the social relation 
involving exchange. According to Marx, with reference to commodities, the 
conversion takes place courtesy of the underlying ‘guarantee’ of the money 
relation. Every commodity has an exchange value (set by its material and 
labour costs plus a margin of profit, part of which is cycled back into produc-
tion as capital). The problem, identified by James Coleman, would be that 
some instances of social capital do not lend themselves to equivalence; for 
example, a skilled professional in one field cannot be exchanged for a skilled 
professional in another (1994, 302). Moreover, insisting on the word capital 
from a political economy perspective may serve to commit us to an under-
standing of the term as a relation that is mediated by money, and involves the 
creation of surplus value through production.
The argument against this approach may be in the risk of adopting too rigid 
a definition of capital. However, this leaves open a criticism that in order for 
the term to have any definitional value for its operationalisation, we must insist 
on precision. The very term ‘capital’ is an open invitation for political econo-
mists to take it under serious analytical consideration – and with good cause, 
given the capitalist nature of most social media. Ideally, there ought to be some 
things that should not be considered commodities, and thus not reducible to 
the money relation, such as the subjective qualities of human beings. This, how-
ever, is facing a major test in the online world where ever more social media 
users are caught up in self-commodification, such that the content they pro-
duce (and the personal data they furnish) is a form of commodity for the social 
media network platform, and as there is widespread selling of experiences-as-
commodities. ‘Labour produces not only commodities: it produces itself and 
the worker as a commodity–and does so in the proportion in which it pro-
duces commodities generally’ (Marx 1972 [1844], 69). What is the commodity 
in the online ‘playbour’ of the networker where there is no clear employer? Is 
the commodity the individual actively reproducing her or himself as a digital 
product? Is it the data that is generated through every interaction?
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Three Forms of Exchange: User-As-Commodity,  
User-Generated Commodity, and ‘Rent’
In online social environments, there are three forms of commodity that enter 
into some form of exchange: the user-as-commodity, the user-generated com-
modity and the ‘rent’ paid by companies for advertising space. Much more than 
simply enabling the production of content that becomes part of social circula-
tion and exchange online, the producer becomes a digital ‘object’ of continual 
production.
Social media profiles and their connections may be considered a form of 
virtuosic score. That these social media profiles will be in most cases piloted 
by actual network users also means these users are performing a kind of 
 production by furnishing new content and acting as cross-syndicators who 
distribute the content of others over the network. The posting and sharing 
of one’s creative productions, knowledge, opinion, and experience may all be 
classed within the general intellect of the social networkers who participate in 
the social networking ‘hive.’ As such, the users are virtuosos who produce and 
distribute content without being paid a wage to do so. Paolo Virno describes 
virtuosity in this way:
Virtuosic performance, which never gives rise to a finished work, in this 
case cannot even presuppose it. It consists in making Intellect resonate 
precisely as attitude. Its only ‘score’ is, as such, the condition of possibil-
ity of all ‘scores.’ This virtuosity is nothing unusual, nor does it require 
some special talent. One need only think of the process whereby some-
one who speaks draws on the inexhaustible potential of language (the 
opposite of a defined ‘work’) to create an utterance that is entirely of the 
moment and unrepeatable (Virno 2006, 189).
Enticed to make frequent declarative statements with status updates, explicit or 
implicit endorsements of products and services etc., the user both produces the 
content necessary for the social environment as well as producing the self as a 
perpetual work-in-progress product. To the extent that the user and the user’s 
content production become commodities, there is some form of value attrib-
uted to each by the social network host for the purposes of selling advertising. 
The work need not ever be complete, as the network host can draw value from 
each action a social network user makes – be it the clicking on content or its 
production – for it all feeds directly into the system as usable and saleable data. 
As a social network user develops or changes over time, so too does the accu-
mulation of data in building a better data profile of each user, courtesy of being 
able to automate the detection of trends or patterns in user behaviour. Even 
the non-work component of a social media user’s profile has value: when an 
adolescent comes of university age, relocated to a different country, or become 
middle-aged, said users can be placed in different ‘buckets’ and targeted with 
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demographic-specific advertising. The user is a user-as-commodity as data can 
be obtained and refined for surveillance and marketing purposes. The state 
at which the user engages in production and consumption then adds the sec-
ond aspect, the user-generated commodity. Both of these may be considered 
the market-facing aspect of social media environments, conducted in full view 
of the social network’s users. The more hidden and proprietary aspects occur 
‘under the hood’ or behind closed doors, such as in the sifting and sorting of 
data, in the algorithmic visibility of content, and through the sale of data to 
third party advertisers.
‘Rent’ in virtual spaces is paid by two main ‘tenants’ to the social networking 
service: (i) the user through their abstract social labour, who can make use of 
the service to have a unique profile and interact with others and, (ii) businesses 
and marketing firms who purchase advertising space on the site, tailored to 
data matching between the users’ data and the desired market segment. For 
the second kind of ‘tenant,’ there may be a tier structure whereby a company 
may purchase increased exposure, better targeted demographics, or premium 
analytic tracking tools for an increased rate.
The relationship social networking services have with the two ‘tenant’ groups 
does not qualify as rent if by rent we mean a piece of property that is leased 
by a rentier. What problematises the rent model is partly the nature of fixed 
capital associated with rent: a property owner has a fixed number of physical 
properties, or a car rental service has only so many vehicles in its fleet. Major 
social networking companies may have some form of finite space, but server 
space expansion is not a significant barrier, particularly when an almost infinite 
surplus value can be extracted from a large user base.
Among several reasons why large social networking services like Facebook 
cannot be characterised as rentiers, Fuchs tells us:
Facebook invests money into production and constantly lets users pro-
duce data commodities in order to sell ever more advertisements and 
accumulate ever more capital. Facebook is first and foremost an adver-
tising company: it lets its users produce ever more data and ever more 
commodities in order to accumulate ever more capital. Such a dynamic 
process of accumulation of use-values, surplus-labour, surplus-prod-
ucts, commodities and money capital cannot be found in the case of a 
rentier. (2015a, 35)
Fuchs (2010, 190) points out that the content generated by users (informational 
content) is a commodity produced by user labour that has an exchange value for 
the social networking service. However, even the issue of whether users are per-
forming labour at all is still in contention, given the nature of the ‘goods’ pro-
duced by users that can be reproduced without the further labour of the user.
Rigi and Prey (2015, 398) disagree with Fuchs’ formulation because the 
exchange value of informational content is not a factor since the nature of 
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digital information has replicability, and can be transported at a negligible cost. 
The labour time involved in the initial production of informational content 
may be considerable, but its reproduction is not if it can be done easily and will 
not require any additional social labour time by the user. Rigi and Prey argue 
that there can be no exchange value for informational content because it is not 
a commodity in its initial produced state, and no surplus value can therefore 
be extracted. They do, however, admit that it is possible that such information 
can be converted into a commodity with an exchange value when processed 
and sold to advertisers, but that this takes the form of a service rather than a 
good such as information. The automated means of obtaining, sifting and sort-
ing that information permits large social networking services like Facebook 
to generate surplus value in the form of profit. In sum, the surplus value is 
generated from the processing of information, not in the raw material form of 
information produced by user labour. Moreover, Rigi and Prey argue that the 
exchange values involved in technological and labour inputs to produce the 
informational content do not appear in the final reproduced product, and so 
there is no exchange value to speak of.
Firstly, this may present a slippery slope insofar as it may also come to justify 
the exploitation of any number of content producers – be the content apps, 
digital books, online newspapers or digital music – as digital piracy partially 
operates on the premise that it is not theft, given that the material costs for 
replicability are negligible and not directly exploitative.
Secondly, although Rigi and Prey’s critique of Fuchs appears to short-circuit 
any claim to the generation of surplus value contingent upon the exploitation 
of online prosumers since the informational content has no exchange value, we 
might refer to Fuchs and Sevignani (2013) who speak of the inverse commodity 
whereby the commodity itself (data) remains largely concealed from the user 
behind the notions of gift reciprocity and 'the social' that these social media 
sites extol for its users as a means to encourage content production and partici-
pation, which ultimately increases the ability of social media sites to engage in 
acts of accumulation.
Thirdly, as Fuchs (2015b, 119) says, the major blindspot in this debate about 
whether or not digital labour is being exploited is understanding the key dif-
ferences Marx himself makes between different forms of labour as produc-
tive or unproductive. To gain a better foothold on what is at stake in this 
debate, Fuchs draws from a careful reading of Marx three types of productive 
labour: labour that produces use-values, labour that produces both capital 
and surplus-value and collective labour that also produces both capital and 
surplus-value. Perhaps one of the more telling fragments, most amenable as 
an analogy to social media users’ (un)productive labour, would be what Marx 
says of actors:
Actors are productive workers, not in so far as they produce a play, but 
in so far as they increase their employer’s wealth. But what sort of labour 
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takes place, hence in what form labour materializes itself, is absolutely 
irrelevant for this relation.(Marx, Theory of Surplus Labour 1857/8, 328–9, 
qtd. in Fuchs 2015a, 136)
There is an analogical link between actors, performers and buskers to that of 
social media users as virtuosos. Although the social media site does not dictate 
the script (beyond proscribing some actions and expressions identified in the 
terms of service) it owns the stage, the content; it can advertise and modify for 
whatever reasons it deems fit, and charge admission. The admission in this case 
is two-fold: a ‘free’ admission to other users to view the content and produce 
their own, and a kind of ‘backstage pass’ to third-party advertisers in the form 
of curated network data. However, unlike a theatre owner and actors, the lat-
ter of whom will be paid a wage from the proceeds of the admission price, the 
users on social media are not paid a wage and would qualify in Marx’s render-
ing as self-employed individuals. Even if there may be a debate over whether 
social media users’ content production and participation (both of which involve 
labour time) is productive or unproductive for the users, it still generates a sur-
plus value for the social media site that takes the use value of the users them-
selves (data) and transforms it into a commodity, and thus can be considered 
exploitative (of both individual and collective labour on these networks). What 
is highly problematic in this debate on productive versus unproductive labour 
is the amorphous character of production, consumption and distribution in the 
age of networked, neoliberal capitalism as opposed to the more straightforward 
relations in industrial capitalism.
It could be argued that the user is ‘paid’ for her or his labour by being granted 
access to the service in exchange for granting the network exclusive license 
to use and distribute all content as the network sees fit. Is it not the case that 
the social media service provides ample opportunity for play and leisure? In 
such a case, there is no justification for any user to demand a percentage of 
the proceeds generated from the selling of data or the time spent in leisure as 
a ‘licensing fee’ or royalty is being paid in the form of a service for being social 
in an online context, with a wide range of tools and affordances to facilitate it. 
Moreover, as major social media sites operate according to a business model, 
they are indexed on profit, but also need to generate sufficient revenue to pay 
employees and make improvements to the service.
There are problems with this view. One of the most significant is the steady 
blurring of the lines between labour and leisure. Trebor Scholz (2013) uses the 
term ‘playbour’ to describe this merger. Although many users on social media 
may view their actions – everything from clicking on content, to producing 
content for others to consume – as a form of leisure, it is a form of additional 
(rather than necessary) labour time. Such forms of digital play have become 
entrenched and normalised to such an extent that it may not trigger aware-
ness among many users that their actions are being transformed into a data 
commodity to which they gain no remuneration. For those with the material 
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advantages to participate in online leisure activities such as these, it may not 
seem like work, but still arguably qualifies as such. This blurring occurs when 
‘knowledgeable consumption of culture is translated into excess productive 
activities that are pleasurably embraced and at the same time often shamelessly 
exploited’ (Terranova 2013, 37).
Not all social media use is play, or even playbour. Perhaps less acknowledged 
would be that class of workers who use social media as part of necessary labour 
time where social media becomes a site of labour for those who are employed 
to manage a company’s social media account. If these same people also operate 
their own personal social media accounts during their leisure hours, these sites 
become a source for two avenues of potential exploitation. When an employee 
of a company is tasked with the company’s social media accounts, there is con-
siderable labour that takes place, including the development of new content, 
managing the account, and interacting with other users.
The user’s productive labour power consumed by the network platform leads 
to a discrepancy between that expended power and that of the value or price 
that is derived from that labour: surplus value. As there is no wage paid to the 
user, the costs of production in terms of variable capital expenditure is limited 
to those who are directly employed by the social media company. On one hand, 
the user may participate in the enjoyment of her or his production, as well as 
that of others, just so long as access to the devices and services remain afford-
able. In other words, the user can produce and consume the product of her 
or his labour as opposed to not being able to afford to do so. However, on the 
other hand, the product of this labour does not belong to the user, but to the 
SNS company.
It is important to reiterate Fuchs and Sevignani’s point that the relationship 
in this circuit (users, social media company and advertisers) is not one of rent. 
We might instead employ the more apt term of factorage. The role of the factor 
during the colonial period in the US and Britain differs from commission or 
rent whereby the factor would own the goods to be sold without revealing the 
principal. A site like Facebook owns the content and the data they derive from 
users, and sells the data to the purchaser (advertiser) without revealing the 
identities of the users from which the data was obtained. In return, Facebook 
uses its platform to target the advertising to the users.
Circuits and Circulation
Nick Dyer-Witheford identifies four main segments along capitalism’s circuit, 
effectively refurbishing Marx’s concept: production itself, the reproduction of 
labour power, reproduction of nature and circulation (1999, 92). The smooth 
flow of capital depends on a heavier reliance on digital networks to better 
integrate each of these segments, and it does so through a variety of means, 
be it the proselytising of digital networks, market-intensification, concealing 
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productive labour behind the veil of play, or the further despoliation of nature 
in the resource extraction, manufacturing and disassembly of digital devices. 
The focus here will be to read online social capital through these circuits and its 
position in the process of circulation.
If online social capital is something that is produced through circulation, 
what is being circulated? The short answer would be to state that online social 
capital is the circulation of virtual (intangible) goods in terms of an exchange, 
and that one or both parties in that exchange may gain an advantage. Something 
is being exchanged here in terms of heterogeneous goods that may or may not 
come under the unifying index of price. If online social capital is the raw vir-
tual profit gained by an exchange, we may ask how it is reinvested, or if there 
is a standard or fluctuating price associated with content. This may be highly 
circumstantial, for a user whose content receives n number of likes or retweets 
may derive a different ‘sum’ of online social capital than another user who 
receives the same n. We would also have to factor in the labour in the produc-
tion of the content, however minimal; for example, the up-votes on a video by 
a user playing Bach on a pipe organ would have to factor in the time, training 
and money involved in becoming adept at the pipe organ, whereas a video with 
the same up-votes featuring a squirrel chasing a cat is a serendipitous capture 
of an event uploaded to a site, not involving a tremendous amount of labour 
or training cost. Factoring on the production cost of the event alone, the pipe 
organist may have had to rent a music hall to perform Bach, and the other user 
was simply walking through a public park.
In the second volume of Capital, Marx identifies the three-stage process of 
capital circulation. In the first stage, the capitalist converts money into com-
modities (M–C); in the second the capitalist puts the commodities into the 
production process, thereby creating commodities of a higher value (P); and 
finally the capitalist converts the new commodities into money (C’–M’), from 
which the cycle begins again. The intervening step in this process is both the 
purchase of labour power and the means of production, both of which are nec-
essary for the conversion of the commodity (C) into a higher value commodity 
(C’), where the net gain of profit is derived from the surplus value generated in 
this conversion.
This formula (M–C > L / MP) is entirely suited to the conditions of industrial 
capitalism, but will differ in a social media environment where each user may 
simultaneously be the commodity and the labour power. The circuit begins 
with the social media platform and the initial investment in the purchase of 
labour power (L) in the form of software specialists and the means of produc-
tion (MP) in the form of hardware, offices, services, etc. This resembles the 
industrial capitalist circuit. In the end, the value-enhanced commodity is the 
social network itself (C’). However, what has been built is the virtual infrastruc-
ture, the factory space for what will be the additional phase of this circuit: the 
‘purchase’ of the labour power in the form of new users to produce the content 
for this network. Until then, the network itself is an empty frame devoid of 
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content. The means of production is partially supplied by the network in the 
form of the actual network space and user interface, but not entirely: users still 
need to purchase the digital devices and the connection services via an inter-
net service provider even to access this virtual factory, just as a worker might 
have to purchase a vehicle to commute to work. The users produce with their 
labour (L’) the next commodity, which is content. However, in this process the 
network is converted into a partial means of production for the users who will 
ultimately supply the final commodity in the chain: data. This data is then sold 
by the network platform and converted into the money form.
The network as commodity form is two-faced insofar as, on the one hand, 
it becomes a partial means of production for user labour, but it is also a com-
modity in its own right as what it sells to the user (in this case, a prosumer of 
content) is the services related to the network ‘experience.’ In this simplified 
formulation, there are two levels of labour power: the cognitive labour of com-
puting professionals to create the network, and the creative-cognitive labour of 
users to populate the network with content.
 L L
M - C < — - C’ < — - C”
 MP MP’
M = Money Form; C = Commodity Form; L = Labour Power (cognitive labour of the 
designers, engineers, et al); MP = Means of production (hardware such as servers, soft-
ware, offices, etc.); C’ = Network Infrastructure; L’ = Cognitive and creative labour of 
users; MP’ = Means of production among users (network infrastructure + devices and 
internet service provider); C’’ = user-generated content converted into data and sold to 
advertisers.
In this formulation, the commodity form sold directly to advertisers is repre-
sented by matching the data against available advertising space on the network. 
However, there are another two levels that speak to how this circuit operates. As 
users generally do not pay a subscription fee to use the social media network’s 
services, the trade-off is user data, which takes the place of the money form in 
this relation. In exchange, the consumption of the service may be marketed as 
‘experience.’ Experience is sold back to the users by way of targeted advertising 
whereby the users are invited to purchase an object or service as something 
to enhance their own experience according to expressed consumer tastes. The 
final stage occurs within this circuit from the user-end, and involves online 
social capital and its generation. Users may seek to convert their offline expe-
riences (for example, travel) and labour (cognitive and creative) into online 
social capital, generally expressed numerically through counters and facilitated 
by the use of social buttons. The generation of social capital can involve increas-
ing the size of one’s personal network, which can be considered a benefit to the 
social media network as it may enrich the data being produced and facilitate 
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cross-syndication; the user can produce new content of interest to other users 
(creative, experiential, cognitive), which in the process of its being published 
on the social network grants the social network ownership of that production – 
insofar as the terms of service dictate that they have the right to distribute, mar-
ket, alter and modify it in any way they so choose. The symbolic aspect of social 
capital generation takes the form of numeric counters whereby, for example, 
a user’s content on Facebook is paid in the form of likes by other users. These 
represent a token wage that has no exchange value with any other currency, 
yet it is still a form of work. For the social media network and the advertiser, 
the economic values are indexed more on the volume of activity – both as a 
sum of all network user production and participation, and the sum of each 
user’s production and participation. Value in this instance is obtained through 
a mass general intellect, a sum total of all users’ creative and cognitive labour in 
the production and cross-syndication of content. In this exchange, rather than 
the traditional formula whereby the labourer sells her or his labour power in 
exchange for a wage (L–M), the user sells the raw commodity (user-generated 
labour, experience, and data) in exchange for the benefits of the network ser-
vice. As a ‘value-added’ perk, the user’s production of the self as commodity 
can result in the gain of online social capital, which should not be mistaken for 
the money form (wage or profit). Occupying the space and not regularly con-
tributing and participating in the network (interacting with other users, pro-
ducing content) may result in quickly diminishing returns as the algorithm that 
populates each user’s newsfeed may become populated with more active users. 
Given the fast-paced nature of content creation from a large user base, one’s 
content can quickly fall ‘below the fold’ whereby the relevance of the content 
becomes determined by its visibility. This will have an impact on one’s online 
social capital, and so an increase in user-generated production and participa-
tion is a sufficient condition for increasing online social capital. The sufficient 
condition may also be contingent upon a variety of strategies and tactics that 
can be employed to increase online social capital. Why we do not claim that 
production and participation is a necessary condition might be on account of 
one’s offline forms of gaining social capital and popularity, some of which may 
generate conversation on social networks by other users. An Olympic medallist 
may not have to take a selfie or broadcast a win if other users are making men-
tion of it on the social network.
In order for the social network to be profitable, the initial money that was 
invested at the beginning of the cycle must not only be recouped in the sale of 
the commodity, but that the commodity form will be of a higher value due to 
productive labour. The labour must have produced surplus value, or C’ = C + c 
(where c = the surplus value extracted from the productive labour). In the ideal 
circumstances, a portion of the surplus value is reinvested in the circuit of pro-
ductive capital, and may include–in the case of a social media network –  better 
hardware, software, data curation methods, marketing and optimising user 
interface for both ease of use and more efficient data capture. Data, furnished 
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by users through their productive labour and self-commodifying activities, is 
the commodity that is sold and converted into money. This is very much in line 
with the traditional formula; however, the difference is the second step of pro-
duction after the in-house labour, that of users whose labour is unwaged and 
thus has a surplus value delimited by the size of the network, the connections 
on that network, and the participation and production of its user base.
The users provide two specific enhancements to the network commodity 
through their activity. The first is in supplying content, which creates the ‘sub-
stance’ within the network’s framework. The second occurs when users comply 
with ever more invasive yet innocuous-seeming requests for data. For example, 
when Facebook introduced its timeline feature in 2012, ostensibly marketed to 
users as a means of curating their own content and posting items known as ‘Life 
Events.’ Users could then fill in significant events that may have occurred prior 
to their subscribing to Facebook. Apart from the possibly disturbing question 
of slotting one’s pre-Facebook life events into the neatly arranged timeline 
interface, it provides an immense trove of data for Facebook where it can pro-
duce a much more refined data profile of the user based on a longer timeline 
to use for predictive purposes. What may seem innocuous, such as posting a 
pleasant memory from the distant past, becomes valid data for marketing.
The social media user is positioned in this case as a kind of entrepreneur 
who, as part of the circuit of capital, reinvests earned online social capital with-
out there being an obvious equivalence between these numeric forms of online 
social capital and money-capital. Encouraging more participation and devis-
ing means by which to entice users to provide more personal data are profit-
able inputs into the social network’s capitalist circuit. The lure at the user-end 
may partly be the promise of increasing online social capital, as it may seem 
to engage in a game of probabilities: producing more content might increase 
the chance of that content becoming visible to other users, and thus a higher 
chance of receiving coveted likes. A larger investment of labour time spent on 
social media might increase the odds of larger returns.
What remains problematic is that this online social capital, as capital, can-
not be reinvested according to the traditional circuit of capital. However, let us 
assume for the sake of argument that online social capital, expressed numerically 
through  volume via the use of social buttons, is its own distinct micro-economy 
of accumulation. We already know that this micro-economy is plugged into the 
actual economy of the social media platform’s generation of capital as discussed 
above. If we take these numeric expressions as the money form, it is evident that 
‘more is better’ with respect to accumulation.
Online Symbolic Capital
Online social capital shares a border with symbolic capital and how it gets rein-
vested. The nature of symbolic capital is convertible; that is, earning prestige 
Social Capital as Capital 25
in one area may be converted to another area. An accomplished athlete may 
leverage this renown to become a popular public figure to endorse a prod-
uct, a highly regarded astronaut may run for public office, and even a popular 
YouTuber may make the leap to becoming a reality TV show star. In follow-
ing on from Max Weber’s analysis of status, Thorstein Veblen (2010 [1899]) 
explored the intersection of class and status, and in particular the habits of the 
wealthy elite to display that status through conspicuous consumption. Pierre 
Bourdieu (1984) argued that class differences are expressed as symbolic differ-
ences, thus perpetuating inequality. Depending on the social space, these forms 
of capital will be distributed differently. The old models of class still prevail on 
social media as established celebrities and other public figures maintain a pres-
ence there with numerous followers and considerable attention, but given the 
‘democratisation’ of the web, this has contributed to a softening or shifting of 
regard for traditional authorities so that it is not just the experts and elites 
who hold sway in public discourse. Although this may represent a significant 
change, divisions online still exist along class, gender, race and linguistic lines.
Considering the symbolic capital differences on social media along the lines 
of online social capital, those who already have wealth and status have an easier 
time acquiring more online social capital due to their being popular or well 
regarded. Popular figures such as Justin Bieber, Katy Perry or Donald Trump 
can very easily acquire new followers, retweets, likes and favourites. However, 
if we consider an ‘average user,’ their accumulation of online social capital may 
also signal an opportunity to leverage this for other purposes, although there is 
no clear line between gaining likes and followers, and achieving a higher status 
in another field. In some cases, this does occur, such as in the case of micro-
celebrities on social media who are able to leverage their popularity on social 
media to endorse products and services for money.
Metrics such as likes and followers are a form of currency by which one 
user can be compared to another. If it is a form of currency, it is certainly one 
that can be manipulated, such as in the use of click farms. How many likes are 
‘enough’ on a post to be viewed as having value, according to those who will rely 
on these measures as being equivalent to value? What of inflationary pressures 
on this currency? User X produces an interesting post with an associated album 
on Facebook regarding her vacation to Jamaica. It is her hope that, in convert-
ing the experience into a digital format, it will be of interest to her network. 
She has successfully converted her class-based symbolic capital in being able 
to afford a luxury vacation to her online social advantage. The network users 
connected to User X respond with likes and comments, and this may drive 
popularity as it appears in more users’ newsfeeds courtesy of the proprietary 
algorithm. User X accumulates, say, 1,000 likes and is now more prominently 
featured in the newsfeed of other users in the network. Let us now assume two 
scenarios: in the first, the activity the post has generated attracts the attention 
of a celebrity who also visits and likes the posting, the result of which gener-
ates an even higher volume of likes. In the second scenario, User X feels 1,000 
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likes is insufficient attention for the post and so opts to purchase the services 
of a company that will auto-generate them using either bots or actual persons 
who are hired to promote content. In the first case, it is less about the intrinsic 
value of the post that merited the surge in ‘likes,’ but the influence of a well-
known person created the conditions of a social herding effect, not unlike a 
celebrity endorsement of a product or service. In the second scenario, User X 
has purchased what are effectively counterfeit forms of social currency. The sec-
ond scenario may be more pernicious in terms of inflationary pressure on the 
individual value of each ‘like’. Moreover, it also demonstrates another avenue by 
which online social capital plugs into the actual economy through the develop-
ment and purchasing of services to artificially generate online social capital. If 
social capital, numerically expressed, can be seen as a competition to acquire a 
large quantity, we have only to recall Marx’s warning that the creation of surplus 
value will inevitably lead to inequalities. In the games of social capital, there are 
clear ‘winners and losers.’ As competition over this value may increase, so too 
may less savoury social strategies be employed to gain the advantage, such as 
aggressive forms of competition for attention.
The depreciation effect of online social capital numerically expressed is also 
part of the economic relation. A piece of content from a year ago that may 
have garnered a large number of likes does not retain its initial value. Unlike a 
piece of machinery that will depreciate in value from use, the content does not 
undergo any physical depreciation: someone’s tweet or Facebook post is not 
subject to wear and tear over time. Its value diminishes for a variety of reasons, 
which may include relevance, but also its availability for immediacy and expo-
sure in a large social graph. Even if the content is ‘yesterday’s news,’ it may still 
be relevant.8 However, what is unique to online social capital would be the fact 
that the apparent numeric value does not go down, nor is its value diminished 
in relation to new content that has more or less likes. At the point the content 
is no longer accessed, that numeric value remains identical for as long as it is 
data housed on a server and still technically accessible by others. It may be a 
more useful analogy in considering the numeric value like a video game score, 
particularly of the older arcade variety where the prize for achieving a certain 
score is simply being afforded the opportunity to keep playing. And, just like a 
top score, the number itself does not diminish, but instead raises the bar for a 
bare minimum to be achieved in order to be on the leaderboard.
The content’s numeric value cannot be exchanged for some other content. A 
thousand likes is not like a thousand units that can be converted in a typical 
currency market. One cannot convert it, insure it like property, or leverage a 
certain amount to obtain a loan like our friend Chichikov. Instead, it becomes 
a static numeric value that has no explicit monetary exchange value. It may, 
however, be ‘resurrected’ value in the case of politics where a muckraker may 
retrieve an old tweet by a political candidate for purposes of embarrassment or 
sabotage. In that case, there is no additional value added to the original content 
except as secondary reference.
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The numeric markers for online social capital seem to exist outside the laws 
of supply and demand. There is no serious issue with supply. Given that there 
is a finite number of human beings on earth, a percentage of which have access 
or interest to ‘like’ a piece of content as a means of conferring a value upon it, 
then supply is technically finite. However, the creation of multiple accounts 
and the processes by which the system can be gamed using automated ‘liking’ 
services such as click farms allows for gaming the system and inflating supply. 
When some websites claim to peg a value on each ‘like’, ranging from zero to 
hundreds of dollars, we must question how they might have arrived at those 
values given the potentially unlimited supply available, and if the value arrived 
at is applicable to all content regardless of how old it might be.9
In terms of ‘exchange’, one’s online social capital ‘score’ does present at least 
an indirect convertible value for those who work in social media marketing, 
public relations, or in the ICT sector where some applicants may be asked to 
provide proof of their social media skills by including their Klout score.
With a profusion of services for marketers and influencers, the use of scores 
and rankings will generally measure audience reach, follower engagement and 
cross-syndication. How these rankings are calculated is not always very clear, 
relying on proprietary algorithms. For instance, klout.com describes its calcu-
lation method in this way:
We measure multiple pieces of data from several social networks, and 
also real world data from places like Bing and Wikipedia. Then we apply 
them to our Klout Score algorithm, and then show the resulting number 
on your profile. The higher your Klout Score, the tougher it becomes to 
increase. (klout.com).
Other sites, such as Webfluential, go as far as to put a dollar figure on the value 
of each post. The methodology for calculating this value remains within a black 
box, ostensibly to dissuade gaming the system unfairly.
What is meant by these monetary values given that one cannot simply 
exchange the content (as commodity) for money? To be charitable, it may refer 
to the increase in potential financial advantage in selling products or services: a 
person with a million followers may be able to maximise her or his audience if 
said user publishes a book or an album. This does not speak to the supply side 
of this question, and the potential availability of infinite likes may be akin to 
printing money, and yet there seems to be no runaway inflationary pressures 
on the value of each ‘like’ given that their designated value (by these websites) 
appears to assume a common value for each ‘like’, not taking into considera-
tion other factors that exert influence over the value, such as novelty effect, 
exposure, etc.
The supply of likes is potentially infinite, and so is the demand. However, the 
question of value remains. Given that numerically expressed online social capital 
can succumb to over-accumulation, and a lack of opportunities for reinvesting 
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it, this is likely to result in the ultimate devaluation of that capital. How does one 
remobilise online social capital in order to acquire more?
Monetary deals are occasionally brokered between users with a high numeric 
value of social capital and the host network. The more commonly known exam-
ple would be YouTube which offers content creators with a high view rate based 
on CPM (cost per thousand impressions).
How this works is that advertising is matched to content, and the content 
producer gets a percentage – but only if the viewer clicks on the ad or watches 
the entire ad. If a viewer clicks ‘skip this ad,’ the content producer does not get 
paid. The CPM is paid by the advertiser, but YouTube takes a 45 per cent cut, 
leaving the content producer with RPM (revenue per thousand impressions). 
This is calculated as follows: earnings divided by monetised playbacks multi-
plied by 1,000. However, the CPM can vary according to type of content and 
viewer demographic, resulting in a range of fifty cents to ten dollars. So, let us 
assume a $1.00 CPM rate on a piece of video content receiving a million views. 
Assume further that only 10 per cent of those viewers engage the ad content 
with a click or watch the entire ad. That leaves a CPM rate of 100,000. At a 
dollar each, we are left with $100. Deduct YouTube’s 45 per cent cut, and the 
content producer is left with $55 for a million views. If we were to treat each 
view of the content (not the advertisement) as an ‘admission price’, the content 
producer has received 5.5/1000th of a cent for each view. It then becomes the 
responsibility of the content producer to encourage watching or clicking on the 
ad, not the content.
Compare this with major Hollywood productions. With any potential block-
buster there are very significant upfront costs for development, production 
(including pre- and post), crew wages, the cast and directors (generally calcu-
lated on speculation based on contingent compensation pending how well the 
film grosses). There are also print costs, marketing, residuals and different rev-
enue inputs (theatre, pay-per-view, DVDs, streaming licenses, etc). According 
to Stephen Follows (2016), just as many blockbusters make a modest profit as 
those that fail. The major difference, apart from an economy of scale, would be 
that the average YouTube content producer may not have such upfront costs 
and so might technically be able to derive a bit more profit. However, it is not 
the case that there is a 50 per cent success rate on profit for YouTubers, and that 
profit percentages do not resemble those of Hollywood successes. Ten million 
viewers of one’s YouTube clip do not net the same profit (adjusted against lower 
costs) than ten million viewers of a Hollywood blockbuster.
The accumulation of online social capital through numeric counters repro-
duces the mechanics of capitalism’s instrumentalist and rational self-interest 
mindset as one might find in many popular video games indexed on character-
levelling and loot accumulation. Moreover, these mechanics are reproduced 
across social media space, be it in the unpaid labour of the YouTube’s Heroes 
Program where users are given points to ‘level up’ in performing crowdsourced 
activities for flagging content, Yahoo!’s comment section on news items with its 
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reputation scoring system, or similar crowdsourced services where badges or 
other social tokens take the place of a wage for performing forum-based labour. 
Levelling up, earning social ‘prestige’ by numerically based accumulation, digi-
tal ‘badges,’ and so forth point to the gamification of online social interaction, 
but also the exploitation of unwaged labour.
Do accumulators of online social capital benefit from some form of com-
pounding interest? Yes and no. Someone who has accumulated a large number 
of followers, and has a recognised track record of producing content others 
enjoy and benefits from the algorithm by which the user’s new content appears 
in other users’ social feed, can potentially leverage these for an increase on 
future reinvestment. It is no secret that the socially rich get richer, putting paid 
to the optimistic notion that those who are less popular in offline environ-
ments will have an almost guaranteed surge in popularity online as many of the 
offline barriers such as appearance, location or ethnicity can be lifted. Despite 
numerous exceptions, those who possess the skills for social popularity tend to 
migrate those skills to the online environment.
But what drives those in pursuit of social capital? Why do they not simply 
repose in the numerically-assigned figure of their online social capital and 
‘retire’? Firstly, there is no cash-out mechanism; one cannot simply exchange 
the number of Facebook likes or connections for money. Secondly, reinvest-
ment of social capital to gain more increases apparent social power in ways that 
cannot be expressed in other forms. As David Harvey points out, ‘the very rich 
cannot own billions of yachts or MacMansions. But there is no inherent limit to 
the billions of dollars an individual can command’ (2011, 43).
There is a curious stability to online social capital due to the ‘long tail’. 
Unlike certain sectors dominated by oligopolies in telecommunications, auto- 
manufacturing or banking, the failure of the most popular nodes in the  network 
does not imperil the network to failure. In this social ‘market’, if extremely suc-
cessful users like Justin Bieber or Kim Kardashian were to vanish from online 
social networks, others would fill the attention vacuum. In this way, social 
media networks are largely insulated from the failure of individual users, just 
so long as there is a steady supply of users continuing to produce content and 
provide data that can be commodified.
Rise of the Micro-Celebrity
If we calculate a social media user’s specific labour in the production of a mar-
ketable identity to be ‘sold’ to other users and attract attention, it might be 
better distinguished as a form of self-branding. A brand uniquely identifies a 
product or service as distinct from other similar products and services. The 
branding narrative capitalises on what is unique about the product or service, 
while either explicitly or implicitly inviting comparison with similar prod-
ucts and services. In the case of those users who actively seek to create and 
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maintain their digital representation as a form of branding, we might ask what 
they receive in return. There is an apparent use-value to the construction and 
ongoing reputation management of one’s social profile, as it is the online social 
‘face’ of the individual. However, brands generally operate by legal protective 
mechanisms such as trademarks, copyright, and similar forms of property. The 
use of the brand by other entities might entail the paying of licensing fees. In 
the case of online users as brands, there is really no mechanism by which the 
brand ‘holder’ can legally exert that it is under their ownership given that real 
ownership is held by the social networking service. Instead, the act of self-
branding makes the leap from simple use value to an exchange value by par-
ticipating in a social market, the abstract unifying relation that mediates the 
different brands on offer being a different form of price – the numeric counters 
of social buttons as a symbol, for example – in an economy controlled by the 
social networking service.
Despite questions of ownership, this has not dissuaded a number of social 
media users to leverage online social capital to become micro-celebrities. This 
new phenomenon, which appears to shift the creation of celebrity status to an 
achievable end for regular users, is defined as ‘a new style of online perfor-
mance that involves people ‘amping up’ their popularity over the Web using 
technologies like video, blogs and social networking sites’ (Senft 2008, 25). 
A new category of influencers has emerged on social media that are able to 
capitalise on their following to endorse products and services in exchange for 
money. Emerging out of ‘lifestyle blogging,’ Crystal Abidin has traced the rise 
of the microcelebrity influencers, defining them as,
[E]veryday, ordinary Internet users who accumulate a relatively large 
following on blogs and social media through the textual and visual nar-
ration of their personal lives and lifestyles, engage with their following 
in ‘digital’ and ‘physical’ spaces, and monetize their following by inte-
grating ‘advertorials’ into their blogs or social media posts and making 
physical paid-guest appearances at events (2016, 3).
With Instagram being one of the most popular platforms for this kind of adver-
torial method, Abidin further traces the connection between the use of self-
ies and influencing behaviour as a form of subversive frivolity that capitalises 
on online social connections as an entrepreneurial means to market both the 
self and the product to establish a branding presence. Various companies have 
taken notice of how successful online influencers can be for marketing pur-
poses, and influencer management agencies have emerged to act as brokers 
between influencers and companies.
With media exposure on the success of influencers in making considerable 
sums of money, this has generated interest among those who seek to monetise 
their social media activity. Even so, the media availability heuristic will mostly 
focus on stories of success as opposed to numerous failures – a situation not 
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dissimilar to the excitement generated by producing stories about ‘appillion-
aires’, where the focus on a few wildly successful entrepreneurial app developers 
conceals the majority of developers who did not succeed.
There is considerable labour in the process of being an influencer, as it 
involves successfully integrating and embedding the endorsement of a product 
or service with the carefully curated posting of a selfie. Conspicuous product 
placement, product demonstration, photo editing and the like must be con-
ducted in a way that is aesthetically pleasing to an audience as well as main-
taining trust in the individual who is posting the content. What may seem an 
effortless and casual selfie-taking is usually the result of a great deal of prepara-
tion and post-production editing. This labour may also be highly gendered and 
ageist work, with young women between the ages of 18–24 earning more than 
men, and potentially relying on stereotypical conceptions of beauty.
The issue of self-branding is part of a broader post-Fordist and neoliberal 
ideology of valorising the entrepreneur (Hearn 2008; Read 2008; Khamis et al. 
2017). Although the issue of selfies-as-reflexivity and self-branding deserve 
their own specific and more extensive treatment, the purpose here is to  signal 
how self-branding in particular plugs into the capitalist circuit of produc-
tion. In the case of influencers, sponsored posts can be considered a form of 
contract labour. In this process, the influencer transforms the image of the 
self into a saleable commodity by exploiting the high-trust nature of online 
social networks. It is not enough for a social media influencer (SMI) to have 
a large follower base, but to continually grow it using an array of social media 
marketing strategies. On the one hand, the SMI has some degree of free-
dom to design his or her own content, but must be mindful that the client 
receives a good return on investment. On the other hand, the SMI will have 
to absorb the up-front costs associated with the branding activity, including 
the labour time involved in product staging, enhancing images and growing 
their  follower base.
If one of the ideals of social media is to truly emphasise social interaction 
between people as a kind of digital public sphere, the advent of social marketing 
colonises the space, blurring the lines between a user and a brand, while also 
normalising the objectification and commodification of the self.
Liking and the Online Social ‘Market’ – Tracking and Tracing
Social networking services create the conditions of a ‘free’ social market. The 
currency of numeric social capital is not printed by the social networking 
service as if it were a treasury or mint, but it has set up the social currency 
system and manages it in different ways. The stability of this social market is 
partially underwritten by diversification so that if the individual with the most 
numeric social capital vanishes, there are plenty of others who can occupy 
that prime position. Moreover, the social market is buttressed by the collective 
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transactions of social capital of most of its users, engaged in an act of online 
social capital exchange.
It is questionable if the social buttons feature, whether active or not, would 
have a significant bearing on the real economic conditions social networking 
services operate within: they would still sell advertising space, promote their 
own features, grow their user/prosumer base and likely continue to cycle cap-
ital into reinvestment into making improvements as well as expanding their 
reach. However, the addition of the social buttons feature might be an incentive 
for those who seek some numeric basis to engage in accumulation. In some 
cases, the numeric accumulation might be leveraged for monetary gain, as 
in the case of celebrities who might enter into agreements with companies to 
endorse products or services. Moreover, the addition of such social buttons has 
been part of an active strategy by companies like Facebook to multiply interac-
tions, and to better track and trace interactivity for the purposes of increasing 
participation and potential profits.
As Roosendaal (2010) notes, Facebook uses its social buttons to track and to 
trace users by placing cookies on the user’s browser, and this occurs even if the 
user does not interact with the button. Moreover, visitors without a Facebook 
account will also have a cookie placed on their browser, strongly implying that 
Facebook’s data collection goes beyond just its users. This arguably invasive use 
of data collection appears to present a boon to not only corporate interests, but 
furnishes researchers with larger volumes of online behavioural data, a process 
of datafication:
a legitimate means to access, understand and monitor people’s behaviour 
is becoming a leading principle, not just amongst techno-adepts, but 
also amongst scholars who see datafication as a revolutionary research 
opportunity to investigate human conduct (van Dijck, 2014, 198).
What is unique about the metrification of user engagement through social 
buttons and what Gerlitz and Helmond (2013) dub the ‘like economy’, is that 
user intention is not what is being counted, only the end result of engagement. 
The social context of communicative intention, such as liking ‘ironically,’ sub-
stantively or superficially, as an obligation of minimum reciprocity, points to 
a pared down sociality where our ability to decode communicative intent is 
left either to inference or explicit references should the user qualify by adding 
a comment to a post. Gerlitz and Helmond (2013) identify three ways these 
counters have an impact on social media interactions. Firstly, the act of liking 
has a multiplier effect in terms of traffic and engagement, particularly as receiv-
ing and giving likes is likely to perpetuate social activity; secondly, the social 
economy can be scaled (or customised) to each user, but operates across several 
social formations via newsfeeds, etc.; and thirdly, cross-syndication of content 
facilitates content matching through the affordances of the user-recommender 
model of content flow.
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Apart from the serious privacy implications of such track and trace meas-
ures being employed by social media sites, it also sets up a kind of artificial 
social stock market that uses some degree of cybernetic mechanisms to meas-
ure activity, filter data, and sell these data as commodities. While the users are 
‘selling’ their data to social media sites in exchange for opportunities to engage 
in online social activity, such activity is being measured and factored into pre-
dictive models to better refine advertising methods.
The motivation for why users participate in the behaviour of liking – a digital 
signal of endorsement, approval, approbation, reciprocity or social obligation – 
runs a very wide gamut. When Facebook initially introduced the liking feature, 
there was only the single explicit option of liking the content or not recording 
a ‘like’ at all. Some users complained that there was no ‘dislike’ button, but the 
addition of such a feature would diminish the positive experience Facebook 
was trying to promote. It was only recently, in 2016, that Facebook introduced 
the ability to add an emoji to better qualify one’s emotional reaction to content. 
Although this provides more options to qualify our communicative intentions, 
it also strengthens the algorithm in better refining data.
In a survey conducted by Brandtzaeg and Haugstveit (2014), a useful typol-
ogy underpinning the kinds of liking behaviours on Facebook were identified, 
including socially responsible liking, emotional liking, informational liking, 
social performative liking, low-cost liking and routine liking. In each of these 
cases, however, the user is conferring a value on another user’s content (or a 
brand) for others to see. In some cases, this is done strategically: some users 
are politely soliciting the ‘liked’ user to reciprocate out of obligation or flattery, 
while others do so as a status or value statement such as wishing other users 
in the network to see that some user X takes a positive view of some product 
or cause. There are several strategic reasons users may have to confer value 
through social buttons, with some expecting one-to-one reciprocity while oth-
ers seek to be associated with a popular user or popular content that they did 
not produce.
Aggregate Social Capital
In the second volume of Capital, Marx focuses his analysis on how the sphere of 
circulation moves to the sphere of production and then back to that of circula-
tion. By the eighteenth chapter, he considers aggregate social capital, which is 
the sum of all capitals and their relations. Each individual capital circuit is but 
one moving piece in a larger complex of circulation involving both the repro-
duction of capitalist processes in production and that of the capitalist class. It 
is here, however, that we come to a terminological difficulty: the way in which 
social capital has been employed in the sociological literature of the twentieth 
and twenty-first century deviates substantially from how Marx uses it. At best, 
we may point to Bourdieu, who understood that the different forms of capital 
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are interrelated, but the emphasis is not necessarily on production. If there is 
‘reproduction’ of social capital in the literature, it is more the reproduction of 
social norms, sanctions, and opportunities afforded by wealth and status. This 
may satisfy to some extent the Marxist idea of the reproduction of the capital-
ist class and its interests, but does not address the production process from the 
standpoint of labour.
Instead of focusing on the immiseration of labour, much of the literature on 
social capital focuses on the correlative development of human capital (skills, 
education, etc.), which appears to simply assume that the capitalist process is a 
natural one, and that focus is better directed to ways by which one can measure 
and improve social capital in order to obtain benefits in occupational opportu-
nities for advancement, which would then have a potential knock-on effect for 
an increase in social status and wealth.
Online labour itself becomes ever more fragmented and concealed by the 
very working tools employed with an almost fetishistic importance and imbued 
with an almost talismanic power. Although a potentially infinite surplus value 
is still extracted in this scenario from a mass cognitive intellect that becomes 
increasingly global, of equal concern is the extraction of surplus data from these 
computer mediated social interactions or exchanges whereby it is the capital-
ist market with all its powerful corporate interests that are the primary benefi-
ciaries. That individual users who more resemble consumers than citizens may 
‘profit’ by a more extensive degree of access to choices for new or better products 
and services, or may play a part in their redevelopment through online feed-
back processes that companies may monitor, these choices are gridded accord-
ing to consumerism rather than self-actualisation. The profit motive did not 
simply vanish in the informationalisation of society. Despite the utopian claims 
that increased reliance on ICTs would shift the focus away from profit toward 
producing the social and public good, profit still remains the primary motive 
regardless of how it is dressed up in the appearance of sociality. The profit 
motive becomes embedded on social media, but is also sold as a benefit to indi-
vidual users to function as entrepreneurs to exploit these networks in seeking 
their own profit. In some ways, this resembles something of a pyramid scheme. 
Whereas the promise takes on the appearance of distributing profit potential 
across all the nodes in a network, it is the concentration of wealth in fewer hands 
continuing unabated from the time of the captains of industry; in today’s case, 
the captains of industry are the network giants who have discovered novel ways 
of augmenting the producer-consumer relationship whereby the consumer is 
also the producer who assumes the majority of the labour and the risk.
Information society proponents such as Alvin Toffler (1991) claimed that 
the knowledge economy, powered by computers and digital networks, would 
dematerialise labour in such a way that it would be transformed from the fac-
tory floor’s routine drudgery and immiseration into better and more cogni-
tively intensive labour, fails to appreciate the reality of much outsourced labour 
that is still largely routinised even with the integration of digital technologies. 
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That is, the nature of the toil has changed. Whereas ever more of the factory 
work may have dissolved away in increasing deindustrialisation and deskilling 
in once prosperous industrial manufacturing areas such as Detroit’s automo-
bile sector or the industrial heartland of Eastern Germany, we find new forms 
of routinised labour in places such as China, Bangladesh, the Philippines and 
India, where workers assemble digital components for the next wave of digi-
tal devices, or underpaid workers toil in boiler room working conditions and 
spend long shifts in click farms increasing the number of likes or ‘level grind’ 
for Western gamers who have the money to pay others to farm gold on World 
of Warcraft. Even in developed nations there is a surfeit of low-skill, routinised, 
poorly paid jobs that involve digital networks, such as those paid to create false 
and appealing accounts for dating website services.
Rather than dispensing with routinised labour of an industrial age, such 
labour has been reconfigured so that it may be the employment situation 
itself ceases to have any guaranteed routine; that is, the increasing precarity of 
employment on short or zero-hours contracts that make up ever more of the 
labour market. Still, when we consider how routine itself has changed, and the 
extraction of surplus labour, the routines become rituals associated with con-
stant feedback and connection – the office worker who must respond to a flood 
of emails via his or her handheld device during vacation or any time outside 
of regular working hours just to remain on top of workload. In this way, some 
workers find their leisure time colonised by the demands – implicit or explicit – 
of labour, blurring the line between labour and leisure time. On one hand, the 
routine of the punch-clock may be on the decline for these workers, while on 
the other hand a new routine emerges of constantly checking in and managing 
workload outside of regular office time. In many respects, Taylorist scientific 
management has not vanished with the spread of the information age, but has 
been embedded as an intrinsic feature.
Even if we retain the largely functionalist definition of social capital as hav-
ing nested structures involving trust, reciprocity and goodwill, there may still 
be inequality. As Bob Edwards points out, ‘[a]ccess to social capital depends on 
the social location of the specific individuals or groups attempting to appropri-
ate it in much the same way that other forms of capital are differentially avail-
able’ (Edwards and Foley 1997, 677). When ported to digital social networks, 
the question of location takes on less of a physical, geographic meaning and 
more of the order of location within a specific network, the flow of informa-
tion between those network actors, and the in- and outbound reach of content 
from other self-selecting networks. Where issues of geography still come into 
play may be in terms of access to the network, particularly the differences of 
internet service coverage and speed between rural and urban areas with the 
former having less, and thus may have an impact on differential availability of 
online social capital.
In assessing the motivations that give rise to the development of social cap-
ital, off- or online, Portes (1998) identifies these as either consummatory or 
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instrumental; consummatory insofar as they reflect deeply embedded social 
norms, and instrumental insofar as they involve the more economic aspects of 
rational action theory by which individuals perform actions with a view to gain 
advantage or profit. It might be considered more common that those engaged 
in the active, explicit pursuit of increasing social capital do so for instrumental 
reasons and thus for their own benefit (De Graaf and Flap 1988; Burt 1992). 
Rational action and rational choice theory are in themselves essential compo-
nents to the economic theories that underpin neoliberalism, mostly pioneered 
by the Austrian School and later Chicago School of economics. Emblematic of 
this view are the axiomatic foundations of praxeology that assume in advance 
that all human action is rational (von Mises 1963, 18–21), and so it follows 
from this that the function of choice for the individual seeks at the outset an 
advantage on the basis of a rational calculation.
It is under these conditions, garlanded by the continued adoption of some 
cybernetic principles in our network age, where the inward turn to the self 
becomes ever more a placeholder for traditional forms of community and 
social capital; instead, online communities and self-selecting networks as pro-
moted by social media are largely decorative in nature. With a keenness on 
marketing to the self-as-brand, a new crop of social media individualists and 
cyber-libertarians can appropriate what is meant as social capital as a rational, 
self-calculating instrument to ultimately promote individual values.
Main Points
•	The capital aspect of online social capital can be expressed in Marxist terms 
as an exchange rate guaranteed by a unifying ‘price’ due to metrification of 
social relations.
•	The use value of social interaction is subordinated to the exchange value pre-
sented by online social capital and its reliance on standardised measurement
•	There are three forms of online social capital exchange: (i) The user-as-
commodity where the user is a source of data that can be capitalised by 
the social network owner; (ii) The user-generated commodity that involves 
everything social media users create or share, and; (iii) ‘Rent’ whereby the 
social network host ‘leases’ space to users to perform abstract social labour, 
and ‘leases’ the data produced to advertisers.
•	Online social capital differs from symbolic capital insofar as the former 
does not lend itself to being directly converted. Although there are a num-
ber of services that claim to be able to put a dollar value on social capital, 
their methodologies differ widely and remain unclear.
•	Users who choose to commodify their social connections and online social 
capital may choose to leverage these to become social media influencers 
and micro-celebrities, converting their digital production of the self on 
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social media into a profitable venture of creating advertorials for products, 
which thus sees capitalism colonise online social space yet further.
•	Social media sites make use of social buttons and the pursuit of online 
social capital to better track and trace its users, capturing data, increasing 




Capitalism and the Ideologies  
of the Social
The question now turns toward how the use value of online social communica-
tion gets converted to a kind of exchange value. The first step will be to discuss 
the theoretical frontiers of capitalism as it pertains to social media, and to drill 
down to some specific strategic examples.
The normalisation of social media is expressed by its ubiquity and apparent 
necessity. To abstain from social media might be considered by some as proof 
of abnormality and a cause for suspicion. Hiring firms may pass over a candi-
date if said person does not use social media. In some cases, employers have 
flouted labour laws in demanding password access to social media accounts of 
prospective employees to invasively see who they ‘really are’ – a significantly 
more overt yet no less disturbing trend reminiscent of Henry Ford’s penchant 
for sending agents to covertly surveil workers in their off-hours to report back 
on various behaviours, such as alcohol consumption. With the thickening of 
the US and Canadian border, the US Department of Homeland Security has 
refused entry to those travellers who do not hand over full password access to 
their social media accounts, or who may be put under additional scrutiny for 
not having any social media accounts at all. In less severe cases, some people 
may become inadvertently excluded from social functions that are organised 
solely on Facebook, based on the assumption that everyone has an account 
there. For others, there simply little choice but to engage in social media as 
part of the requirements of work due to how much social media has become 
integrated as part of a communications strategy for everything from marketing 
products and services, to the daily operations of local governments.
Just as there are more opportunities for social inputs using social media, a 
rise in apparent necessity in their use has been capitalised by social network 
owners as providing ever more economic inputs for profit generation. As more 
social competition may become manifest on social media in attempting to 
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accumulate a larger share of the attention economy, it may be fair to say that 
capitalism itself has become embodied in social and communicative activities, 
encouraging a competitive pursuit of online social capital.
Capitalism’s colonisation of social time is not entirely new, but yet another of 
its integrated components aided in part by the ubiquity of social media, the lat-
ter's apparent necessity in both labour and leisure contexts and affordances for 
the automation of data extraction and cross-syndication of content. As such, 
it shares a border with other forms in the typology of capitalism: communi-
cative capitalism, financialisation capitalism and neoliberalist-informationist 
capitalism. However, social capitalism in this instance operates within a kind of 
encapsulated social fishbowl – and to the fish, the world is an ocean. The same 
functions of capitalist accumulation seem to operate within the social media 
domain among users, but in ways that adopt capitalist ideology and apply it to 
the social. There are also still significant and real connections to real capital, yet 
our focus is on how the social on social media becomes ever more reminiscent 
of capitalism, and thus seems to operate as its own ‘fantasy economy.’
We can define this ‘fantasy economy’ as the less visible means by which social 
interactions are not only exploited as data for social media companies, but also 
how capitalism itself becomes more normalised and embedded in online social 
media through the use of paid or sponsored content, and in the curious pursuit 
of obtaining some profit by the accumulation of incremental values associated 
with social buttons. Problematically, social relations have become ever more 
quantified and industrialised, right down to the means by which we can man-
age our connections and rely on ready metrics to engage in value comparison. 
Likes and other social metrics of this type become a form of standardised cur-
rency, to such an extent that for some it becomes a sine qua non of online popu-
larity and opportunity. A curious new circuit has taken shape in many online 
social interactions where reciprocity becomes coded as a form of exchange that 
is underwritten by the like economy in the unifying form of a ‘price’ that can 
be calculated.
Communicative Capitalism
Luc Boltanski and Eve Chiapello (2005) characterise capitalism as a kind of 
spiritual exercise that aims to radically shift social values. Capitalism in its cur-
rent form has discovered a means by which to better optimise forms of cir-
culation as the key to accumulation. Whether it be through modifications to 
supply chain management in favour of just-in-time production, crowdsourc-
ing, automation, and the development of more efficient networked systems for 
the extraction and curation of user-supplied data, the rate of circulation con-
tinues to increase.
In response to the high-flying promises of how increasingly networked commu-
nications would create more informed choice and true democratic engagement, 
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Jodi Dean identifies a new outcome: ‘instead of leading to more equitable distri-
butions of wealth and influence, instead of enabling the emergence of a richer 
variety in modes of living and practices of freedom, the deluge of screens and 
spectacles undermines political opportunity and efficacy for most of the world’s 
peoples’ (2005, 55). And, as our content can continue to circulate faster, on more 
networks, more efficiently and receive more inputs from more users, the same 
unity-in-diversity that was extolled as being the result of such networks has led 
to more inequalities and certainly more exploitation by those who own these 
networks. Whether enmeshed in what one might call a kind of fetish or a specta-
cle, more communication has meant less individual value in communication and 
more profit to be gained by ever tightening circuits of capital.
The ‘ideal’ of this social capitalism is predicated upon the idea that free and 
equal individuals, with free and equal access to the digital tools and oppor-
tunities, can pursue their desires online for the purpose of personal wealth 
enrichment gained through their own immaterial labour. The ultimate goal is 
to transcend equality via competitive strategies whereby the lucky, Darwinistic 
few will accumulate a larger share of the attention economy. Just as in capi-
talism overall, the contradiction is to vigorously promote individual freedoms 
where said freedoms are legally guaranteed as equally accessible by all, and then 
to pursue a program whereby disparity and inequality is the end goal. That is, 
everyone is said to be on the same starting line, but the winners will pull ahead 
by their own initiative and work ethic.
Neoliberal capitalism has a particularly problematic relationship with notions 
of the internal and external. According to its broader, macroeconomic goals, 
deregulated and borderless free trade plus direct foreign investment appears 
to efface the boundaries of the trade-zone inside and outside. When there 
are crises and failures, the preachers of neoliberalism will claim that external 
agents – terrorists, socialists, anti-capitalist fringe groups, which may be irre-
sponsibly lumped together as all characterised as ‘opposed’ to the neoliberal 
idea of freedom – it is the fault of something ‘external’ to the system. When 
markets fail, responsibility is redistributed to such an abstract degree, which 
contradicts the extreme gospel of taking personal responsibility (preached to 
the non-wealthy as the means to wealth), and the laws of competitive, quasi-
Darwinistic capitalism are temporarily suspended to permit corporate bail-
outs. Interestingly enough, the division between neoliberal capitalism and the 
more socialist or progressive ideologies is in where to pin blame for failure. The 
more left-of- centre perspective is to consider the citizen as part of a broader 
system or structure composed of forces – not all of which the individual can 
control. So, for example, lingering racial narratives may have a knock-on effect 
on crime, poverty and limits on opportunity as part of  broader structural con-
straints. For the neoliberal, there are no structural constraints as such, for the 
heroic consumer can adopt a strong work ethic and simply choose to work his 
or her way out of poverty, discrimination and depressed wages by aggressively 
pursuing an almost libertarian objective of personal free enterprise. Of course, 
42 Social Capital Online
choosing unionisation would be rejected as a correct choice since that would 
be to prioritise cooperation over competition. When people find themselves in 
dire financial straits due to low-wage jobs, the neoliberal response is to say that 
said individuals simply made bad choices, and that they should make better 
choices in the future. This ‘tough love’ pragmatism is wilfully blind to any of 
the external factors that may have limited the individual’s choices, and will not 
give a hearing to the context behind certain choices made or very real systemic 
limitations on opportunity that neoliberalism is complicit in upholding.
The lionisation of the individual as free-floating and self-determining is 
not only an essential piece of the neoliberal ideology, but also in the gospel of 
online social capital. This occurs despite the reality that these individual nodes 
(as they are networked) are not free-floating radicals simply pursuing their own 
unfettered pathways, but are instead locked-in monads. Individuals can choose 
their pathways and practices online from what appear to be an endless array 
of choices without visible obstruction, but more choice does not necessarily 
equate to actual freedom, particularly when what is made visible and ‘personal-
ised’ for the user is structured by social media algorithms. Even search engine 
results on Google will favour businesses.
If communicative capitalism is little more than the circulation of content 
(Dean 2009, 22), a monologue staged by a multitude without much substantive 
engagement or subsequent offline action that could not be considered politically 
progressive.10 It is akin to a village where everyone speaks and so few listen. And 
those who should be listening – governments and corporations with the eco-
nomic power and control of assets to make responsive changes – will generally 
contribute to the dialogue with their own canned or talking point content, add-
ing more circulating content to the monologue of the many. Or, worse still, tap 
into the conversation as a means of surveillance and as a strategic starting point 
for manipulation, persuasion and other tactics to further ideological agendas.
What Dean and others point to is a dilution of individual voices, ever more 
problematised by the convergence aspect of social media. Unlike previous forms 
of media that were communicative channels designed to inform and entertain, 
the number of purposes social media is put to creates a multiple divergence 
of uses, not only diluting voice, but functions. Such potential dangers of mass 
communication means were already considered even with the rise in popular-
ity of the radio, pointing to a kind of rise of pettiness, banality and tribalism:
Only after the human voice had been transmitted around the world 
with the speed of light did it become plain that the words so widely dis-
seminated might still be the same words one could hear from the village 
gossip or the village idiot or the village clown or the village hoodlum. 
(Mumford 1944, 395)
John Stuart Mill’s ‘marketplace of ideas’ takes on a more economic interpreta-
tion of market in terms of finance and commodification. Instead of ideas, we 
Capitalism and the Ideologies of  the Social  43
might witness more of a clearinghouse of half-digested, reactive rather than 
reflective, redundant, frivolous sentiments and opinions that either valorise 
corporate brands, prop up hate-based beliefs, traffic in mis- and disinformation, 
disseminate propaganda, or provide the data fodder for advertisers to embed 
their story-branding via targeted advertising on privatised social networks. 
David Harvey (2005) points to this absorption of human social interaction into 
the digital domain of networked culture, and it is Gilles Deleuze’s prescient 
‘Postscript’ (1995) that tells us that this turn to a largely cybernetics-inspired 
communication-control feedback technology creates dividuals and data blocs 
that are easier to predict and control because all behaviour and choice in that 
milieu is prescribed.11 Possibilities on these networks are limited to what the 
network architecture permits. Ultimately, participation is a necessary but not 
sufficient condition of engagement and constructive action; however, partici-
pation in the network functions as a support and uncritical celebration of the 
network spectacle itself.
Just as classical capitalism succeeded in the abstraction of labour power from 
previous forms of labour, so too does digital communicative capitalism now 
succeed in abstracting social power as something derivative, quantifiable and 
imbued with the promise of exchange value. The user becomes the site of a new 
production, just as much as a member of the social factory performing ‘social-
ised’ immaterial labour. Even though the material advantage that may be gained 
by accumulating social capital may appear promising for many, it is still largely 
a process of alchemy, a transmutation experiment indexed on producing the 
more prosperous, popular future self. A life dedicated to accumulating social 
capital through promiscuous connectivity to increase the odds of receiving vali-
dation for one’s online content production loses its intrinsic, experiential, social 
value. Taking pride in one’s accomplishments, travels, personal benchmarks, 
and life events without feeling obliged to broadcast them on social media as a 
guiding means to validate experience is much more in alignment with our sta-
tus as social beings as opposed to leveraging such events in the seeking of profit. 
Or, to apply a homily by William Bruce Cameron, ‘[n]ot everything that counts 
can be counted, and not everything that can be counted counts’ (1963, 13).
The idea of social media as a kind of social factory aligns with the idea of the 
user as the site of production. The role communicative capitalism plays in the 
colonising of social life outside of work blurs the once static boundary between 
labour and leisure. At issue is the very ontological status of the social media 
user given the level of exploitation employed to extract ever more surplus value 
from those who produce content. The incentives to participate, and to do so 
often, with the subtext of remaining socially valid or relevant is caught up in the 
circuit of purchasing the means of production (hardware devices and software 
services), making it a ‘pay to play’ phenomenon. More importantly, it is the onto-
logical question that speaks directly to how alienation emerges as a by-product 
of the circuits of digital communicative capitalism and the degree of importance 
attached to contused notions of social capital as a site of accumulation.
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Participation on social media is voluntary for most, although there is ever 
more ambient pressure to subscribe or potentially lose out on reaping the 
social, cultural and professional opportunities afforded by such large networked 
spaces. Although social media participation in no way compares to forced or 
sweatshop labour (Hesmondhalgh, 2010), Dyer-Witheford rightly points out 
the parasitism of this shadowy capitalist world in which people are organised 
and mobilised according to the needs of the network:
[Facebook posting] does not replace the ‘normal’ structures of daily 
class exploitation at work and home, but is added to and superimposed 
upon them, to constitute a regime in which the user is habituated, on 
pain of exclusion from social worlds, to surrendering the elements of 
their personality–identity, creativity, sociality–to enhance the circula-
tion of capital. (Dyer-Witheford 2015, 93)
The grim appearance of necessity here is reinforced according to the ubiquity of 
social media, influential pressure from peers, and the shift in information being 
posted on these sites for various opportunities. This heavy degree of normalisa-
tion of social media is not without its risks, particularly as this normalisation 
favours the private sector owners of social media (and, subsequently, the share-
holders) as it was this group who were the main beneficiaries of heavy financial 
investment after the dot-com crisis of the early 2000s.
In everyday terms, social media becomes yet another task to manage, another 
obligation to fulfil, on top of one’s already existing obligations. The apparent 
necessity, buttressed by normalisation, begins to colonise both home and work, 
at times effectively blurring the distinction. However, it may not be recognised 
as such due to a view that socialising is not typically considered work. This 
does not take into account the very real conditions of labour time involved 
in online socialising activity, nor the fact that such leisure activities are being 
driven toward ever more ‘eyeballs on ads’:
The more time a user spends on Facebook, the more profile, browsing, 
communication, behavioural, content data s/he generates that is offered 
as a commodity to advertising clients. The more time a user spends 
online, the more targeted ads can be presented to her/him. (Fuchs 
2015a, 27)
Such advertising need not simply be what one sees in a social media site’s side-
bar or as sponsored content, but can also be entwined with the production of 
desire by other users, colonising the high-trust culture of networks and indirect 
word-of-mouth marketing:
As social media allows us to be more open about our desires, we pro-
duce our own ontologies and metadata on such sites as Facebook: Sam 
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is a friend of Sue; Sue is a fan of BMW. When Sue ‘likes’ the latest BMW 
model, her desire is pushed out in the social stream. (Gehl 2014, 106)
Another aspect of increasing alienation might be the artificial creation of 
‘needs.’ Although it may be hyperbole to accept the premise that if one is not 
on social media, one doesn’t exist, there is an existing pressure to join. This 
happens in a context where some users will claim that it is justified along the 
lines of being the only way to view the lives of distant relatives or in not being 
excluded from social plans. The aspect of FOMO (fear of missing out) indicates 
the anxiety someone may feel in not being connected, and thus subscribing to 
these social media sites becomes more identified as a social necessity.
This necessity extends beyond the social, as some job recruiters have been 
reported of not hiring applicants because there was no social media history to 
better assess the character of the applicant. Refusal to join, and thus refusal 
to work for, a popular social media site can lead to diminished employ-
ment opportunities. Refusal to join may be construed as being in bad faith. 
Abraham Maslow’s famous hierarchy of needs does indeed identify the social 
function as one of the human requirements, and social media has provided 
an additional space where this may occur, promising self-actualisation while 
reaping profit.
The Fourth Fantasy
When it comes to the role of communicative capitalism in the use of social 
media, Jodi Dean identifies three main fantasies: the Fantasy of Abundance, the 
Fantasy of Participation and the Fantasy of Wholeness (2005).
In the Fantasy of Abundance, Dean references the heady, dot-com years with 
all its optimism about how the information age would lead to moving away 
from economies of scarcity and toward an economy of abundance due to the 
affordances of new digital technologies in being able to manage larger volumes 
and faster speeds facilitating more efficient transactions (2005, 58). This idea 
of abundance has helped propel the alliance of neoliberalism-informationism 
(Neubauer 2011), allowing for the kind of creative destruction that has seen 
the shift between roll-back neoliberalism during the Reagan/Thatcher years to 
a modified, market-centric form of ‘state-building’ of roll-out neoliberalism in 
legitimising flexible labour markets, constant skills upgrading and the creation 
of a ‘knowledge economy’ (Peck and Tickell, 2002) while developing nations 
took on the burden of intensive industrialisation as Western nations became 
increasingly deindustrialised. Abundance is also associated with the reproduc-
tion of data and knowledge in ways that are not apparently tied to finite mate-
rials; i.e., the near infinite replicability of digital data as opposed to a limited 
print run of a book. However, there are very real-world finite limits, such as the 
materials that are required to manufacture the devices that access the online 
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world (such as ‘conflict minerals’) and limits to energy in order to power and 
sustain the networks upon which more people depend.12 Yet it is this fantasy of 
abundance at the broader economic scale of demand and supply that may have 
arguably presented a boon to major corporations that would have otherwise 
fallen victim to Marx’s law of the falling rate of profit as certain forms of both 
fixed and variable capital costs can be reduced (or devolved to consumers).
Dean’s treatment of this fantasy of abundance concerns communication, and 
that the ‘exchange value of messages overtakes their use value’ (2005, 58). All 
that matters is circulation of data: the message, the sender, the receiver, are all 
irrelevant or at least secondary to the circulation itself. As more users contrib-
ute content, the less value each instance of communication has, which then 
may precipitate a need or desire to be more shocking, outrageous, offensive and 
extreme in order to garner attention. So, with the abundance of messages we 
can send over social media, the more this becomes devalued as just contribu-
tions to data flow and circulation.
In the Fantasy of Participation, Dean speaks of the registration effect (2005, 
60), which is the belief that our opinions and contributions online matter on 
their intrinsic merits, that they have a value more than simply contributing to 
circulation. On social media we are presented with numerous opportunities and 
prompts to contribute, be it a suggestion by the site to provide a status update, 
a reminder that one has not logged in recently to view what one has ‘missed,’ to 
rate one’s experience using a hotel booking service, to connect with a number of 
people harvested from one’s email contact list, and so forth. Added to this would 
be forms of clicktivism and slacktivism associated with various causes whereby 
merely clicking a button replaces more substantive action and engagement. When 
we apply this to online social capital accumulation, we may also feel an obligation 
to ‘like’ the content of someone we like, which may prove much more convenient 
than writing a more substantive response, or as a form of obligatory reciprocity 
because said person has ‘liked’ our content. The notion that our contributions 
are significant is undermined by the fact that social media users are encouraged 
to participate more, but that content matters little beyond cross-syndicating the 
content and in providing ready fodder for keyword analysis performed by algo-
rithms to deliver content and targeted advertising.
In the Fantasy of Wholeness, Dean points up the myth that the internet is a 
democratised, smooth space of unity, a true marketplace of ideas (2005, 67). 
The fantasy may put one in mind of the ideal that John Rawls (2005) speaks 
of in terms of political liberalism; namely, that prejudices and hierarchical 
considerations can be hung like hats by the door prior to meeting together as 
equals objectively discussing political conceptions of justice. In reality, com-
munities on the internet are not commonly a McLuhan-style global village, 
but fragmented, composed of ideological tribes, and exacerbated further by 
algorithmic sorting that empowers filter bubbles that deliver content that con-
forms to the respective worldview of each user on social media. The algorithm’s 
role in deselecting visible content maintains the social media space as a mostly 
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positive one free of conflict, yet also free of the diversity one would expect of a 
truly globalised public that could ostensibly achieve a unity of differences.
Given these three main fantasies that Dean speaks of, I would append a 
fourth that may also conform to her idea of communicative capitalism, and 
perhaps overlap with each of the three fantasies: the Fantasy of Equivalence and 
Conversion. There may be a belief among users who actively seek to increase the 
visible numbers on their social counters that said efforts can be converted into 
actual capital, or that one’s numeric online social capital is equivalent to some 
other stable value upon which one’s personal or social value is based. If there 
is a belief that the like economy is somehow directly equivalent to a unifying 
price, there is an attendant belief in the conversion of contribution labour into 
a kind of payoff. This fantasy occurs in the most blatant and misleading way on 
sites that peg dollar values on social media accounts on the basis of followers, 
likes, retweets, etc., such as Klout et al. It may not matter if the content we con-
tribute to the overall circulation of data is understood, just so long as it accu-
mulates measurable attention in terms of likes, retweets and possibly increasing 
the number of followers as a function of network exposure.
Social Capitalist Strategies
There is no shortage of thinkers who continue to extoll the virtues of build-
ing digital social capital. One notable early example may be B.J. Fogg (2008) 
who lauds the affordances of Social Networking Services (SNS), particularly 
Facebook and its launch of its API, as a means of employing what he calls ‘mass 
interpersonal persuasion’ (MIP). The huge social graph provides access to much 
larger and better-organised audiences for targeting purposes by those micro-
entrepreneurs looking to develop popular apps, while the automated structure 
allows for the proliferation of an app by effectively ‘ghosting’ a user’s account 
in enticing others to join. The rapid feedback system also allows for quick and 
ongoing customisation of the app or its marketing and advanced analytics pro-
vide ample data for measuring app adoption rates and various pre-set demo-
graphic criteria such as browsers, geographical location, etc. Fogg lauds these 
affordances, and although he does briefly acknowledge the potential dangers of 
MIP in the wrong hands, he is overall optimistic about its prospects.
B.J. Fogg’s model for mass interpersonal persuasion (MIP) is of some utility 
in exploring what is effectively mass impersonal persuasion (MIP2). Many of the 
mechanisms he cites such as persuasive experience, automated structure, social 
distribution, rapid cycle, huge social graph and measured impact may equally 
apply to strategies aimed at building online social capital. Despite Fogg’s more 
optimistic conclusion that MIP decentralises authority in media from the top-
down or hypodermic model to a recentralisation of power in the empowered13 
individual who can engage in a more open and participatory model of com-
munication, even the grassroots bottom-up model can be co-opted by powerful 
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entities to give the illusion of popular support. The very same mechanisms that 
allow for online anonymity or screen nonymity and mass participatory inclu-
sion for expression also allow lobbying groups to leverage these mechanisms 
to construct an opaque image of a grassroots crowd using a variety of tools to 
create an artificial public.
Mass impersonal persuasion possesses the possible means of producing a 
persuasive experience without requiring a human entity to author each com-
munication instance. By coupling an automated message delivery method with 
persona management solutions, contemporary astroturfing and botnet cam-
paigns can be self-generating and self-renewing, adapting to different social 
communication requirements through the use of computerised linguistic 
analysis and textual production. One of the other distinct advantages of mass 
impersonal persuasion using advanced botnet methods is in increasing the vol-
ume and presence of messages that would, if operated by a human entity, be 
much slower and decrease the probability of broader social distribution.
In Fogg’s six-point platform for mass interpersonal persuasion (MIP), each 
of these are indexed on experiential observations, measures, and effects. Fogg 
defines a persuasive experience as one that ‘is created to change attitudes, 
behaviours or both’ (2008, 4). The close alignment between viral effects and 
rapid cycle seem to operate according to a similar mechanism for distribution 
of persuasive experiences via web technology. However, more importantly, the 
use of online traffic metrics such as Google Analytics allow campaign managers 
to monitor and measure the success, attrition, or adoption rates of a particular 
campaign component or meme; and other analytical tools further allow cam-
paign managers to monitor traffic on issues according to hashtags as a means of 
coordinating the campaign for optimal effect on those social media platforms 
that make extensive use of hashtags.
Since Fogg’s study, the huge social graph has also seen significant changes, 
especially in the touted features of Open Graph (Facebook 2013) whereby 
a robust API allows for deeper app integration to maximise the ‘Facebook 
experience,’ facilitating cross-platform interaction between app content and 
Facebook status updates. For example, by adopting the Goodreads app, any 
action a user makes on Goodreads site such as starting or finishing a book 
can be automatically updated on the user’s Facebook page for broadcast to 
that user’s network. This form of automated message delivery, akin to Fogg’s 
automated structure for message dissemination and successful adoption, min-
imises on the user being left to construct a message to persuade other users to 
adopt the app, and instead allows the Open Graph app to write the ‘story’ on 
behalf of the user. This form of digital surrogacy takes control of the central 
promotional message without relying on the user-host to promote the product 
or service.
Automated methods are vital to the operations and procedures of digital 
astroturfing and botnet campaigns. Fogg’s discussion of how automated struc-
ture benefits MIP serves two functions:
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First, software can deliver a persuasive experience over and over. The 
computer code doesn’t take a vacation or go on coffee breaks; the 
machine keeps working [...] The second point is that the automation 
makes it easier for people to share the experience with others. (5–6)
Fogg’s focus is on the instrumental value of MIP; however, this may conceal 
some of the dangers that deserve more reflection, such as the potential to exac-
erbate alienation, the nature of unpaid work, a networked capitalist system that 
relies on app entrepreneurs shouldering the burden of risk and responsibility, 
and possibly events Fogg did not anticipate such as the rise of digital astro-
turfing with the use of sophisticated botnets. Fogg is not alone in seeing the 
potential advantages of building or accumulating online social capital, with a 
large number of primers, blogs, and how-to manuals on the subject that all 
take the accumulation of online social capital as inherently good. The danger of 
assuming this would be that it obscures the ideological aspects whereby these 
practices strengthen the hand of capitalist exploitation at the expense of the 
non-pecuniary online community, if not also the immiseration of workers who 
toil in click farms or the precarity of the app-development market.
The pursuit of online social capital appears to provide a solution in search 
of a problem. It certainly provides a solution to a very concrete and practical 
problem for capitalists seeking to increase markets and to seek ways of cutting 
costs by devolving marketing efforts to the consumers themselves in ways that 
consumers will actively participate behind the veil of play. However, for the 
average user seeking to increase likes and number of followers, being caught 
up in this kind of economy is also to be caught up in a kind of myth. Apparent 
social needs are magically provided by the social media space, and the metri-
fication of that space provides the appearance of objective, measurable ‘proof ’. 
The emergence of social buttons and a metric for online social capital is envel-
oped within the myths and metaphors that have developed with cyberspace, 
but also the neoliberal value system where competition and greed are seen as 
good. The pursuit and accumulation of measurable online social capital emu-
lates the pursuit and accumulation of actual capital, but there are little to no 
tangible profits to be made by those who pursue it. The pursuit itself is seen as 
good, as part of the digital sublime Vincent Mosco (2004) speaks of.
Gaming the System of Social Capital
If there were not a potential economic benefit to online social capital, there 
would not be a burgeoning cottage industry either promising clients to increase 
their social capital through services or instructional blogs. Some of these ser-
vices involve arguably unethical practices such as purchasing bogus posi-
tive reviews (or negative reviews in an act of sabotage against a competitor), 
like-farms and the use of botnets. If online social capital is reduced to a kind 
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of video game style high-score on a publicly available leaderboard, as many 
 multiplayer game apps have as a feature, there must be a way to ‘game the sys-
tem.’ This becomes much easier when we consider the affordances of social 
digital media, as opposed to in-person networking.
Some of the services provided may include digital manipulation of code to 
increase likes, friends, followers etc. This would involve exploiting or hacking 
the server, or in deploying automated software where the bots can follow a pro-
gram script to sign up for the site to ‘like’ a Facebook page. Or, these might rely 
on more sophisticated programming to create convincing ‘users’ with a per-
sonality drawn from a list of options tied to geography and other criteria. This 
latter was exposed by George Monbiot (2011) in a proposal issued by the US 
Air Force for such services, and is backed by a patent on how this can be done. 
Generating fake audiences to build one’s social capital only requires paying a 
fee for service to one of a series of providers.
The more labour-consuming practice has been to provide these services 
using real people, run by exploitative individuals in boiler room situations in 
the developing world. A worker may be paid by the account, or volume of likes, 
and quite poorly. AshleyMadison.com, a site which specialises in providing dis-
creet services for those interested in extramarital affairs, endured two major 
scandals. The most recent of these involved a major hacking incident that 
revealed the identities of several users, some of whom were prominent public 
figures.14 The scandal which received less media coverage was a series of claims 
that the website was making use of bots to populate the site with more female 
accounts so as to attract more male subscribers. These claims were initially 
denied by the parent company, AvidLife (now rebranded as Ruby), and then 
later admitted. The strategic use of bots to set up female accounts, and possibly 
associated images peeled from the web, was to serve to even out the gender 
ratio which was seen to be have a much heavier preponderance of male users. 
Closely aligned with this scandal was a claim by an employee in the US who 
was suing the company for injuries sustained working long hours creating fake 
accounts in preparation for the company’s expansion into the Brazilian market.
Other forms may include political trolling where individuals are hired to 
promote or condemn a political candidate. In other cases, it might be a pro-
motion of government policies, such as China’s ’50 Cent Party,’ a group of blog-
gers so named because they were paid the equivalent of 50¢ for every blog post 
that praised or defended the government. Pay-to-tweet services have begun 
to emerge in the political sphere. A service called @robertsrooms, associated 
with the Blak political action committee (BlakPAC) in the US and founded by 
self-proclaimed ‘citizen patriots’ Robert Shelton and Anita White, promises 
to deliver conservative candidates electoral success by mobilizing 10 million 
‘social media warriors.’ They have claimed to have helped in getting Donald 
Trump elected while also ‘out-tweeting’ Hillary Clinton’s supporters. Their pay-
to-tweet model compensates users on Twitter to retweet content or create new 
content under the direction of the service. Unlike the creation of sophisticated 
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botnets that work clandestinely, this method of social media mobilisation oper-
ates out in the open and is ostensibly run by grass-roots supporters who are 
willing to sell their services to prospective political candidates of the same ideo-
logical view. The service runs multiple rooms where supporters can be coordi-
nated in the posting or reposting of short videos, messages, memes and other 
content on social media in support of a candidate. At other times, these rooms 
may be coordinated to attack non-conservative candidates and their supporters.
In other cases, there may be direct manipulation using reward. A well-known 
rum company appeared at a bar that is popular with students, and offered a free 
drink only if they signed into their Facebook account and ‘liked’ the company’s 
Facebook page. In order to avoid unfulfilled promises from thirsty patrons, the 
representatives had on hand a device upon which the patron would sign into 
his or her Facebook and ‘like’ the page in the representative’s presence. There 
are many reasons why this aggressive practice can be considered objectionable, 
including pressuring patrons to publicly endorse a product prior to receiving it, 
but also the potential for violations of privacy.
In other games of online social capital, the pursuit of positive reviews for 
products and services is its own special industry, sometimes courting mer-
cenary tactics of planting fake bad reviews of competitors or hiring out for 
fake positive reviews. Due to the high-trust culture of the web, it may be the 
case that a site visitor may trust a random user’s review much more than the 
official word of the company being reviewed. In the arts of persuasion, it was 
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948) who discovered that word-of-mouth through one’s peer 
group has a much more effective impact on decision making than official mes-
sages from mass media, but that ‘forbidden fruit’ (i.e., reporting on what has 
overheard) can be even more effective.
One of the common features of the online environment is the strong appeal 
to quantity considerations as a basis for making decisions and assigning value, 
and this has already been demonstrated to work in what is called ‘social herd-
ing’ (Huang and Chen 2006). Social proof mechanisms may prove more signifi-
cant in a semi-democratic setting of mass participation since no individual user 
may have the time or inclination to inspect the claims of each individual user. 
In addition, given the screen-based (a)nonymity of many users, tracing a mes-
sage to the profiles of users and comparing these views to those made by the 
same user on other sites under a different screen name frustrates attempts to 
construct a comparative picture of the user and may not permit a measurement 
for credibility across different sites. The use of numerical considerations under 
herding is simply a quantified version of bandwagon effect. Online social capi-
tal has already been naturalised in terms of granting value to certain users and 
content on the basis of recorded number of likes or comments associated with 
that user. It is possible, under certain conditions, to ‘game’ the system such that 
a large surge in likes may be picked up by the algorithm and thus cause more 
visibility of the content for more users. Although social media algorithms are 
likely more sophisticated in flagging sudden surges to prevent like-spamming, 
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click- or like-farming is still a booming industry. Such operations may rely on 
outsourced labour, such as in Dhaka, Bangladesh, where click farms hire peo-
ple to click likes on content. It is not just small companies trying to gain a foot-
hold who might purchases services such as these; it was reported that the US 
State Department spent an estimated $630,000 on these services in 2013 before 
the Inspector General criticised this expenditure (Associated Press 2014). The 
use of human labour (or what is marketed as ‘organic likes’) was a response to 
social media companies being able to filter out suspected automated software 
attempts to artificially increase followers, likes, and views. However, the use of 
automated software to generate inflated social media scores and fake reviews is 
not over; more sophisticated software is being developed that can bypass social 
media filters.
Microburst Gratification and Mobile Prosumers
Personal validation through numeric markers is not unique to social media sites, 
nor does it have its origin there. A focus on quantitative considerations as being 
linked to value has taken many forms, from the number of possessions owned, 
number of home runs, pinball machine scores and bank account balances, to 
name only a few. However, it is with social media that users can assess their 
social value via the numeric counters of likes, friends, followers and comments 
in a synchronous communication environment. This real-time affordance of the 
network allows for instant notification of any increase in these numeric values, 
like a stock market ticker. Moreover, these notifications may induce in the user 
a small burst of gratification akin to a dopamine hit. One anecdotal way of test-
ing this was through an experiment I repeated in several iterations of my social 
networking course over the last six years. The ‘digital detox’ experiment asked 
students to voluntarily remove the use of social media for three days,15 and to 
report in diary form what they were feeling in their own words. In order to 
encourage honesty, reporting on relapses when they occurred was encouraged, 
and the diaries were anonymised. Of the recurring reported sentiments across 
several non-linked student cohorts, were narratives closely resembling that 
of addiction, withdrawal, and feelings of relief during relapse. In other cases, 
relapses were rationalised in much the same fashion as one might expect among 
some of those who return to the use of an addictive substance. What was of note 
was how often it was reported that notification services became the most com-
mon trigger for relapse. Some diarists described with some reflection on how 
responding to the notification provided an immediate sensation of pleasure and 
relief, an intensity shortly followed by a return to normal, a pattern resembling 
that of the chemical reward of the dopamine system.
Such conditioning to stimuli is not new in itself: prior to the internet, there 
may have been a similar dopamine-like response to the ringing of a telephone 
or finding a letter in a mailbox. But if there is a chemical incentive to the activity 
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of increasing one’s online social capital, it may be strongly linked to both the 
system of real-time notifications, as well as the psychological attachment to see-
ing an increase in numeric counters that are ‘proof ’ of increasing value. Such 
an increase in quantitative values may be mistakenly correlated to an increase 
in social or personal value of the user in the similar way some may mistake an 
increase in personal wealth as an increase in personal and societal value. The 
acquisition of higher numerical values does not necessarily always correspond 
to an increase in effort. To reuse the video game metaphor, one of the more 
popular mobile game genres would be the ‘idle’ variety where the numeric val-
ues of a character, the time-based production of some building, or the accumu-
lation of the in-game currency will occur while the player is not actively logged 
into the game. This sets up both a feeling of surprise and satisfies a feeling of 
progress and growth. In sum, validation and accomplishment through a process 
of accumulation, and the largely capitalist notion of growth for growth’s sake.
Inasmuch as practices of accumulation, growth for growth’s sake, is part of 
the constellatory ideological framework of neoliberal capitalism, so too is the 
notion of mobility. Invocations of mobility will generally tend toward under-
standing in terms of spatiality and temporality. One is considered mobile if one 
is not rooted or fixed in a particular location, with a freedom to be migratory 
or nomadic. When taken in a positive register, this mobility is by choice (rather 
than, say, a forced migration due to civil war or natural disaster). In terms of 
temporality, mobility refers to the ability to access content and services at any 
time. The social aspects of mobility, understood in more corporeal terms, is 
enabled by a distinctly mobile technology that is portable and can access con-
tent on a global scale. As opposed to improvements in transportation tech-
nologies in the last two centuries, mobility shifts into a distinctly cognitive and 
person-centred concept whereby one can be nomadic in the virtual domain 
while remaining rooted or fixed in place. Mobility, then, comes to signify tech-
nological mediation of content on demand anytime, anywhere. Perry et al. 
(2001) critique the ‘anytime, anywhere’ rhetoric of mobility as it still emerges 
out of the implications of hardware and software design. These proprietary 
forms of hardware and software commit the user to develop or access content 
through very specific channels. This fits comfortably within the principles of 
neoliberalism whereby choice is trumpeted yet restricted to a pre-set list of 
options it sanctions: ‘neoliberal logic is best conceptualised not as a standard-
ized universal apparatus, but a migratory technology of governing that inter-
acts with situated sets of elements and circumstances’ (Ong 2007, 5). What is of 
note is that digital mobility – no longer necessarily tied to time and space – is 
spoken in almost the same breath as flexibility, and thus granting some form of 
convenience and ‘power’ to the individual user.
Such mobility and its closely related virtue-word of flexibility is already 
witnessed in many workplaces where the worker’s subjectivity is cultivated 
through constants skills upgrading to make them employable in a competi-
tive global market, but this apparent empowerment acts as a cover for lack of 
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job security (Moore 2010). Despite claims of self-expressive empowerment, the 
down-shifting responsibilisation of users does not come with actual power. In 
fact, power is retained within the network while risk is distributed to the user-
base. What we see is ‘a shift from exchange to competition in the principle of 
the market’ based on inequality rather than equivalence (Foucault 2008, 118). 
This is little more than a part of the fundamental shift from Fordism to flexible 
production regimes, packaged in the seemingly positive idea of the creative 
economy. What we see is an actual retrenchment strategy perpetrated by social 
networks that seek to enhance their own centralised control over data collec-
tion and distribution.
No longer strictly a disciplinary society, but one of control, the mechanisms 
that carry out control practices aligned with neoliberal economic thought gov-
ern and steer what content is visible, and how it is to be distributed, to guard 
against the kind of a feeling of ataxia – a loss of genuine control – that might 
cause users to reflect and question the very tools and principles upon which 
these platforms rely. It is no longer acceptable in some circles to critique social 
media and what it may mean ideologically, but to either acquiesce in a spirit 
of resignation or to wilfully embrace the Joyful Science that marks the techno-
optimist drive. The digital model for social interaction, when it is packaged 
as inevitable or simply necessary to realise the goals of the network’s desire to 
expand into larger markets, leaves very little choice for users but to comply and 
thus conform to the new model if they wish to participate. The digital model 
then serves the double function of enforcing compliance among users with the 
terms of service they agree to, in addition to extracting surplus value from them.
One of the possibly hidden dangers of relying more on social media may be 
in how these are aligned with aspects of new managerialist-style tactics of sur-
veillance and ‘quality control’ in terms of principal-agent relations. In the latter 
situation, content visibility and distribution, user interface changes, and shifts 
in how data is collected, becomes packaged as a benefit providing more quality 
and efficiency for users. The power of these increasingly cybernetic networks 
to surveil (or work with other entities to provide surveillance data), and chan-
nel select content, does not seem to speak favourably to user-empowerment. 
Instead, users are in effect data-farmed as inputs in a feedback system that will 
restrain choice and possibly shape their behaviour through what the platform 
decides to make visible. The discursive shaping of the term ‘platform’ has impli-
cations on how the information is distributed and made available, steering a 
middle course between what is:
socially and financially valuable, between niche and wide appeal. And, 
as with broadcasting and publishing, their choices about what can 
appear, how it is organized, how it is monetized, what can be removed 
and why, and what the technical architecture allows and prohibits, are 
all real and substantive interventions into the contours of public dis-
course. (Gillespie 2010, 359)
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Social media sites are not identical in form or function to the industrial sites of 
confinement where production took place, but instead a new dispersive instru-
ment delegates tasks via digital controls, prompts to contribute content such as 
a status update, to respond to new content, etc. Social media sites may not be 
accurately classed as sites of production, and may have entered into the phase 
of metaproduction where what ‘it seeks to sell is services, and what it seeks 
to buy, activities. It’s a capitalism no longer directed toward production but 
toward products, that is, toward sales and markets’ (Deleuze 1995, 181). The 
product in this case – user-generated content – is not produced as much as it 
is transformed, and it is achieved through the digital medium of its collection 
and delivery. The automation that goes along with this shift in data collection 
and algorithmic distribution opens up the mass of users and their content to 
global economic flows, possibly leveraged as branding instruments by social 
media sites to take control of new potential markets, and thus balance the two 
functions of marketing to its ‘outside’ and monitoring on its ‘inside.’
When users of social media are restricted in terms of their choice to use the 
proprietary social software available, there is in this way a very clear command 
and control mechanism by which there is a push for standardisation and cen-
tralisation of online experience and the goal of content generation with more 
data capture. The transformation of organic social exchange into a social deliv-
ery system turns away from the species-being of human communication and 
social fulfilment through interaction and towards executability, predictability 
and back-end profitability.
Spurious ‘technological’ developments [...] are those which are encap-
sulated by a ceremonial power system whose main concern is to control 
the use, direction, and consequences of that development while simul-
taneously serving as the institutional vehicle for defining the limits and 
boundaries upon that technology through special domination efforts of 
the legal system, the property system, and the information system (Jun-
ker 1980, n.p.)
It is this ‘ceremonialist’ hangover whereby social networks solidify power and 
wield the instruments (social software) to increase it, while it simultaneously 
re-inscribes the values of the elite. When it comes to the power of the users 
of the digital technologies, they can be said to surrender their labour to the 
functions dictated by the implications of social software design: ‘The mes-
sage behind the neutrality of screens is not that we are the organization. The 
real message, to be grasped, is that without the organization, we are nothing’ 
(Thiry-Cherques 715).
The ongoing aestheticisation of social media technologies is packed behind 
the optimistic and glittering generality of what is one of neoliberalism’s most 
favoured terms: innovation. Despite its frequent invocation, the term innova-
tion is rarely precisely defined, nor are its implications addressed. Innovation 
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can be seen as largely part of a discursive formation whereby certain assump-
tions on value are put forth and aligned with positive associations of (linear) 
progress, change, and novelty. A survey of the vast literature that touts inno-
vation demonstrates inconsistency in its application, pending context, and 
attempts have been made to arrive at a unified consensus as to what innova-
tion means, or how it is to be measured (Adams et al. 2006, 22). Attempts to 
construct a universal definition have taken the form of extensive literature 
reviews on the subject, and parsing out specific attributes such as the nature, 
type, stages, social context, means and aim of innovation (Baregeh et al. 2009, 
1331–2). Inasmuch as procedural and attributional clarifications may assist in 
better operationalising efforts in the domain of innovation, left untouched are 
the assumptions that innovation in itself is positive. As Emma Jeanes (2006) 
rightly argues with an appeal to Deleuze on what is and is not ‘creativity,’ the 
mantra of ‘innovate or else’ is uncritical and the champions of innovation rhet-
oric staunchly resist criticism. The ‘innovation theology’ seems inextricably 
bound to accountancy principles of finding efficient ways to reduce costs and 
leverage human capital in a perceived threatening, Darwinised economic envi-
ronment of global hyper-competitiveness.
Accumulation and Time: ‘Time is Money’
One of the goals of capitalism is to increase the rate of production over shorter 
spans of time by seeking efficiencies and rationalising production. During the 
rise of industrialisation, several techniques were introduced to achieve this end, 
be it through Babbage’s idea of the division of labour into functional specifi-
cation, standardisation of labour toward mass production, increasing mech-
anisation, and the application of Taylor’s theory of scientific management. 
Furthermore, the conquering of space through the development of transporta-
tion networks such as the railways and communication through the telegraph 
enabled shorter time intervals for the exchange of goods, services, and infor-
mation. Today, a global network of shipping routes by land and sea, in addition 
to methods of just-in-time production to decrease speculation and inventory 
costs, increased automation, and even the proposed use of drone technologies 
for the delivery of goods, has shortened the time in the production process 
as well as bringing a host of goods and services to market much faster. Speed 
and efficiency in supply chain management, for instance, are generally the 
hallmarks of a neoliberal economy. However, in the shadow of these gains is 
increasing reliance on super-exploited sweatshop labour, environmental dam-
age and a growing pool of precarious labour while other types of jobs have been 
eliminated due to automation.
Capitalism relies on acceleration as its strategy to increase accumulation, and 
this is no different in the domain of social media where a growth of subscrib-
ers to whom will be crowdsourced the tasks of the subscriber base is part of 
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the strategy for social media’s financial success. With respect to social media, 
users are sold experiences via the services of the social media site, while adver-
tisers are sold space according to the processed data of users’ labour time and 
personal information. If the goal is to accelerate the rate at which commodities 
are sold in shorter time frames, refined tactics have been used such as algo-
rithmic sorting and the outsourcing of the function of the commodification of 
experience to the users who depend on the social media service. These flexible 
arrangements for more efficient forms of accumulation becomes an embedded 
practice in neoliberal capitalism (Harvey 2005).
Accumulation of real capital through the extraction of surplus value from 
digital labour functions at the heart of large social media corporations, but the 
question turns to how this practice has migrated in a new form into a cultural 
norm online where users compete and adopt strategies to accumulate more 
social capital faster, seeking means by which the returns on labour time invest-
ment can be higher. Robert Hassan’s (2009) concept of network time identifies 
behaviours that seem patterned by the economic aspects of prevailing neolib-
eral capitalism. Our social time ever more becomes colonised by digital labour 
time, and so social time becomes another segment in the chain of production 
so that it even becomes (socially) produced in line with the speed and expecta-
tions of the social media upon which it may be experienced. Various associated 
behaviours may follow, possibly explained by this patterning by a dominant 
neoliberal capitalist ethos that is already embedded in the social media network 
architecture itself. One may then cue the instrumentalist, pragmatic forms of 
social capital accumulation as yet another form of flexible strategy, but also the 
less savoury behaviours of aggressive competition, self-promotion, and a lack 
of empathy in social interactions online. Moreover, the social media sphere is 
enlarged in scope, reach, and perceived importance until ever more it becomes – 
to use Lieven de Cauter’s (2004) term – encapsulated, or within the kind of 
fishbowl virtual world of an enormous network spectacle.
The conversion of actual capitalistic tendencies to the social capitalist struc-
tures of user-based accumulation has not somehow resolved the issues of ine-
quality or resolved any of the deep-seated contradictions of capital. Instead, 
neoliberal capitalism has imprinted itself on the sociocultural dimension of 
social media, if not exercised a complete appropriation of culture and multiple 
publics. Other forms of inequality may simply be distributed differently, but 
the inequalities still exist, if not also some alarming upticks in the amount of 
sexist, racist and homophobic attacks on social media that give voice to fringe 
hate groups to amplify the historical use of power against marginalised groups.
Moreover, users seeking to increase their social capital are paying in real 
money and time to do so. Although it may be tempting to think that payment 
is toward access to a social marketplace, given the labour time involved on 
social media that colonises leisure time, it is more appropriate to understand it 
as a social factory. As Fuchs succinctly tells us, ‘[c]orporate social media pro-
sumption is a form of continuous primitive accumulation of capital that turns 
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non-commodified leisure time into productive labour time that generates value 
and profit for capital’ (Fuchs 2014, 116).
In this chapter we encountered many instances where the social aspect of 
social media becomes effectively colonised by neoliberal and communica-
tive capitalism as a form of work-time, and that an increasing sense of neces-
sity has normalised the use of social media. We took on board the insights 
of Jodi Dean’s communicative capitalism to track the fantasies that enshroud 
and mythologise a great deal of social media activity, while tentatively offer-
ing a fourth fantasy. We are also witnessing that those who seek to increase 
their ‘share’ of online social capital may either resort to gaming the system or 
be compelled by the demands of a workplace to adopt the risk and responsi-
bility of becoming mobile and flexible sites of production and accumulation. 
Such acts may border on the mercenary and unscrupulous, and yet only serve 
to empower the circulation of capital by those powerful owners of social net-
working sites. Ultimately, we can pin blame on major network corporations 
for selling users on an ideology that seems to privilege the social, and yet uses 
this as a means to increase our participation and contribution activity on these 
networks for their own financial gain. This kind of commodification of the 
social is hardly a new observation; theorists such as Christian Fuchs and José 
van Dijck have amply demonstrated this. However, the accumulation of online 
social capital and all the gamesmanship that it may entail adds yet another layer 
of enticement for us to contribute according to principles that mimic market-
centric capitalism with the veneer of the social as a way of rationalising the 
pursuit of these online ‘high scores.’ Does this pursuit of accumulation make 
us more empowered, socially whole, and happy, or does it simply route us back 
into the same or similar forms of alienation Marx speaks of with respect to the 
extraction of surplus value from labour?
It is my own view that the ‘lure’ of social media via the self-promotional and 
gamesmanship tactics to increase one’s online ‘score’ exacerbates alienation, 
and particularly by substituting a more substantial social connection online 
with its mere appearance through accumulation efforts that valorise the indi-
vidual over community. We become divided competitors in the social media 
‘factory’ as opposed to united community collaborators. The solution is to cre-
ate and maintain a social media platform that evades the capture of capital-
ism, rejects its alienating principles, and focuses primarily on community over 
competition or profit.
Main Points
•	Communicative capitalism abstracts social power as something quantifiable, 
and imbued with the promise of exchange value. The user becomes the site 
of production for the social media site.
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•	The allure and convenience of measuring online social capital accumula-
tion comes with the false promise of increasing personal validation and 
wealth through vigorously competitive social comparison. This presents a 
fantasy of equivalence and conversion through a mode of standardisation 
of comparative measurement.
•	There are two interrelated circuits of capitalism operating here. At the user 
end, it is the pursuit of accumulating a higher score of social capital through 
strategic use of the platform, commodification of the self-as-brand, and the 
buying and selling of likes. The real value is situated in the enclosing capitalist 
circuit whereby the social media company monitors the inside (users) to sell 
users experiences, while marketing to an outside (advertisers) by selling space.
•	The more users pursue online social capital via social media sites, the more 
social media sites profit through the exploitation of the user base and the 
collection of their data. Social media sites are the real beneficiaries of this 
simulated social marketplace economy that can primarily only promise a 




From Accumulation to Alienation: 
Marx and Veblen
The previous chapter discussed some of the features of social capitalism and the 
nature of these flexible and mobile regimes to gain insight into the phenom-
enon of accumulation that occurs on social media, particularly with a view to 
online social capital’s most readily apparent symbol: numeric counters that val-
idate, valorise, and give some semblance of value to user production on social 
media. This is paired with the way social media sites accumulate and aggregate 
user data for its own purposes, not for the benefit of the user. Both of these 
forms of accumulation are not only circuits unto themselves, but are linked.
To what degree users on social media are alienated and exploited through 
their acts of online social capital accumulation must be answered in light of 
the specific affordances of social media, while also drawing from the works of 
Marx and Veblen. Given this chapter’s focus on alienation and exploitation, 
appealing to the works of Marx would be an obvious choice; however, this will 
only represent part of the story, for there is also the institutional economic 
approach developed by Thorstein Veblen that may speak to social media users’ 
conspicuous acts online. Combined, this will tell a more dynamic story about 
how alienation and exploitation manifest in the pursuit of online social capital. 
Both Marx and Veblen will agree that alienation is a major issue to be addressed 
and ameliorated, despite being in disagreement about its origins. For Marx, a 
raising of class consciousness is key to superseding alienation and exploitation, 
whereas for Veblen it is to wrest the power of invention and creation away from 
purely pecuniary interests, but also to raise consciousness in a different way: 
to get people to question their own conspicuous consumption and ritualistic 
behaviour. In the simplest of terms, the way out of alienation and exploitation 
leads, for Marx, to the classless society where workers own the means of pro-
duction; for Veblen, to a society where education and technology will not be 
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influenced or controlled by private sector interests, and instead be an available 
resource held in common.
There is still considerable debate as to whether social media use is increas-
ing or decreasing exploitation, and the same for alienation. In the classic 
Marxist literature, exploitation exacerbates alienation, yet some authors such 
as Eran Fisher (2010, 2012), Boltanski and Chiapello (2005, 2006) make the 
compelling argument that the situation with social media today presents a 
very different case, whereby there is a split between exploitation and aliena-
tion, with social media increasing exploitation of its users while user alienation 
decreases. Whereas exploitation increases from data collection of users and 
user- generated labour on social media, users have more control over how they 
choose to express themselves and through the benefits of sharing and creativity, 
thus decreasing their alienation. Although the affordances of social media for 
creation, sharing and engagement exist, the instrumentalist logic underpinning 
capitalist social media pervades even these behaviours. When these benefits 
are geared toward, or measured by, accumulation of online social capital, this 
seems to bring alienation back into focus.
Subsequent to expanding upon the issues of exploitation and alienation as part 
of two interlinked circuits of accumulation, it can be argued that the pursuit of 
online social capital as expressed by the numeric counters reifies capitalist ide-
ologies through a form of mimicry in an abstract or artificial economy within an 
actual economy of data collection and marketing. Furthermore, in the process 
of making use of social media to compete in the games of online social capital, 
users may in fact be producing themselves as branded digital objects, and thus 
can be said to be alienated from themselves as their own subjectivity is caught 
up in the circuit of capitalist production. As Lukács says of reification, ‘a relation 
between people takes on the character of a thing and thus acquires “phantom 
objectivity,” an autonomy that seems so strictly rational and all-embracing as 
to conceal every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between people.’ 
(Lukács 1972, 83). This phantom objectivity, core to Marx’s arguments on com-
modity fetishism, is present whenever labour is appropriated by another. Thus in 
this exploitative situation of extracting surplus value, this precipitates alienation.
Alienation
Marx’s core ideas on alienation function as an interrelated whole. There are 
four facets of alienation:
Alienation from One’s Labour Alienation from other Labourers
Alienation from the Product of One’s Labour Alienation from One’s self
Each of these facets of alienation differs in degree and expression pending the 
qualities and conditions pertaining to each person, productive capacities, and 
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labour arrangement. Marx’s analysis points to how these may differ in terms 
of class, and he spends more of his time focusing on the proletariat as the class 
most negatively impacted by the conditions of alienation. It can be simplified to 
this: what I do, what I make, who I relate with, who I am.
With the division of labour, the creation of wage-labour, and the rise of the 
factory system, there would be a commensurate separation that would precipi-
tate increased alienation, an end to the unity between human nature and labour 
through the inorganic and de-subjectifying aspects of capitalist production.
In the first of the four major separations, Marx points to a worker’s separa-
tion from the work being performed, as the worker no longer has a say in what 
is produced, or how it is produced (Marx 1964, 13). In a traditional factory 
context, someone working on an assembly line is instructed to manufacture 
parts in a standardised fashion using techniques that are set in advance, thus 
enabling a kind of deskilling compared to the artisanal and craft labour more 
common to the pre-industrial era. This would also apply to a worker in the 
largely industrialised field of the fast food industry who has no choice but to 
prepare pre-set meals using pre-defined techniques to produce the standard-
ised menu item. This form of alienation through routinised labour limits what 
the Autonomists will call the ‘worker’s affect’ – the capacity for creation and to 
derive something transformative from the act of one’s labour.
In the second aspect, we have the worker’s separation from the product being 
produced. Not only does the product of the labour not belong to the worker, 
but the worker cannot choose to make alterations to the way the product is 
produced, nor can the worker decide how the product will be used (Marx 
1964, 15). The product does not satisfy any need for the worker except that 
which is external to the productive activity: a wage. The worker’s creative and 
cognitive potential is not permitted to develop under these conditions, and so 
is treated by the capitalist as something like a source of fuel for the capitalist 
production machine.
In the third aspect, the worker is separated from other workers by the capi-
talist tendency to divide and rule, pitting workers in competition against one 
another rather than to encourage collaboration (Marx 1964, 17). This is prob-
lematised further in our era by the advent of neoliberal economic-inspired 
forms of casualisation, telecommuting, zero-contract hours, and the sustained 
attack against unionisation – all of which are somehow touted in an optimistic 
fashion as providing benefits to the worker in terms of flexibility (casualisation 
and zero-contract hours), convenience (telecommuting) and rewarding indi-
vidual merit while diminishing the value of workplace solidarity. This is exacer-
bated in the information economy: dividing workers spatially, temporally, and 
in encouraging individualist competition does not easily permit the kind of 
class consciousness Marx so strongly advocated, and it further seeks to increase 
profit upon practices that increase alienation and exploitation.
The fourth aspect binds all the other aspects together. The worker’s separa-
tion and alienation from the self is the end result of this form of estranged 
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labour in the capitalist system (Marx 1964, 16). A life dedicated to the produc-
tion of things that not only must have an immediate utility in the profit sys-
tem but is also the property of others, may serve as ingredients to the further 
immiseration and dehumanisation of the worker. Added to this that the activity 
of the worker, and the worker’s relation to other workers, is afflicted by this 
pervasive alienation, reduces the human being to subsistence activity: live to 
work, work to live.
The concepts of alienation and exploitation are strongly correlated given that, 
in Marxist analysis, the result of exploitation is alienation. So, we must ask if (i) 
social media users are exploited and, (ii) if, as a result of exploitation, they are 
also alienated. Furthermore, we must ask if the pursuit of online social capital 
is a feature tied to this exploitation and alienation.
Fisher (2012) splits alienation from exploitation rather than conflating the 
two. It might otherwise be understood that the two are complementary or 
entwined functions of capitalism, but Fisher independently asserts that, in 
social media, the increase in exploitation operates by a tacit promise of reduc-
ing the alienation of social media participants:
[T]he relations of production entailed by social media are based on an 
implicit social contract which allows media companies to commodify 
the communication produced by users (i.e. exploiting them) in return 
for giving them control over the process of producing communication, 
and expanding their opportunity for de-alienation. (180)
Social media on its own may not be alienating if we consider alienation to mean 
that users are somehow separated from fully realising themselves, others, their 
labour, or the product of their labour. In fact, there may be some reason to 
believe that social media may be a de-alienating force. The capacity for self-
expression is limited only by the affordances of the network platform, as well as 
the means to connect and share information and values with others.
Fisher points to a dialectical relationship between social media exploitation 
and alienation; namely, that the communicative benefits of social media pro-
vide opportunities for self-expression and content sharing, etc., but this only 
occurs as exploitation of those users increases:
[I]n order to be de-alienated, users must communicate and socialize: 
they must establish social networks, share information, talk to their 
friends and read their posts, follow and be followed. By thus doing they 
also exacerbate their exploitation. (Fisher 2012, 179)
The promise of de-alienation through social media entails authentic self-
expression and the cultivating of online relations which, in turn, provide the 
means for further exploitation by the network platform as users provide more 
surplus value by communicating more frequently, sharing photos, etc. As 
alienation decreases, exploitation increases – even if a majority of users do not 
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perceive themselves as being exploited. Users become ‘reconceptualised in the 
digital discourse as atomized nodes of entrepreneurship in the network of social 
production’ (Fisher 2010, 142). In this process of apparent emancipatory affor-
dances for flexibility and creativity in this social production, Fisher makes the 
strong point that although this may be a ‘dealienating’ force, the turn to a form 
of entrepreneurial individualism and atomisation of users-as-nodes comes at 
the expense of more collaborative social structures as the work produced online 
becomes increasingly privatised. The increase in user productivity aligns with 
many of the touted virtues of neoliberal capitalism: workers who are adapt-
able, flexible, and atomised as opposed to fixed, secure and united by solidarity 
and collectivity. This, in turn, opens up more opportunities for the capitalist to 
engage in exploitative behaviour.
It would be too strong an assertion to say that social media de-alienates all its 
users, and particularly if we are unclear about what degree of alienation each 
of the users experiences prior to engaging in social media. At best, we might 
say that social media provides some or many with the means by which they 
can indulge in their positive aspects to be creative and engage in meaningful 
interpersonal relations not afforded them in their everyday work lives. The use 
of social media does not necessarily alleviate the alienation one might experi-
ence in the workplace or in offline life. Instead, social media’s emancipatory 
benefits may function as a creative social outlet. However, this is not always 
the case. For those who work exclusively on social media as their profession, 
their opportunities are prescribed by the demands of their employment. One 
example is account ownership: litigation concerning cases where an employee 
who operates a company social media account (whether in their own name, 
that of the business – or both) is terminated is still without much precedent. 
The company may argue on the lines of trade secrets or that the acquisition of 
followers was due exclusively to the employee’s connection to the company, and 
that those followers are the property of the company and not the employee.
Secondly, social media provides a potential for engaging in communicative 
exchanges and interpersonal relations that are meaningful and not alienating.
Thirdly, the increased integration of digital environments that augment even 
an offline world may also be indicative of an increase in alienation: the erosion 
of offline face-to-face social skills, a decrease in empathy, the unspoken demand 
to spend more time online to engage in instant communication feedback with-
out being afforded the time for more meaningful reflection, an indifference to 
the outside world, the prospect that users become more like stimulus-response 
machines who react to online notifications as though thoroughly behaviourally 
conditioned, and the ways by which some online services augment reality by 
ideological means, so that a map of the landscape points almost solely to where 
one can consume products and services.
Lastly, there is both the structure and content of social media communica-
tion as potentially alienating. By structure, it is the network frames in which 
users are prompted to input their personal information, hobbies, interests and 
so forth for the ease of data mining; by content it is the proportion of online 
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communication dedicated to discussing consumer products and services, 
endorsement of brands, etc.
None of these objections render Fisher’s argument of de-alienation insuffi-
cient, but they point to circumstances where we cannot say for absolute cer-
tainty, in all cases, that alienation decreases with the use of social media. There 
are numerous examples of de-alienation with the emergence of social media, 
but there are also counter examples.
We see further how alienation is exacerbated by the embedded and largely 
unseen algorithms operative in our social software. As Dyer-Witheford (1999), 
Terranova (2000, 2004) and Pasquinelli (2011) point out, in different ways, that 
our human processes become encoded as machinic form, gradually reducing 
our capacity to act (our affect) in the name of speed and convenience. It is not 
just routinised labour that is gradually displaced by the algorithms, but creative 
choices. Instead, we may be presented with ‘recommendations’ for whom to 
connect with, digital reminders that we have not participated for some time, 
and served a selective list of items in our network newsfeed at the exclusion 
of others that limit our capacity to act in response to only those items in the 
newsfeed we are presented with. Even the process of expanding our networks – 
itself a product of the logic that more connections is intrinsically better as it 
may increase our social or professional opportunities – may be facilitated by 
social media. A good example might be in consenting in allowing the site to 
access a list of contacts via one’s email account, offering to send on one’s behalf 
a batch invitation email to subscribe or connect. Sites such as LinkedIn make 
use of this option, and will match existing users to one’s existing email contacts 
for a mass invite to connect. Even in those cases where one takes the time to 
scrutinise each potential connection, LinkedIn provides a simple and editable 
boilerplate invitation message.
The following table may indicate a few of the still existing alienation ‘flash-
points’ associated with social media:
ALIENATION SOCIAL MEDIA USERS
From One’s Labour 1) The ‘how’ and ‘what’ partially prescribed by the framework 
of the social media site.
2) Automated processes that bypass creative choice.
3) Prescriptive terms of service that justify deletion of content 
deemed by that service to be in violation, including 
creative and political content.
From the Product 
of One’s Labour
1) User content is the property of the social media site with 
its exclusive right to modify or distribute.
2) Data as the processed ‘product’ of labour is a commodity 
sold to third parties using a model reminiscent of factorage.
3) The content of the labour having no productive labour 
value, only that it has been performed and can be data 
mined for, say, keywords.
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ALIENATION SOCIAL MEDIA USERS
From Others 1) Privileging competition over collaboration and 
cooperation.
2) Connection for connection’s sake.
3) Digital reputation management in construction of self-as-
representation, and as digital object.
4) Algorithms that determine visible content.
From the Self 1) Representation of idealised self via the social media site’s 
affordances.
2) Value migration so that offline experience is worth ‘less’ if 
not ported to the online milieu for validation by the social 
network.
3) Operating according to ‘network time’ as opposed to free 
time.
4) Selective exposure and self-selecting networks narrowing 
one’s understanding of the self and world.
5) Expectations to react and respond rapidly as opposed to 
reflect and act at one’s own pace.
6) Occupation of time spent away from personal reflection.
7) Vicarious living and social comparator activities.
8) Quantification of social activity as a measure of personal 
social value.
Alienation, Deskilling, and the Online Social Economy
There is yet another aspect of alienation that ought to be addressed given Marx’s 
dire warnings over how capitalist technologies deskill workers and create the con-
ditions for dead labour. Although not all social media users rely on social media 
in the classical sense of earning a wage for their labour, there is a haunting echo 
of work being performed and the gradual deskilling of that work transformed by 
convenient user experience. In tracking the rise of the world wide web, even the 
creation of websites may no longer require knowledge of HTML as there are sev-
eral web hosting providers that make the building of a personal website possible 
with no coding knowledge whatsoever. In the world of social media, the freedom 
of design one had in such milieus as MySpace has been sacrificed for ease of use 
by constructing a rigid user-interface architecture where all elements share uni-
formity with every other social media user’s account – a form of ‘freedom’ from 
design. This may actually serve to limit user action potentiality, prescribed by the 
network architecture (Papachrissi, 2009). On the one hand, the removal of bar-
riers of specialisation required to build and maintain one’s involvement in these 
sites has permitted more inclusive entry by the populace, whereby this specialisa-
tion is mostly undertaken ‘in-house’ by employees of the social media site.
If we take the accumulation of online social capital as a form of work, and one 
that relies on a huge social graph linked to competition, it is of some value to 
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recall Marx’s statement: ‘All improvements in the means of communication, for 
example, facilitate the competition of workers in different localities and turn 
local competition into national’ (1975 [1847], 423). However, we might update 
the statement to reflect the expansive shift to the global scale, following the 
associated reification of a global economy. Users are ‘plugged into’ the circuits 
of capital, especially on social media sites where production, consumption, 
marketing and circulation converge.
What links online social capital accumulation to social digital alienation? To 
take a strictly Marxist interpretation of capital as a social relation, what medi-
ates this relation? In the case of social capital as something that is accumulated, 
what is accumulated is the image of social capital through its representation: 
namely the numeric indicators that confer a sense of value and currency related 
to the general economy of users on any social media site platform. These rela-
tions among users become objectified as counters and are linked to the appar-
ent value of the user. Already, the user in this general economy is abstracted as 
a representation of the self, modified as a digital object through which the user 
produces content in an effort to accumulate social capital.
The larger the user base or general economy of a particular platform, the 
larger the potential volume of transactions in this space, as well as the potential 
to accumulate online social capital. The more active users a site hosts, the more 
chances one has to sell one’s productions in exchange for the approbation cues 
that underpin social capital. However, if the global economy is any indication of 
a pattern that might be applied here, a larger economy can never guarantee any 
one individual’s wealth accumulation. Worse, it creates greater disparity due to 
several factors. It may also create the conditions of ‘many sellers, few buyers’. 
This has increasingly become the case for those who produce video content for 
such enormously popular sites such as YouTube, being the largest single ‘buyer’ 
of user video content. This was identified by Ulises Mejias when he correctly 
calls this relation a form of oligopsony as opposed to an oligopoly (2013).
This feature of oligopsony is directly in play when we consider that those who 
engage in online self-branding in order to acquire more online social capital 
effectively ‘sell’ their labour power to the social networking site. If the goal of 
a user is to accumulate the largest amount of online social capital, it may seem 
logical to create a visible profile on a social network with a huge social graph. 
A network with a billion users as opposed to a thousand presents a higher 
potentiality for accumulating a larger amount of online social capital resources. 
However, the oligopsonistic nature of social media has emerged as dominant 
players like Facebook have either outpaced or absorbed its competitors, lead-
ing to fewer providers of social media services. It is the enormous user base 
that sells their labour and personal brand to these major social media sites in 
exchange for the services provided.
There is still one way in which the dominant social media sites retain their 
oligopolistic nature: by being the sellers of data. So it is in this way that major 
sites such as Facebook, Twitter and YouTube can operate as oligopsonists to 
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both users and those who seek to purchase advertising space on a site with one 
of the largest potential markets in the world.
Alienation and Veblen
The Marxist formulation of alienation is perpetuated by class division and capi-
talist exploitation, but it is far from the whole story when speaking of alienation 
in an online context. What Marx does not fully address is the cultural means 
by which institutions of power reproduce their status, and how individuals who 
seek advantage may emulate certain behaviours that are largely ritualistic in 
nature. Whereas Marx focuses on class struggle as part of the broader dialectic 
of chance and necessity, Veblen points to status and its forms of display as the 
human invariant.
Thorstein Veblen was among the first to recognise economics as thoroughly 
entangled or embedded in social institutions. In this age with the rise of democ-
ratised and digital forms of social institutions alongside traditional ones, it is 
feasible to apply the idea of an embedded economy in the social institutions of 
digital media, and particularly to extend the definition of social institution to 
such corporate entities as Facebook, Twitter and others. The very model from 
which all social media as private corporations follow is a distinctively market-
based logic of accumulation. Veblen reminds us of the ritualistic nature of insti-
tutions, and warns against the depredations of pecuniary interest that impede 
true innovation.
Veblen identifies a fundamental dichotomy between an institution’s more 
 ceremonial function with its resistance to change, and the instrumental 
role  technology can play in progress and change. Whilst he does argue to 
some degree about the manner in which technology can shape culture and 
 society, his critics may be unfair to impute to him an outright technological 
determinist stance.
Traditional institutions in their most ceremonial aspects rely heavily on 
status-based hierarchies. The complexity of these institutions and the vested 
interests of those who occupy the power roles would characteristically be resist-
ant to change, equating it with disruption and possibly jeopardising status. The 
threat of new technologies can precipitate change and disruption, be it crisis, 
resistance or adoption. Ideally, Veblen argues, adjustment is essential and tech-
nology should occupy a more instrumental role.
It may be argued that much of the activity on social networks has an instru-
mental basis, due to the nature of computerised networks operating by a net-
work logic and epistemology. The instrumental use of social networks by the 
corporate hosts can be seen in the way it acquires user data for its pecuniary 
purposes, whereas the instrumental use for the network user may be indexed 
on the accumulation of online social capital that can later be leveraged for some 
extrinsic purpose. Both ends of the network – host and user – are caught up in a 
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distinctly economic instrumentality, performing a cost-benefit analysis of time 
spent, connections made and reputation management as a means of increasing 
a return on investment.
The focus here on online social goods of conspicuous production and con-
sumption is restricted to the social behaviours that are geared toward increasing 
online social capital and claiming stake in the attention economy. Moreover, it 
is important to question whether the terms of prosumer or produser are suf-
ficient to replace the producer-consumer distinction, even when considering 
user-led collaborative processes for content creation. Contrary to Bruns (2009), 
production and consumption may still be useful and operative terms. If we 
were to turn to pre-internet media, a reader who submits a letter to the editor of 
a newspaper or a listener who participates in a radio call-in show, could theo-
retically be classed under prosumption. However, the functions of production 
and consumption are still clear and distinct. The fanfare associated with the 
benefits of prosumption (Ritzer and Jurgenson 2010) and produsage (Bruns 
2009) are said to inform a radical shift in economic models (Benkler 2006), 
while possibly overlooking the predatory and exploitative aspects of freely cre-
ated and distributed content (Fuchs 2010).
The alliance between the emergence and rapid proliferation of ICTs and neo-
liberal ideology has already been recognised by several authors (Castells 1996; 
Dyer-Witheford 1999; Harvey 2005; Bulut et al., 2009; Neubauer 2011). The 
specific context in which digital social environments may find themselves may 
have adopted in part some of the ideological shibboleths of informational capi-
talism insofar as that context represents:
[a] dialectic between forces and relations of production and consump-
tion (that) revolves around technologies specifically designed (and mar-
keted) to enhance, capture, transmit, and store human capacities such 
as creativity, communication, co-operation, and cognition’ (Manzerolle 
2014, 206).
Under these conditions, production itself is transformed, and social prosumption 
in the online environment comes ever more to resemble competitive business.
There is a great deal of contention between the Marxist and Veblenian views 
regarding alienation. For Marx, alienation is contingent upon the legal legiti-
mation of private property and capitalist accumulation which alienates work-
ers from their labour, the object of their labour, each other, and their own 
sense of self. For Veblen, alienation has its source in the predatory and tribal 
economy whereby such things as raids and acquisition were less about satisfy-
ing basic needs and more indexed on status-raising. In this movement, the 
instinct for workmanship is impoverished as ‘work is irksome’ and extravagant 
displays of wealth are required in Veblen’s view of conspicuous consumption 
to explain the drive to display wealth as a status marker in societies. According 
to Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption, consumption patterns are less 
From Accumulation to Alienation: Marx and Veblen 71
indexed on durability and utility and more about status display. A silver spoon 
may tarnish and is a softer metal than steel, but it conveys status. Mapped unto 
the pursuit of accumulating social capital in an online context, there may be 
quite limited durability (due to novelty-effect) and utility (as it may not lead 
to actual wealth accumulation on the basis of the labour theory of value and 
that surplus value is extracted by the social media site). To be a YouTube star 
may not result in financial riches, but one may earn (an arguably temporary) 
cultural cachet.
Considering Veblen’s theory of conspicuous consumption is in itself incom-
plete without contemplating that, on social media, there is also conspicuous 
production. If the goal of online social capital in the like economy is to be seen 
and raise one’s status in a digital community, what one consumes in terms of 
content becomes conspicuous as a form of status display. Following particular 
online celebrities becomes part of a user’s status in that they are choosing to be 
seen as being associated with that celebrity and that celebrity’s values. Certainly 
not in all cases, as one can follow a politician and be disposed against her or 
him. In conspicuous production, the means by which users will display their 
status by posting images of a luxury vacation, expensive car, or some other 
form of luxury accessory may be performed in order to gain more likes while 
being seen as having good consumer taste and wealth. Such examples are plen-
tiful on social media, such as the Instagram accounts RichRussianKids – which 
displays the luxurious lifestyles of the children of oligarch families – Rich Kids 
of Instagram, and others who use highly staged and filtered photos to portray 
lives of extreme wealth and privilege.
Such efforts at status display are not consigned to just that small segment 
of society with a great deal of wealth seeking to gain likes, but can be found 
emulated across social media in a variety of forms, including glamorous selfies, 
travel and adventure photos, professional status posts and even the popular 
genre of taking photos of one’s food.16 Beyond conveying signs of professional 
status or wealth, some forms of conspicuous display can take the form of broad-
casting social activist causes such as adding an awareness ribbon on an avatar 
or in associating one’s profile with highly regarded public figures.
One may also point to some social media sites’ use of specific filters for 
enhancing photographs that may alter the visual appearance of objects or per-
sons in order to make them appear more glamorous than they actually are. 
For Veblen, such acts of reputation management and self-curation would be 
signs of conspicuous display in a competitive environment of seeking attention 
and positive status. This does not yet include other forms of conspicuous status 
displays such as those that clearly have a metric for easy communication of a 
user’s ‘value’ in a network. A large number of friends, followers and likes attests 
to a display of popularity and importance to the network. Beyond what one 
buys, it is the conversion to what one produces in terms of content that points 
to conspicuous display with a goal of gaining more approbation and having a 
community legitimise the status of the individual.
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Conspicuous forms of production that seek to enhance online social status 
is conspicuous when one’s labour is specifically indexed on transforming the 
use value of a communication event into an exchange value in the ‘like’ econ-
omy. By optimising one’s digital profile and content production with a view 
of increasing quantified social capital, such behaviour can be understood as 
opportunistic, instrumental, and conspicuous.
If large financial markets are too complex, if not chaotic, their oscillations 
privy to allegedly rational actors making rational choices, does the same apply 
to the social market and to the development of social capital? If human instru-
mentality as a motivation for behaviour in making choices to leverage social 
capital for individual gain can be viewed in Veblenian terms as infused with the 
broader sociological conditions of conspicuous consumption as an evolution-
arily cultural invariant from the time of predatory cultures to the modern day, 
this in itself might serve as an indictment against the over-optimistic assump-
tions related to social capital.
In Veblen’s technical terminology, features of the social media environment 
may attest to an evaluative apparatus of the invidious by which others may be 
compared according to quantifiable measure. How many ‘likes,’ or ‘friends’ 
online may be a function of reducing the subjective qualities of ‘social’ and ‘atten-
tion’ to numerical considerations alone as a measure of popularity. Mapping free 
market principles onto social activity has become the norm in many digital envi-
ronments, and so the qualitative value is subordinate to the quantitative, more 
easily apprehended by a digital audience in the assigning of value. But it is the 
appropriation of the social by pecuniary interests that both Marx and Veblen 
would agree in finding deeply problematic. If social activity is more of a spon-
taneous one that speaks to one of the essential features of our social being, we 
might recall Marx: ‘in degrading spontaneous activity, free activity, to a means, 
estranged labour makes man’s species life a means to his physical existence’ 
(Marx 1972 [1844], 73). However, in the case of our labour directed to the accu-
mulation of social capital, this may be performed for reasons that do not have 
anything to do with survival. That is, making online connections and producing 
content on social media is not a pre-requisite for obtaining the means for our 
subsistence. Food, shelter, and clothing are not contingent upon n number of 
likes on Facebook.17
The search for status enhancement through a conspicuously economic means 
is portrayed as a route to self-actualisation. For Veblen, it is this desire for status 
that is the driving force in scaling production beyond that of simply satisfying 
basic needs. Just as Veblen argues, those who seek status must seek ways of 
providing a demonstration of their pecuniary strength, generally through acts 
of wasteful consumption and unproductive uses of time, the same might be 
said with respect to the online social venues whereby it is not explicitly mate-
rial wealth that is being generated and displayed for status enhancement, but 
a particularly social variety that is also measured in much the same manner as 
material wealth.
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Veblen and Competitive Accumulation
At the heart of egocentric or instrumentalist online social capital is the drive 
toward accumulation strategies. In search of virtual goods as a marker of social 
class, actions directed to accumulation and conversion lead steadily to becom-
ing the ‘accepted badge of efficiency’ whereby the ‘possession of goods, whether 
acquired aggressively by one’s own exertion or passively by transmission 
through inheritance from others, becomes a conventional basis of reputabil-
ity’ (Veblen 2010, 19). Accumulation should not be thought in strictly material 
terms or the goods that are trafficked on social media. Instead, accumulation 
takes on an objectivising approach to the myriad subjects who are subscrib-
ers to social media in that they can be accumulated as a sum of connections 
that further enhance the perceived status of the central ‘node’ (in a social net-
work, each node is central to itself as an egocentric access point). Moreover, 
social approbation markers on social media linked to a quantity constructs the 
appearance of value of the posted content of a user on the basis of a number, 
which in non-economic terms represent affinity and approbation, but function 
as a standardised measure of social wealth: The higher the number, the higher 
the perceived value of the user, and so, ‘the end sought by accumulation is to 
rank high in comparison with the rest of the community in point of pecuniary 
strength’ (Veblen 2010, 20). In this case, the competitive nature of said envi-
ronments is not linked to money, but according to the premium attributed to 
quantifiable social wealth.
Although digital environments appear to conform to an economy of abun-
dance due to the ease of duplication of immaterial goods trafficked online as 
endemic to the nature of digital information flows, both the acquisition of 
meaningful social capital and the attention economy are still indexed on an 
economy of scarcity, and hence the requirement for competition to acquire 
these resources. The comparative and competitive drive among users may be 
technically defined, with reference to Veblen, as invidious insofar as the grad-
ing or rating of others is based on relative worth or value (Veblen 2010, 22). 
This invidiousness pervades social media as part of the evaluative framework 
by which others may be said to be judged against a measure of peculiar markers 
that are quantitative in nature.
Social wealth, earned or inherited by association with reputable or popular 
persons, is not yet social capital. In the games of online social capital, social 
wealth must be first transferred to the digital milieu in some measurable way 
whereby said wealth can be leveraged for producing capital. In other words, the 
truly social and qualitative must be transubstantiated as something quantita-
tive that reduces or effaces the subjectively social. As the socially rich offline 
may have a higher probability of being socially rich online according to Social 
Enhancement Theory (Merton 1968), this transfer or exchange may prove of 
some facility to those who already enjoy a large number of social connections in 
the offline world. These must be reiterated and formalised in the online milieu 
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by way of invitations to connect, thus mapping offline social wealth online as 
evidence of social wealth. One of the unique aspects of social media is that 
social connections and interactions become, pending privacy settings, visible 
to a spectator audience, perhaps in a similar way as ‘Society Pages’ in the past 
detailed the lives and gossip circulating about members of the upper classes. 
Social wealth may be seen as intrinsic use value, whereas its mediatisation and 
commodification in online social networks gives it a new status as exchange 
value in the form of social capital. What is being traded and gained, generally 
at a perceived profit, is the commodity form of the digital self and its asso-
ciated productions. Investment occurs through conspicuous production, and 
later management, of the personal profile. This ‘property’ of the user, which is 
in effect subject to the rent paid to the host in non-monetary forms, is a trading 
area where is housed all the ‘goods’ of the user. These goods may take the sim-
ple form of preferred tastes in music or film. Or, it may also be the images that 
associate the user with some popular product, or a marker of affluence and the 
means of disposable income in the form of travel pictures of Europe. One of the 
distinct advantages of social media environments is in the way these environ-
ments are structured: the media-rich qualities and specific arrangement of the 
site with a strongly visual bias encourages acts of visual display. Such displays 
are ideal for meeting the real purpose of conspicuous consumption: to be seen 
and judged as being of higher status and thus worthy of more attention. All 
the while, the tireless algorithm in the background harvests keywords for the 
express purpose of monetising social interaction.
Of Social Profits to Be Made Via Conspicuous Display
Social displays, particularly of social wealth in the online venue, do not escape 
the cycle of commodification, which
reduces ourselves and those we encounter on the internet to glamorous 
and attractive personae. Commodification becomes self-commodification, 
but shorn of context, engagement and obligation, of our achievements 
and failures, of our friends and enemies, of all the features that time has 
engraved on our faces and bodies – without all that we lack gravity and 
density. (Borgmann 64).
Albert Borgmann identifies the dehumanising and marketising aspect of the 
internet in general, but it may also equally apply to the specific conditions of 
social media. The commodification of the self (and relations with others) has 
increased as capital has discovered new ways of inscribing market logic within 
these social relations, drilling down right to the level where conversations online 
are mined for their data value and in the behaviour of some users to pursue a 
quasi- capitalist agenda of accumulation. When it comes to the all-important 
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context of our social relations and their supporting narrative, context itself may 
become victim to the over-privileging of the immediate, particularly when we 
consider that content usually appears in reverse chronological order on social 
media, thus placing the responsibility on a user to seek ‘below the fold’ to 
reconstruct the context of our conversations and interactions. This privileging 
of  immediacy and novelty is an endemic feature that feeds into our desire for 
stimulus through microburst gratification, the depreciation of social capital as 
numeric value affixed to any particular content, and the pressures or expecta-
tions of informationism.
Friends and visitors who are alerted to a user’s posted content can affect that 
user’s social marginal utility value by clicking on the ‘like’ button or supplying 
a comment. Said friends and visitors may be said to be consumers of the image 
produced by the user, but are presented with a means for an instant polling. Jean 
Baudrillard tells us that contemporary media presents objects as a form of test 
that minimises our contemplative time in order to prompt us to respond with 
a ‘yes’ or ‘no’ (Baudrillard 1993, 63), so too is the user also participating in the 
selective test of producing just the right content that will gain the approval of 
the audience. Such a production may be judged a failure if it does not provoke 
a response that is made public. The production may be judged subpar if it fails 
to reach a certain numerical threshold such as number of likes or comments. If 
the user seeks to maximise on their return on investment for the production-
event, a certain understanding of what is considered appealing to the social net-
work audience is required. However, this is little more than the necessary but 
not sufficient condition for increasing social profit; other factors play a role in 
determining how the market responds to the posted content, such as number 
of connections the user has, and how well advertised the event happens to be 
according to the proprietary algorithm of the SNS. This suggests that despite 
what efforts are made by the user to generate and disseminate content that 
might appeal to an audience, there are a variety of factors outside of his or her 
control that may have an appreciable effect on social profit. From the standpoint 
of the user, labour is required that aligns with variables of relevance and regular-
ity of posted content to avoid one’s production falling below the proverbial fold.
Maximising social profit in an environment where one’s everyday life is rela-
tively unknown by the connected members of one’s network requires develop-
ing strategies for making it known by attracting attention to it. Veblen remarks 
that social situations with a higher number of participants requires tactics for 
increasing the visibility of conspicuous consumption (2010, 49). Such social 
arrangements with larger numbers of participants who, ostensibly, are also 
vying for recognition of status among transitory observers increases the prob-
ability and intensity of competition.
One may argue that it costs little or nothing to join social media at the user 
end. Participation does require the purchase of devices and internet services. The 
devices themselves are caught up in a rapid cycle of production- consumption-
disposal, at times themselves being conspicuous fashion items. As social media 
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continues to increase rich media content affordances, this places more strain on 
hardware to keep up, and eventually necessitates the replacement of the devices 
themselves. The material costs of participation aside, the price to be paid in 
using social media may include a variety of less tangible costs such as giving the 
SNS permission to use one’s data, as well as time computed as a cost in the use 
of social media. In some ways, using social media can be an extravagant use of 
personal time, and thus may be classed as a form of conspicuous consumption. 
Veblen makes the critical distinction that use and consumption differs from 
ownership, just as indolence is not a measure of leisure (Veblen 2010, 16).
The user’s social media profile is the immaterial product of the user’s labour. 
As such, it enters into an online social commodities market in a competition 
for attention and an increase in personal social capital. The new techno-social 
reality of social media emulates market logics and redefines users as micro-
capitalists of the self. This occurs within a unified social economy that is global, 
out of which a new and virtualised form of wealth can be produced through 
strategic social partnerships online. Such labour, despite occurring in a space 
dedicated to entertainment and socialising, may be intensive when all factors 
that go into the production of the digital self and personal social capital are 
considered, such as posting new content on a regular basis, profile manage-
ment, and engaging in offline activities that will have value when posted online. 
This emulation of marketising practices in social terms agrees with the neolib-
eral understanding of the citizen as consumer, and allows for the creation of a 
space wherein the prosumers of social media can enjoy freedoms not experi-
enced in the offline world:
Consumer freedom was originally a compensation for the loss of the 
freedom and autonomy of the producer. Having been evicted from pro-
duction and communal self-rule, the individual drive to self-assertion 
found its outlet in the market game. One can suppose that at least in 
part the continuing popularity of the market game derives from its vir-
tual monopoly as the vehicle of self-construction and individual auton-
omy. The less freedom exists in the other spheres of life, the stronger is 
the popular pressure on the further extension of consumer freedom – 
 whatever its cost. (Bauman 1988, 95)
Ideology of Social Competition
The neoliberal ideology with its aims of globally deregulated trade, flexible 
accumulation strategies and promotion of the arch-individual becomes the 
new bedrock of online social relations. Economic concerns become the spec-
tacular enclosure and teleological purpose of social relations in a rapid feed-
back-based environment governed by ruthless competition. The highest values 
of this environment become competition and connection, all of which can be 
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quantified and conspicuously displayed on one’s profile. Neoliberalism operates 
by adopting a ‘strong’ paternalistic discourse that attempts to naturalise eco-
nomic Darwinism (Peck and Tickell, 2002). All labour – and social – relations 
succumb to a discourse of competition that is global in scale. Social media can 
prove a competitive battleground for those who seek to accumulate the most 
online social capital. As online social capital is visible for public display, and 
not only made visible to the user, this can be considered an expression of con-
spicuousness, for the display of such metrics play a role in proving one’s status 
and value.
The means to access these networks may in themselves speak to the devolu-
tion of the cachet item of leisure to the range of affordability by the petty house-
hold economy. The devices themselves are also caught up in this economy that, 
marketed as aesthetic utility and are specifically designed to be objects that 
appeal to aesthetic taste, while still speaking to ‘utility.’ The production – and 
subsequent disposal at the end of the device’s life cycle – is the fruit of poor 
working conditions in developing nations. Marx's patent truism holds that the 
more luxurious the product, the less likely it is that those who manufacture it 
will be able to afford it. What is to be retained here is the emulative process 
of consuming apparent luxury goods that also appeal to the conscience of the 
consumer as something useful and necessary, for a purely aestheticised gadg-
etry with no obvious utility might not result in popular adoption and thus brisk 
sales to justify the rapid and enormous requirements of the production and 
consumption cycle. Where the conspicuousness of the device is on its own not 
enough to convince consumers to adopt it, other means are invented by which 
certain features unique to the device come pre-loaded and embedded with pro-
prietary software that cannot be ported to a competitor device.
In a time of increasing economic austerity with its knock-on effects for a 
steadily shrinking middle class, it might be reasonable to assume that con-
spicuous consumption must be seen in terms of scalar adjustments that take 
into consideration depressed or stagnant wages and available credit. As discre-
tionary consumer purchasing power in North America has softened (despite a 
modest increase in the consumer price index since the 2008 downturn), thus 
having a deleterious impact on profit, consumption practices might be seen to 
shift or to migrate just slightly to a virtualised form, and this through consump-
tion and production activities in the online social milieu.
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri signal that, at the heart of network culture 
is the possibility for greater collaboration among a multitude that might sub-
vert the aims of postmodern capital:
Cooperation is completely immanent to the laboring activity itself. This 
fact calls into question the old notion (common to classical and Marx-
ian political economics) by which labour power is conceived as ‘vari-
able capital’, that is, a force that is activated and made coherent only by 
capital, because the cooperative powers of labor power (particularly 
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immaterial labor power) afford labor the possibility of valorising itself. 
Brains and bodies still need others to produce value, but the others they 
need are not necessarily provided by capital and its capacities to orches-
trate production. Today productivity, wealth, and the creation of social 
surpluses take the form of cooperative interactivity through linguistic, 
communicational, and affective networks. In the expression of its own 
creative energies, immaterial labor thus seems to provide the potential 
for a kind of spontaneous and elementary communism. (Hardt and 
Negri 2000, 294)
The competition to increase social capital in an attention economy is precisely 
what grants the online social self-servicing mechanisms their justification and 
coherence. It does not occur in a space or milieu outside of a corporately con-
trolled environment, and even the notion of a ‘gift economy’ of social reciproc-
ity online is effectively hijacked by a numerical system that assigns extrinsic 
value to the immaterial labour performed online. There is still a wage system 
in the form of likes and other approbation cues that digitally reify social value 
as something quantifiable. The very plain fact that these social relations which 
define capital occur on networks that have a material basis at least in terms of 
requiring cheap manufacturing labour to produce the hardware and precarious 
labour for the motley services that are created by these hardware may under-
cut part of Hardt and Negri’s argument. But, just as importantly, the online 
social relations on SNSs are still patterned or defined according to accumula-
tion and competitive strategies whereby each user attempting to secure their 
share of the attention economy must make personal calculations of temporal 
investment, and that any collaboration or sharing will somehow improve the 
individual user’s online social capital, thus consigning acts of sharing to some-
thing entirely extrinsic. While a vast number of online users are engaged in a 
global competitive practice of accumulating social capital, the reality is that 
such ‘accumulation requires commitment from many people, although few 
have any real chances of making a substantial profit’ (Boltanski and Chiapello 
2006, 163). The ‘winners’ in the games of social capital exist at the expense of a 
multitude of ‘losers.’
Although many users may be engaged in the competitive games by which 
they can obtain a larger share of attention, this is not always necessarily linked 
to a concrete purpose. That is, setting aside those who have a specific promo-
tional agenda to market a product or service they are selling, the question of 
what a user hopes to gain in achieving an arbitrary high number of likes, com-
ments or connections remains somewhat mysterious. We might speculate that 
the higher the number of interactive events such as likes or comments, the 
more the satisfaction in terms of social validation. It is in a return to Veblen 
that we discover that the motivations are, in fact, deliberate, and although their 
purposes may vary in their particulars, the end goal is to be accorded by a 
community with a validated status. Veblen’s analysis tells us that the drive or 
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imperative for conspicuous consumption, either of goods or time and effort, is 
contingent upon the size of the audience to be impressed.
Conspicuous Prosumption
Conspicuous prosumption may differ only slightly from Veblen’s notion of con-
spicuous consumption. In the latter, what one consumes becomes a sign of one’s 
purchasing power. In terms of social media and the prosumption model, the 
signs of social approbation in high numbers become a sign of one’s commodi-
fied social power. Social power, no matter how the SNS provides tools for its 
apparent measurement in terms of likes, does not lend itself to precise meas-
urement at all. There is no formula by which n number of ‘like-units’ will pro-
duce a value that is anything but arbitrary and relative. One can measure power 
in terms of joules per second as watts, but social power cannot be reduced to 
standardised measurement. At best, the subjective notion of power – be this 
political, social, military, or economic – is a form of potestas, and can only be 
measured according to the relative values of more or less. With respect to social 
power on social media, there is no guarantee that a million likes on a post 
grants to the creator a special social power. Nor does having 5,000 connections 
necessarily mean that the user has more social capital at his or her disposal.
It might be said that there are implicit social norms on social media, and 
a gradual building of cultural capital that guides notions of taste, but also 
which guide to some degree what are the appropriate mechanisms by which 
to develop social capital specific to each social media environment. Software 
design restricts certain choices and behaviours. For example, rejected friend 
requests on Facebook do not result in the requester being notified of the rejec-
tion. These are intentionally designed elements to promote a positive social 
space that reduces the possibility of hostility and rejection, even if a determined 
user can find other ways of indulging in antisocial behaviour such as trolling.
The surplus production of goods beyond the necessities of life are absorbed 
by those who crave an increase in status, and thus can be considered the driver 
in the desire for economic growth, even if it may be considered derivative: ‘The 
utility of consumption as an evidence of wealth is to be classed as a deriva-
tive growth’ (Veblen 2010, 40). For Veblen, waste has a functional utility, albeit 
of a secondary value in the way it is leveraged to satisfy a human desire for 
status. Veblen, committed as he was to applying a Darwinist analogy to the 
field of institutional practices, largely saw acts of conspicuous consumption by 
a wealthy elite and leisure class – as well as those of the lower classes partak-
ing of said behaviours as far as their means allowed, in emulation of the upper 
classes – as an evolutionary invariant; that is, the desire for status by material 
demonstration of wealth and its wasteful expenditure has only changed in its 
particulars while the general aspect has remained the same since the beginning 
of human civilisation. The reliance on some form of ceremonial and ritualistic 
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component of wealth display and expenditure for status enhancement can still 
be seen in the practices of today’s institutions.
Veblen’s definition of waste is that which ‘does not serve human life or human 
well-being on the whole’ (Veblen 2010, 55). Although certain acts and expendi-
tures may be viewed as having at least some value to the individual’s well-being 
and satisfaction, when it solely based on the relative utility of the individual, 
then it might be deemed wasteful. If there is an apparent preponderance of ado-
lescents and college students posting pictures of themselves in acts of intoxica-
tion and images of their food, this attests to the display of unproductive time 
and leisure that marks conspicuous prosumption.
Social media provides a platform for displays of conspicuous consumption 
that may possess wider audience reach, and therefore the increased opportunity 
for receiving validation for such activities. If a person purchases a yacht as a 
symbol of their wealth, the circle of admirers in the offline world may be small. 
However, should the same person then post pictures of said yacht, and a cruise 
in the Caribbean, on Facebook then this may increase personal social capital.
Online social capital indexed on the province of the self, or as a collaboration of 
groups, when conducted on SNSs such as Facebook, serves the interests of actual 
capital for Facebook and its affiliated advertisers that seek to marketise and profit 
from mediated social exchange. It is these entities that either play host to, or lev-
erage social data for targeted advertising, that earns monetary profit. Self-service 
and self-branding activities provide the appearance of autonomy that underpin 
the fetishistic rhetoric surrounding the ‘heroic’ entrepreneur, if at the very least 
the individual user is ‘liberated’ from the managerial hierarchy in their own self-
determination. And yet, the subordination remains as the user swaps out a ‘boss’ 
or a rigid hierarchical system that is plainly visible in an institutional and indus-
trial logic to a fuzzier and more ubiquitous type now occupied by the owners 
of the networks. The unacknowledged labour involved in profile management 
and the temporal investment strategies involved in increasing online social capi-
tal may simply be a redistribution effect of free labour whereby these activities 
conducted by a large mass of users ultimately provides benefit for the SNSs that 
underwrite all attempts at social capital increase, be these successful or not. The 
parallel case, although more monetarily clear, might be the entrepreneurs who 
develop apps for Apple or Android platforms: no matter the success of the app, 
the only cost to these companies is hosting, while the developer provides free 
labour in the hopes of acquiring profit. Should there be a considerable profit, the 
host takes a significant cut of the revenue; the risk is assumed by the individual.
Users self-publish their content, but Facebook’s model is mostly a modifica-
tion on earlier forms of publication. The sale of advertising space that marked 
traditional print was to a readership: ‘The profits of publication come from the 
sale of advertising space’ (Veblen 2005, 182), but in this case, the producer and 
the publisher are very distinct, for Facebook is in effect the ‘publisher’ and the 
unpaid producers of content are not hired by Facebook. It is the users them-
selves that produce the content that further popularises social media sites like 
Facebook, while the network owner acts as a data broker in selling advertising 
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space that is targeted to the prosumers of content. It was Veblen that acknowl-
edged the priority of advertising space as a source of revenue, and that sub-
scriptions were largely secondary.
For Veblen, the ideal for technical knowledge was that it would be held in 
common, apart from pecuniary interests. He envisioned a great Soviet of engi-
neers (Veblen, 1921). When it comes to the productions and insights of social 
media users, however, this is not held in common, as the repository is entirely 
pecuniarily motivated, and to paraphrase Thiry-Cherques (2010), the price 
of inclusion in the network entails some form of subordination. In this case, 
Facebook extracts value from posts and profiles for the purposes of facilitating 
data matching between itself and paid advertisers for targeted advertising.
Social capital – that which is generated from resources held in common – 
would have to somehow develop a means of resisting the pecuniary interests 
of those who are not contributing their own capital to a specific community, 
and are simply profiting by what is generated. However, for as long as social 
relations are dominated by the predominantly neoliberal spectacle, and inter-
actions on the social media platform are motivated with a view to enhancing 
status through conspicuous acts of prosumption in a competitive game, the 
advantages of social capital would only accrue in small part to the entrepre-
neurial individual, and in larger part to the social media platform.
Mestrovic acknowledges that Veblen ‘would have pointed out that the 
Internet is most available in Western nations that exhibit the culture of narcis-
sism he sought to unmask’ (2003, p. 14). And, perhaps just as Veblen critiqued 
fashion and ostentation as status-based activity that aligns with a pronounced 
form of cultural narcissism, it is likely that he might have viewed certain ego-
based behaviours of display on social media as narcissistic. The extensive use 
and reliance on platforms such as Facebook among a growing number of 
individuals exhibits the extent to which unproductive time is spent in virtual 
production, and that the competitive aspects reduce social interactions to the 
exchange value that can be generated from said interactions for personal gain.
Veblen was a caustic critic of capitalism, laden as it is with inefficiencies and 
irrational behaviour culturally inherited from previous phases of production 
and consumption. On the other hand, there is Veblen’s view of technology, as 
something technical that could provide efficiency and progress, but would risk 
losing those qualities in being aligned with the profit motive. At the social and 
institutional level, Veblen’s verdict on social media might be that it is just a part 
of the irrational and invariant human drive for status-aggrandisement.
Veblen and Capital Assets
Veblen never explicitly mentions social capital in any of the works in his oeuvre, 
although it may be argued that he held a view on knowledge, skills, and prac-
tices in a community (intangible assets) that speaks to a kind of social capital in 
all but name that might be a fit with that of Bourdieu’s definition.
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For Veblen, the predatory instinct of human beings is alive and well, whether 
it be through the explicit profit-oriented activities of successful capitalist indus-
tries, or at the level of individual workers who seek to improve their status 
appearance by conforming – via conspicuous consumption – to the tastes of the 
ruling classes. This aspirational emulation would seem to somewhat mute the 
power of labour to organise against exploitation, just so long as they are given 
the trappings of apparent wealth and may participate in the purchasing of digi-
tal objects, and access to the internet. If, for Marx, religion was the opiate of the 
masses by which an institution rationalised and attempted to justify continued 
exploitation of labour, it might not be too much of a stretch to say that Veblen 
might see the techno-optimism of the day as something similar. And, with the 
increased availability of credit, this may have had a slightly nullifying effect on a 
willingness by a majority of exploited labour to take up resistance against capi-
talist exploitation. The predatory instinct as emulated by the ‘common weal’ 
may now be expressed in truly intangible terms: the ruthless pursuit of online 
social capital by active participants in a ‘like economy’.
For Veblen, institutions play a pivotal role in social life: ‘[h]abitual modes of 
activity and relations have grown up and have by convention settled into a fab-
ric of institutions. These institutions […] have a prescriptive, habitual force of 
their own’ (Veblen 1909, 300). When this is compared to how digital networks 
have been empowered and lionised by various political and economic institu-
tions in the information age, there is bound to be some degree of normalising 
efforts to promote a kind of habituation to social media usage. The extraction 
and sale of data, and the advancement of pecuniary goals by corporatised social 
networks, would not count for Veblen as a kind of social capital. Veblen instead 
would conceive of social capital as the accumulated technological/industrial 
experience of the community:
As items in a process of cumulative change […] these productive goods 
are facts of human knowledge, skill, and predilection […] The physi-
cal properties of the material accessible to man are constants: it is the 
human agent that changes–his insight and his appreciation of what 
these things can be used for is what develops. […] The changes that take 
place in the mechanical contrivances are an expression of changes in the 
human factor (Veblen 1898, 387–88).
This represents a considerable theoretical divergence between Veblen and Marx. 
As Dorfman notes,
In Marx the productive agent in economic life is labour, in Veblen it is 
the accumulated expertise and initiative of the race, techniques created 
by man for human use. Veblen, like Marx, holds that capital goods cost 
nothing but labour, and that all gains to capital, aside from those going 
to the working community, are surplus gains, but Veblen maintained 
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that capital goods are instruments of production only by virtue of the 
technological knowledge possessed by the industrial community (Dorf-
man [1934] 1966, 285–6).
There may be sufficient similarities in Veblen’s conceptual repertoire to at least 
point to operative terms that function as synonyms for social capital. As a 
means of preparing that ground, it is worthwhile to illustrate how Veblen con-
ceives of capital in terms of tangible and intangible assets. For Veblen, tangible 
assets involve pecuniary capital goods that are owned and yield an income for 
said owner, and are assets insofar as they have a capitalisable value related to 
their serviceability as productive goods. Intangible assets are:
immaterial items of wealth, immaterial facts owned, valued, and capi-
talized on an appraisement of the gain to be derived from their pos-
session. These are also assets to the amount of their capitalisable value, 
which has commonly little, if any, relation to the industrial serviceabil-
ity of these items of wealth considered as factors of production (Veblen 
1908, 104–5).
Veblen saw the drive of businesses was to enhance their intangible assets. 
Examples of intangible assets today would include brand names, web domain 
names, customer lists, artistic products related to marketing, franchise agree-
ments, leasing, databases, patents and proprietary formulae and processes 
(such as algorithms). Over time, Veblen noted that corporations focused more 
heavily in the pursuit and maintenance of their intangible asset classes.
So far we are only discussing the two main capital asset types of corporations, 
and yet it is not difficult to see how corporate social network sites continue 
this legacy of focusing more on their intangible assets. Tangible assets are still 
quite important and require the hire of technical experts such as engineers and 
computer scientists to develop the infrastructure. However, a recurring theme 
in Veblen’s work is in wanting to make a critical distinction between industry 
and business; namely, the interests of technical or technological specialists and 
the pecuniary interests of corporations. Veblen saw true innovation stemming 
from skilled technical workers who shared their knowledge in common, while 
it was the role of corporations to seek profit as a primary motive even if it stifled 
innovation through the use of a patent system where such technical knowledge 
would be privatised as a possession to be carefully guarded and not shared.
Veblen saw the problem as being between profit-oriented corporations ver-
sus production-oriented industries that valued workmanship, the former type 
sacrificing the latter in pursuit of profit. For industry, the litmus is progress; 
for corporations it is property. For Veblen, human societies and the origin of 
private property is linked to the predatory instinct, first expressed historically 
through the possession of women and gradually extending to objects. Veblen 
says that this instinct has not been extinguished, and that it continues through 
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a ruthless pursuit of profit. In industrial societies, this pursuit is at odds with 
the principles of workmanship (skills and practices held as knowledge), and 
precisely because the capitalist will be biased in favour of cheaper abundance of 
goods as opposed to focusing on quality and innovation.
On the basis of his analysis of tangible and intangible assets, it may be possi-
ble to speculate how Veblen might have understood online social capital. Social 
media users are the intangible assets of a social networking site insofar as they 
fulfil the labour function of marketing the site and producing a valuable asset 
(data) that can be capitalised as value through third-party sale. Even technical 
knowledge can be obtained as free labour in those cases when there is a need to 
beta test products, or members of a public are encouraged to produce content 
for a community for free (such as what occurs in the gaming industry in the 
development of mods).
For Veblen, the accumulation of online social capital may be expressible as 
a numeric value, but there is no true ownership by the social media user. This 
form of gain is not directly capitalisable by the user, but indirectly by the owner 
(in this case the corporate network). It may only be converted into a more social 
form, such as status. There are other more circuitous routes to convert online 
social capital into self-branding efforts to sell products and services, or in 
attracting the attention of companies to hire one on as an influencer. It is likely 
that Veblen would view the pursuit and accumulation of online social capital as 
serving the interests of the social network company, while the mechanisms for 
capitalising on the intangible assets of so many likes and new connections that 
may arise is limited in terms of who owns the data, and the affordances of the 
platform upon which this is obtained.
Marx versus Veblen?
It will prove beneficial here to summarise a few key points of agreement and 
disagreement in the approaches of Marx and Veblen in this chapter.
1. Veblen recognised profit emerges out of the unfair exchange process 
of capitalism, whereas for Marx it is located directly in the production 
process itself, which generates a surplus value as a result of a distinction 
between labour and labour power. In other words, Veblen points to mar-
ket forces and the invariant of the predatory instinct embedded in the 
economic basis of institutions.
2. Veblen was far more pessimistic about the prospect of the rise of labour 
in the creation of a classless society; instead, his view of history was that 
the predatory processes would continue, and that any workers’ move-
ments would be dissolved into the broader institutional apparatus, usu-
ally through some form of small concessions and the promise of attaining 
higher class status through consumption practices.
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3. Marx understood that the contradictions of capitalism could eventually 
contribute to capitalism’s collapse, although his view is not deterministic, 
and would be contingent upon nothing preventing the law of the rate of 
profit to fall. Veblen does not dismiss this as a possibility, but views it as 
unlikely. He does hold out hope that, through the discipline of mechanical 
technologies, workmanship prevails over pecuniary interests.
4. For Marx, class struggle manifests itself in the crises inherent in capital-
ism, but for that to happen Veblen might object, there would have to be a 
widespread rejection of the trappings of status. During the time in which 
Veblen was writing, the expansion of consumer markets according to the 
Fordist model meant that another opiate of the masses had emerged via 
providing enough of a wage to workers so that they could consume more 
products, partially easing class conflict, and allowing them to participate 
more in consumer society and the pursuit of status.
5. For Marx, it is the worker in general that will precipitate the revolutionary 
change required, whereas for Veblen it is the skilled technical class of engi-
neers who may be the real agents of change through their invention and 
sharing of knowledge. In other words, Veblen places his trust in techno-
logical progress as the only viable means to eliminate many of the harms 
capitalism inflicts on society. Such a view may, in fact, be a bit naive – 
at least insofar as capitalism has been incredibly adaptive in controlling 
and using modern technologies to maintain its dominance.
Despite these differences, which more or less are based on their respective 
understandings of history and human nature, there are also points of agree-
ment. Veblen was not a full-throated critic of Marx, although he points up parts 
of Marx’s analysis as being somewhat naive to the institutional aspects of eco-
nomics and human nature. Veblen, however, is in agreement with Marx that 
the plight of workers in terms of continued exploitation and alienation are very 
real phenomena. Veblen blames capitalism for the continued immiseration of 
labour, if not also actively reinforcing institutional processes that perpetuate 
the allure of class status attainment. For Marx, we might say that religion is 
the opiate of the masses that keeps labour complicit with their exploitation, 
whereas for Veblen it is consumption practices that are dangled as the promise 
of achieving higher status: an aspirational desire that can never be truly fulfilled 
no matter how much one consumes.
Main Points
•	Marx’s four aspects of alienation still apply to the mechanisms of social 
media, despite the absence of the wage relation.
•	Although claims that social media’s affordances may appear to decrease 
alienation is supported by the freedom of users to create, share and express 
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themselves, countervailing aspects also speak to an increase in alienation 
given that the content is not owned by the user, what is made visible is 
controlled by the social media site, a feeling of obligation makes participa-
tion on social media seem more like work, and the emphasis on accumu-
lating online social capital inevitably leads to dissatisfaction as more user 
production is geared towards accumulation of a resource at the expense of 
self-reflection.
•	Adopting Veblen’s analysis of conspicuous consumption and considering 
the production side, production becomes linked to a goal of enhancing 
online social status by performing labour specifically indexed on trans-
forming the use value of a communication event into an exchange value. 
As users are caught up in a cycle of production and consumption of class or 
status-based imagery, these conspicuous forms are ‘rewarded’ in part by a 
visible metric by which to display online social wealth.
•	As users compete to participate in status-chasing activities, such acts are 
tied to Veblen’s understanding of the predatory instinct in competing for 
power, which is expressed in possessions; in this case, the possessions to 
be displayed are transmuted into images for display and social approval. 
Competition in this artificial economy is what drives this invariant form of 
behaviour.
•	As social media provides the means for conspicuous display, it also con-
ceals inequalities so that those with less economic means can be enticed to 
participate in status-chasing pursuits rather than critique the institutional 
status quo apparatus of which social media is a part.
CHAPTER 5
Alienation 2.0 – Symptoms of Narcissism 
and Aggression
A Washington Post article from May 2016 followed a then 13-year-old girl, 
Katherine Pommerening, who was an avid user of the popular image-sharing 
site Instagram. Apart from detailing the life of a ‘typical US teen’ growing up 
immersed in online social media, what may be considered very intriguing 
about the story was a description of her habits when using Instagram:
She has 604 followers. There are only 25 photos on her page because 
she deletes most of what she posts. The ones that don’t get enough likes, 
don’t have good enough lighting or don’t show the coolest moments in 
her life must be deleted (Contrera 2016, n.p.).
What is of interest with such behaviour is how this form of self-curation is 
indexed on the value given by other users, expressed as likes. The seeking of 
larger numbers of likes appears to function as a strong motivator for what con-
tent is produced for public consumption. Like rolling out a new product, if it 
does not achieve high enough sales, it may be withdrawn from production and 
another product released. For younger social media users, there appear to be 
high stakes in achieving a sizeable number of followers and likes as proof of 
social value. Some may go to extremes in order to achieve this, as well as mak-
ing use of various tools for photo enhancement or engaging in overt sexualisa-
tion and risk-taking behaviours in an effort to appease an audience.
This normalisation of social competition in online spaces is linked to accumu-
lation and the ease by which popularity becomes measured. Marx understood 
that, for as long as human beings and their production were governed by indi-
vidualism and cutthroat competition under the profit motive, alienation and 
exploitation would continue where sociality is subsumed by reification. Being 
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cost-effective, competitive, flexible, and adaptable become economic virtues 
while also exacerbating alienation from one another and our own sense of self.
We are afforded more opportunities for social activity online, with greater 
convenience, speed, reach, and access. That being said, these ICTs emerged 
out of a distinct ideological worldview that glorifies capitalist individualism. In 
order to achieve and preserve this form of capitalist individual autonomy, the 
social relations of production are reified and partially determined by the ‘natural 
law’ of competition. This concern for the inward, narcissistic turn and its con-
sequences has been shared not only by some members of the Frankfurt School 
(such as Adorno and Horkheimer) but also the fields of psychoanalysis (emerg-
ing from Freud and extending to the Object Relations School) and cultural 
studies. In this chapter, we will explore some of the implications of these more 
broad-based online behavioural trends in social media, and how these connect 
to online social capital. The main connection to be made here is how the nature 
of competitiveness on social media not only empowers self- aggrandisement in 
the form of narcissism, but also leads in some cases to aggression.
From Digital Narcissism to Online Id
Social media may appear to be heavily dominated by narcissistic behaviour 
from a proliferation of selfies, the diligent archiving of the details of everyday 
life, the dogged pursuit of online social capital, and conspicuous acts of digital 
display — a digital form of narcissistic behaviour watched over by the corpo-
rately owned networks of loving grace.
In a broader context, there has been the unprecedented rise of populist dem-
agoguery, the shocking re-normalisation of racism as an attack on politically 
correct or civil discourse, the sweeping return of old nationalisms throughout 
the US, the UK and some European nations, and a living political discourse 
that starts to resemble Sinclair Lewis’ It Can’t Happen Here (1993 [1935]) and 
Philip Roth’s The Plot Against America (2004). With Brexit and the election 
of Donald Trump, we are seeing ever more digital examples of public aggres-
sion and evidence of various forms of narcissistic entitlement that may have 
surprised even Christopher Lasch, who wrote the arguably sensationalist The 
Culture of Narcissism in the 1970s.18
Any observable increase in narcissism and aggression cannot be said to be 
definitively caused by social media and any preoccupations with increasing 
various forms of social capital since it may simply just facilitate such behav-
iours. The affordances of social media and the broader ideological context may 
serve to understand how, for example, someone like Donald Trump was able 
to build his own political capital using Twitter, tapping into widespread dis-
content and using it to his political advantage, under-spending his opponent 
in terms of media buys while relying more on social media to disseminate his 
message. Many of Trump’s tweets can be seen as apparent manifestations of 
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the aggression and narcissism being witnessed on, and possibly facilitated by, 
social media.
Aided in part by the customisation options that ‘personalise’ the experi-
ence and make the user a central node in their social interactive digital space, 
we might subject the data-flood of selfies and self-promotional utterances to 
keener analysis through several lenses such as political economy, psychoanaly-
sis and subdomains of identity construction.
Digital Narcissism
The term ‘narcissism’ is subject to a broad definitional latitude, and the concep-
tual particulars of the term can be expressed and applied in a variety of ways 
and approaches. A clear distinction needs to be made between ordinary or 
healthy narcissism, and more extreme forms. A healthy sense of self-regard and 
self-interest is not problematic, but there are behaviours that can be deemed 
harmful for the self and others. In the foregoing discussion, I will keep loaded 
terms such as ‘pathological,’ ‘unhealthy,’ and ‘abnormal’ in suspension, and con-
sign their usage only to when speaking of the clinical literature on the subject.
At issue would be the prospect of a specifically digital narcissism. Melding 
the term ‘digital’ with the standard definition of narcissism might at once open 
up questions of the possibly enabling, amplifying, or ambient effects social 
media may have on the construct of the narcissistic personality, or invite 
exploration of how the integration of ICTs in everyday life play a major role 
in identity construction and development. The digital narcissism ‘tent’ is large 
enough to include a full spectrum of approaches that range from technological 
determinism to instrumentalism. At issue would be what central pole holds up 
this tent.
A neoliberal ideological apparatus appears to enable such behaviours as sim-
ply a benign manifestation of self-branding entrepreneurialism, the crucible of 
American exceptionalism from which much of our ICTs originate; the ‘ecstasy’ 
of immediacy in communication facilitated by these technologies in an effort 
to anneal digital presence, and many of the optimistic assumptions buried in 
the seemingly value-neutral terms of ‘information society,’ ‘economic growth,’ 
and ‘freedom’ may in fact be little more than glittering generalities. A con-
structivist viewpoint may direct us to understand digital narcissism as simply 
an outgrowth of the broader sociopolitical forces that shape both the digital 
technology and the formation of the individual, perhaps having its narrative 
extended into the digital domain from the insights provided by Christopher 
Lasch (1979). In his work we locate the scathing indictments of CEO wor-
ship, enabling sociopathic tendencies, of breeding disloyalty as a form of val-
orising arch-individualism, of a decanted Ayn Rand gospel of selfishness as a 
moral virtue, and the self-centred practices of everyday life. Lasch’s work may 
be dated, but there are eerily prescient features in his work that resonate with 
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effects of the integration of social media and portable digital devices. What is 
unique about digital narcissism is not the mechanism of narcissism itself, but a 
kind of megaphone effect with increased opportunities for pursuing narcissistic 
goals, if not also a competitive pressure to be seen and heard in a vast ocean of 
social media noise.
The emergence of the ability to manage one’s own personal profile on social 
media is descended from previous digital forms of self-representation online, 
such as personal websites and blogs. Much of social media today has been able 
to absorb many of these functions of the earlier web with the incentive of hav-
ing access to a much larger potential audience. Expressing one’s personal views 
or posting one’s pictures can now be done in a much larger social marketplace, 
but with potentially more competition.
The representation of self and its behaviours migrate to the digital realm, 
with more recent scholars and commentators such as Jean Twenge and W. 
Keith Campbell (2003, 2009), Soraya Mehdizadeh (2010); Christine Rosen 
(2007); and Sherry Turkle (2012) considering  how the digital social domain 
may have an either causative or correlative effect on alienation from the self. 
Case studies on the subject of online narcissistic behaviour become more plen-
tiful despite the challenges of employing an objective measure for analysis of 
a constantly shifting and highly personalised digital landscape. There may be 
some strong correlations between digital expressions of narcissism and the ena-
bling features of social media. It may appear that there is ‘more’ narcissism, 
but this may simply be an appearance: with more people having the means to 
express themselves openly on social media, and the traces of those expressions 
housed in an ever-expanding digital archive; this may only suggest that we now 
have more readily available evidence of narcissism that has been with us long 
before the rise of social media.
Whatever the approach to the subject, what remains somewhat ambiguous 
is the ultimate aim of digital narcissistic behaviours without risking generali-
sation. To that end it is useful to consider a variety of strategic objectives that 
the online narcissist aims to achieve, be this to increase self-validation, online 
social capital, cornering the market in the ‘attention economy,’ and online influ-
ence, whether these can be treated separately or combined.
Digital Objects and Objectification
Narcissistic traits are more readily recognisable on social media due to the 
software platform that facilitates more options for self-display. In such venues, 
narcissistic traits in users were associated with a higher volume of social net-
working site usage, and particularly through self-description and strategic use 
of profile photos (Buffardi and Campbell 2008). There may also be a patterning 
effect whereby new users to social media may engage in behaviour that seeks 
to adapt and emulate the more successful and established social media users.
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When thinking about social media behaviours, one example that may spring 
to mind as something patently narcissistic would be the proliferation of selfies. 
Social critics in popular media are quick to raise the alarm that such behaviours 
are unhealthy, but this fails to appreciate that selfies are hardly anything new. As 
Jill Walker Retteberg (2014) reminds us, selfies, as a form of self-representation, 
are descendants of previous means to represent the self, including cave paint-
ings, self-portraits, pre-digital photography, diaries and autobiographies. It is 
important to understand what a selfie is in the digital context before too quickly 
leaping to the assumption that all selfies are to be pathologised as dangerously 
narcissistic given that there are a wide range of other self-display behaviours 
that are not explicitly a form of posting a selfie.
The traits of extreme or pathological narcissism involve a fragile ego- 
construct, a punitive and sadistic superego, and poor object relations. In terms 
of relations with objects, the pathological narcissist will ‘identify with an object 
and love an object standing for their (present or past) self ’ (Kernberg 1975). 
This stands in contrast with the ordinary narcissist object relation that attaches 
to an object as representing the parental image. The online representation of 
self operates as a far more cognitively comprehensible object that the narcis-
sist can identify with in terms of a relation patterned on narcissistic distur-
bance. ‘Both adult and infantile narcissism include “self-centredness,” but the 
self-investment of normal adult narcissism is in terms of mature goals, ideals 
and expectations, whereas the normal infantile self-investment is in terms of 
infantile, exhibitionistic, demanding, and power-oriented strivings’ (Kernberg 
1975). These two modes of narcissism are not yet pathological. The pathology 
becomes manifest through a series of steps or phases which include a regres-
sion from the adult to the infantile, the investment of love toward an object that 
represents the self, and finally in dispensing with the object-status entirely to 
allow the full deterioration of object relations so that the grandiose self cleaves 
to a grandiose projected image of self (1975, 323–4).
The flashpoint for the pathological narcissist emerges when the economic flow 
is disrupted; i.e., narcissistic supplies decrease or are removed entirely. In the 
case of the tributary relations the narcissist relies on for validation, such as the 
constant praise and attention from others. It may be at this point that the tribu-
tary relationships conflict with the narcissist’s punitive idea of self-reliance and 
the reality of dependence upon those very relationships. With the assistance of 
online representation, the pathological narcissist can have an externalised object 
of grandiose self that can be manipulated (or otherwise transformed into a puni-
tive superego that will reflect back at the self with unrealistic expectations). The 
paradox emerges between the self ’s belief in extreme self-reliance, and that of 
depending on others for constant praise and attention. One can imagine the frus-
tration or rage the extreme narcissist would experience in not receiving a steady 
supply of likes for her or his online contributions. In less extreme cases, there 
may be a sense of disappointment, or even a questioning of self-worth: a scenario 
that seems to be more prevalent among adolescent users of social media.
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Tracking and Striving For the Perfect Representation
This management of online representation is a perpetual process. Christine 
Rosen (2007) states that the creation of one’s self-portrait used to involve canvas 
and paint, but that our online self-portraits are composed of pixels. Extending 
the analogy further, the online self-portrait is always a work in progress, and 
‘self-portrait’ is more than just the visual image, as it includes everything that is 
said to represent the self such as textual posts that convey personal beliefs and 
affiliations which contribute to a multimedia-based narrative of the self.
Tracking the impact of our online presence carries over from previous modes 
of self-tracking behaviours. Using the term ‘quantified self-representation,’ 
Retteberg uses the historical example of Benjamin Franklin, who charted how 
well he was observing thirteen moral virtues in his life, placing each of the vir-
tues in rows, and each day in columns, placing a single black mark on the day 
he did not live up to the virtue (2014, 10). Retteberg also uses other examples, 
such as a prisoner marking days served on a cell wall, and the more recent 
example of people using activity-tracking devices such as FitBit to record num-
ber of steps walked, the results of which can be integrated with social media. 
These kinds of self-accounting behaviours are not an uncommon human trait, 
and are usually goal-oriented. For instance, Ernest Hemingway would record 
his weight on a daily basis, just as other people may track their caloric intake, 
monitor their consumption of alcohol, plot fertility calendars, blood pressure, 
or bodybuilders who measure the consumption of macro-nutrients and the 
number of maximum repetitions and sets they can perform. Social media has 
provided a large number of affordances for people to track and display their 
progress with the aid of apps, spreadsheets and wearable devices, while also 
broadcasting that information to an audience that may or may not be attempt-
ing to achieve similar goals.
Such tracking and self-accounting behaviours can usually be clustered as 
self-improvement initiatives, and the sharing of that data might serve a variety 
of purposes, from seeking encouragement and support from others, motiva-
tion, health benefits, to simply boasting. Retteberg, drawing on van Dijck’s term 
of dataism, is interested in how we use quantitative measures to interpret data 
in a better understanding of ourselves, and to assert control (2014, 68; 73).
Tracking takes on a more pernicious form when it is focused solely on one’s 
online representation and the number of likes one has acquired. It is of some 
value to consider Baudrillard’s discussion of the body as the ‘finest’ consumer 
object and object of salvation that constantly needs to be managed with delib-
erate narcissistic investment (1998, 129). By extending the analogy of this 
objectification of the body to that of the online self as an object for display 
and narcissistic concern, it may suggest a false form of ‘liberation’ and accom-
plishment since the online self is a form of reappropriation for capitalist objec-
tives: ‘where it is invested, it is invested in order to produce a yield’ (1998, 131). 
Whereas bodies in consumer culture come to stand in as a representation of 
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identity that we ‘inhabit’ and manage with a view to some degree of narcissis-
tic investment for some form of yield, our online profiles with their prolifera-
tion of selfies and statements may be the successor: a kind of digital ‘body’ we 
inhabit, manage, fetishise and capitalise upon.
Posting selfies can present a means for self-expression and the potential for 
experimentation. The more problematic issue arises when those who post self-
ies feel they must comply with standard beauty myths in order to compete for 
attention and approbation, particularly when perceived societal expectations 
are highly gendered. Those who do not garner the attention they hope for 
may suffer a blow to self-esteem, and it may exacerbate body image anxieties 
through a kind of digital dysmorphia; namely, rather than looking in a mir-
ror seeing only ‘flaws,’ a lack of attention and approbation on social media can 
result in magnifying feelings of inadequacy.
It may become ever more expected among certain demographics to post self-
ies and engage in competition for attention, and although on the surface this 
may seem to some as self-aggrandising and narcissistic behaviour, one should 
not discount the social context in which these users are posting this content. 
By contrast, the committed narcissist is seeking attention for different reasons. 
What unites the two is the seeking of online social capital, measured in terms 
of likes as proof of value.
Not everyone who has a committed interest in tracking their likes on social 
media is a pathological narcissist, but may be caught up in the curious artifice 
of the like economy as a way of measuring their social impact. What is unfor-
tunate is when this results in negative outcomes such as body image issues, 
dangerous risk-taking behaviours, and – in the case of the narcissist – a will-
ingness to adopt extreme or aggressive behaviours when public attention falls 
below expectations.
This shift in social attitudes that makes the self a digital object of constant 
improvement, an idealised projection, or a constant work in progress may 
not necessarily indicate that there is a pathological dimension to a majority 
of users. What it will indicate, however, is that the need for exhibitionism and 
validation is exacerbated by a variety of anxiety-inducing phenomena precipi-
tated by broader social expectations with regard to the growth and popular-
ity of digital social communication that may be numerically based. This splits 
int the twin concerns around self-as-brand management for increasing online 
social capital, and ‘FOMO’ (fear of missing out). The perceived need to have 
presence, to participate on social media with more content and more often, and 
the perception that the institution of celebrity has been democratised as some-
thing achievable through the exclusive use of social media, may alter expecta-
tions of how interactions occur on these platforms.
Online social interaction is diverse and difficult to evaluate with any defini-
tive accuracy. The rate at which social bonds are formed or dissolve, the number 
of nodes involved and the rapid nature of today’s instant-communication net-
works makes it impossible to diagnose – an analogous scenario to Heisenberg’s 
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uncertainty principle in physics where we cannot know both the speed and 
location of any particle. And yet there is reasoned suspicion that online social 
networks cater to a growing desire for unstable, superficial social arrangements. 
Whether or not these depend on high or low commitment varies from user to 
user, and what is meant by ‘commitment.’ For example, a social bond can be 
high commitment in terms of expectations to be online and to respond regu-
larly, while also being low commitment because of low quality cultivation of 
interpersonal sharing. For several users, the quantity of social connections they 
are involved may be too high to cultivate high commitment connections that 
possess qualitative depth, and for those who have an unmanageable amount of 
connections even high commitment at the level of regular superficial responses 
are not possible. It might be reasonable to assume that the higher the density 
of one’s online connections, the lower the individual commitment to mainte-
nance or cultivation when taken as a whole since the analogue nature of time 
prevents us from doing more than allocating the limited time we have avail-
able. However, this may suit the pathological narcissist who is not particularly 
interested in forming high commitment relationships and may seek a return 
on investment by maximising the quantity of connections. This strategy was 
once employed by advertisers who sought to bet on marketing to everyone, but 
since advertising budgets are not infinite, it made sense to realign a marketing 
campaign to target niche groups where the statistical odds of getting a return 
on marketing investment dollar was higher.
Social media is potentially ideal for adopting a narcissistic strategy given 
the large potential supply of users. Inasmuch as access to a large audience in 
one-to-many or many-to-many communication opportunities can be devel-
oped for noble purposes, there is also the enabling feature of such communica-
tion opportunities for providing narcissistic supplies that further exacerbate 
a pathology. Coupled with the heightened expectations of regular and near 
immediate communication, this may generate an enormous supply of exploit-
able human resources for self-validation, yet may also exacerbate the depend-
ency/self-reliance paradox of narcissism.
Intensity and Attention
The intensity of constant communication and the desire to make intensive use 
of commercial signifiers speaks to how embedded and integrated capitalist 
values are in many online exchanges. Users who cater to their own narcissis-
tic impulses may feel it is their obligation to engineer intense presence and 
make intense speech acts. Intensity of this kind is also measured by duration: 
short burst salvo through aphoristic utterance (we can include photos here as 
part of intensive speech acts) with the hope or expectation of a long lasting 
effect (through cross-syndication of content). In this way, the narcissistic user 
is chained to a belief that s/he is the locus of attention – a position more easily 
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held given the nature of social media networks to be egocentric in structure. 
When the narcissistic project of maximising virtual territory and the garnering 
of public attention is geared toward this project, constructive development of 
the ego may be waylaid or deferred in favour of a dedicated model of develop-
ing one’s online character as part of the regime of social capital. The enjoy-
ment of reward is to be had only after the labour is complete, and even then 
(despite a frequent return to brief adulatory feedback as a sustaining inspira-
tion for further labour) full satisfaction is never achieved. The desire for self- 
aggrandisement and larger doses of measurable validation far outpaces any 
short-term and ephemeral sense of self-satisfaction. If there is a source for this 
kind of communication anxiety, it may be a deficit of satisfaction, the perceived 
widening gap between effort and reward. The desire itself may become mon-
strous in magnitude and scope, making it virtually impossible to satisfy. For 
every temporary satisfaction achieved, full satisfaction is out of the narcissist’s 
reach (bringing the story of Narcissus in line with that of Tantalus). The cluster 
of particular anxieties experienced with regard to online connection and com-
munication may have their root in a perceived obstruction or failure to make 
use of one’s time. This urge to labour on one’s online representation for the pur-
poses of achieving a higher online social capital ‘score’ only further entrench 
the narcissist’s dependence on others, but also amplifies the anxiety associated 
with online ego management, not least of which may be exacerbated further if 
one’s online persona – spread out over a variety of venues – requires frequent 
modification or alteration. The more social network profiles one maintains, the 
more exhausting the labour might be in maintaining these profiles.
Online Ego Management
The behavioural tendency of the online narcissist to engage in acts of accumu-
lation can be explained by the unacknowledged motivation that collecting a 
high quantity of online social connections is a means of recollecting the pri-
mary narcissistic self to achieve the impossible unity when there was no dis-
tinction and differentiation between self and world. This recollection of the 
(undeveloped) self is not interested in cultivating quality relationships online 
since that would take considerable investment and self-awareness the narcissist 
lacks. In the narcissist’s failure to understand or acknowledge that others exist 
autonomously, quality connections are not desired or cannot be cultivated.
Much of the social communication on social media has an ephemerality to it. 
Despite the ephemerality of so much social information made public on social 
media, much of it is archived permanently. The inundation of constant infor-
mation has the effect of diminishing the value quickly. This rapid devaluation 
of information presents a difficulty for the committed online narcissist who 
seeks to make a lasting impression with his or her online efforts, so inasmuch 
as social media provides a seemingly ideal platform to indulge narcissistic 
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behaviour, there are a variety of structural elements that make this task dif-
ficult or even impossible to satisfactorily achieve. Firstly, individual reach must 
contend with the high volume of others who are also locked in competition for 
their share of the attention economy. Secondly, a high volume of new social 
information tends to diminish the returns for online ego investment. Thirdly, 
although reach may not extend as far as the narcissist desires, it may extend 
to such a size that invariably a narcissist will be in direct or indirect competi-
tion with another narcissist. When so much of the narcissist’s energy is already 
devoted to defensive measures (the barrier known as the ‘narcissistic defence’), 
direct competition may pose an even higher degree of threat than the usual 
reserve of envy the narcissist might feel in the presence of indirect competition. 
Lastly, the efforts to maintain enough presence to satisfy the need for narcissis-
tic supplies can be very labour intensive, involving a great deal of management 
of both online persona and cultivating a large supply of social connections. 
Studies continue to indicate higher engagement with SNSs correlated with nar-
cissism (Mehdizadeh 2010, Wang and Stefanone 2013).
Digital Narcissism and Aggression: This is My Sandbox!
Although there may be no reliably conclusive empirical proof to claim that nar-
cissism has increased, or that the web has enabled the traits of narcissism to 
such a degree as to suggest (as some authors have) an ‘epidemic,’19 one can point 
to the connection between narcissism and aggression.
The link between narcissism and incidents of aggression generally arise from 
threatened egotism where there is a perception by the narcissist that there is an 
attempt to undermine or devalue said person (Baumeister et al. 2000, Konrath 
et al. 2006), or as a result of social rejection (Twenge and Campbell 2003). 
The ease by which the classical narcissist can treat other users online as mere 
objects, thus objectifying them, can result in aggressive behaviour when the 
perceived objects either do not provide tributary supplies or seek to frustrate 
the narcissist’s control. In addition, the narcissist may be imbued with particu-
lar ego-attachments that are linked to an infantile sense of territory (Noshpitz 
1984). Thus, if the narcissist is presented with a challenge in any self-defined 
territory such as beliefs involving politics, religion, health etc., this may result 
in narcissistic rage where a cathartic discharge results in a hostile and aggres-
sive attack on the perceived threat to that territory. One of the first linkages 
made between narcissism and aggression is attributed to Heinz Kohut who 
viewed it as separate from the drives, and thus a behavioural reaction, espe-
cially when the narcissist’s sense of self is perceived to be under attack (Kohut 
1984, 138). By contrast, Otto Kernberg adopts the more classical understand-
ing that aggression belongs with the drives, and that its manifestation involves 
defence and resistance. If we take Kohut and Noshpitz’s view of infantilisation 
and arrested development, and transpose these to digital territory, one may 
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question whether social media enable these behaviours in being constructed 
as infantilising spaces linked to the competitive nature of online social capital. 
Although there may not be a sufficient causal link between the gamification 
of social media and competitive ‘social’ gaming as leading to aggression, there 
may be a correlation with respect to how the pathological narcissist may under-
stand the competitive nature of these digital milieus, and responds aggressively 
depending on the social context. In terms of a connection between the digital 
and aggression, one might recall Marcuse who says that destructive ‘energy 
becomes socially useful aggressive energy, and the aggressive behaviour impels 
growth – growth of economic, political, and technical power,’ and that ‘the 
more powerful and “technological” aggression becomes, the less is it apt to sat-
isfy and pacify the primary impulse, and the more it tends toward repetition 
and escalation’ (Marcuse 1969, 257, 264).
Many online news comment areas provide both the benefits and deleteri-
ous effects for the narcissist through the software architecture of social com-
parison information such as counters. The quantification or metrification of 
online social capital presents the narcissist with a real-time feedback system 
for where s/he stands in a digital community. On one hand, any praise given to 
the narcissist in an open comment will provide a higher degree of gratification 
to them because the comment may be read by others. On the other hand, if a 
user provides a criticism, this same effect of public reach may cause narcis-
sistic injury. The extremes of gratification and injury may be much higher in 
the online venue due to ego attachment to one’s online persona as an object 
extension of the self, and so there is an element of risk between an increase in 
the narcissistic reward or the devastation to the narcissist’s fragile self-esteem.
The Triumph of the Id
What we seem to be left with is a life indexed on the pursuit of a false happiness 
where the best result is simply adjustment to the social media environment’s 
competitive nature, and the pathway to this spectacular happiness is littered 
with signs that tell us to amass virtual objects, to consume our way to self-
actualisation. By posting updates as content in an act of conspicuous produc-
tion to enhance our status as happy beings engaged in happy acts of play, all 
while chasing after this digitised dream, alienation may be further exacerbated. 
Accumulating more likes or connections or retweets may only provide fleeting 
satisfaction – a pattern well worn in how desire functions in consumer society 
with its range of new objects that promise a happiness that is temporary and 
tied almost exclusively to an image of true happiness.
The proprietary demands placed upon personal electronic devices to facili-
tate internet access are an attempt to translate analogue time (the time of the 
external environment) into one of digital time which may be compressed or 
fragmented. It is in internet behaviour where the Id flourishes, pursuing a 
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program of pleasure seeking and pain-avoidance with no conception of conse-
quence. The idea of consequence can only function if there is a corresponding 
adoption of continuous time in the triadic register of past, present and future. 
Instead, the enabling function of social media seems to facilitate and cultivate 
Id-based behaviour (or else brings about a closer communication between the 
demands of the Id and the ego, translated into a reconfiguration of the ego-
ideal that the superego will punitively enforce). The time of the Id is the eternal 
present, the epideictic function of self-display, self-disclosure or self-masking. 
The participatory nature of social media facilitates the expression of the ego-
ideal, as well as providing a milieu in which to gratify Id-based impulses. What 
is particularly of interest would be how digital interaction has splintered the 
psychological subject by externalising in materialised form the various levels of 
the conscious and unconscious. Although many of these online social networks 
provide a playground for the robust Id, the superego’s presence is also felt in 
the way these network platforms are constructed, announcing the rules and 
controlling how discourse can appear in these milieus.
Online social relations may be governed by the determinist function of capi-
talist ideology in the form of the spectacle so that most communication seems 
to orbit around commodities. Since capitalism operates best according to a 
series of crises (Kairos), these are experienced as minor panics or agitation to 
further retrench one’s self in the act of consumption activities, even if no prod-
uct is being purchased and only referenced. Since commodities take on the 
transcendental ideal, promising an end to alienation from each other and our-
selves, only the trace or residue remains with the particular object rather than 
the abstract image of self-completion. Since many commodities are indexed on 
pleasure seeking or the illusion of leisure, these are generally packaged in such 
a way as to appeal to the Id. The violence endemic to this spectacle is expressed 
through acts of consumption and aggrandised self-display that operate as a 
means of achieving the ego-ideal of celebrity status. Since the very term celeb-
rity is tautologous and can only be defined in reference to itself, the ego-ideal 
transfers the demands of the Id to the online representation of the self. The 
quiet merger of the Id and superego complete the process of auto-celebration, 
and yet requires tributary relationships in order to attain external validation. 
Achieved celebrity status on social media requires a constant reinvestment and 
staying in the social media game.
In The Ecstasy of Communication, Baudrillard writes: ‘Today the scene and 
the mirror have given way to a screen and network. There is no longer any 
transcendence or depth, but only the immanent surface of operations unfold-
ing, the smooth and functional surface of communication’ (1988, 12). If taken 
to mean that the staged scenario of representation has come to an end because 
there is no longer any interplay of subject and object in the currency of mean-
ing, then the value of signification has also changed.
Our online consumption is based on images and signs which ensure the illu-
sion of our proximity and access to information while also producing a distance 
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that operates according to a different spatiotemporal order. In a world governed 
by objects that are imbued with exchange-value as their primary meaning, the 
next step was to transform human subjects into objectified and manipulable 
signs. There is both narcissism and solipsism in this attitude toward other users 
where among the main goals of online social interaction is self-confirmation, 
ego validation, control and carrying out the continued commodification of all 
social relations amidst the promiscuity of digital networks. The nomadic user 
is in constant pursuit of recollecting him or herself in the maternal, oceanic 
milieu of the online world and its promises of unity and completion. In real-
ity, much of the internet can be an abyss of screened dis- and misinformation, 
stock opinions, and venues for self-display.
Online social networks provide for growth for its own sake, be this the accu-
mulation of one’s own images, the images of others, the collection of connec-
tions, and the overall expansion of these networks in general. For those who 
can be classified as addicted to these online platforms, the offline world pre-
sents itself as a nuisance, as a series of irritations and interruptions that distract 
the gaze from the screen. Yet, online presence alone can become a redundant 
marker of one’s actual presence as though a deficit in online presence conjures 
up the fear of ego-scarcity. Online presence may be understood as a territo-
rial marking. For those who are dedicated to increasing their online presence, 
the aim may be to expand that presence so that it occupies maximum space – 
an aim that frustrates itself given that the spatial dimension of the internet 
itself is constantly growing. In this way, users with this view to maximise space 
may operate under an analogue understanding of space. This analogue way of 
understanding the internet does not correspond to a digital order of organisa-
tion where spatial restrictions are no longer a factor. The real limitations are not 
in spatial terms, but speed; that is, the speed by which information can travel, 
and the speed by which one has the energy to expand within digital space. 
Digital time and digital space are ecstatic in nature in so far as they operate 
largely outside of analogue space and time. They are not governed by, nor do 
they keep pace with, the natural environment.
It is not the classical psychoanalytic assumption that we are fundamentally 
irrational creatures governed by the destructive subconscious drives of the Id 
which needs to be contained by state and social structures, Freud’s later work 
notwithstanding in Civilization and its Discontents. It would be Freud’s nephew, 
Edward Bernays, who would attempt to apply some of the principles of psycho-
analysis in the development of public relations and in channelling the uncon-
scious drives to the benefit of marketing products and services. In this way, the 
attempt was made to redirect the destructive drives toward more economically 
beneficial activities such as shopping. However, despite this safety valve on the 
Id, it was not the individual’s Id that was ever at issue – that would erupt in 
anarchic destruction of the state – nor was it simply a matter of controlling 
individuals in isolation to induce aggressive consumption. Instead, it was the 
control and perfection of the collective Id. Early crowd studies (Le Bon 1895, 
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Canetti 1962) point to the abdication of the ego in large mobs, and to how 
crowds function as a kind of Id-driven dynamo. It is not just the mobs that 
erupt in violence against the state, but a spectacular society’s ability to marshal 
the Id collectively toward mass consumption.
Online identities, divested of depth and placed within their hyper-individu-
alised content in a pre-made online social network form, have already made the 
transition to being commodities that others can collect and treat as on-demand 
objects. This occurs alongside the natural disjunction between the traffic of 
actual goods and information about them where the latter can be mobilised at 
an accelerated rate according to the compression of digital space-time (Harvey 
2011, 190). These online representations are reduced to their exchange value 
(their surplus value pegged on an infinite potentiality that is never truly actu-
alised), and as well reifications of the communication economy. Baudrillard 
(1988) argues that each lives within his or her own bubble, a self as satellised 
from the natural world as the natural world becomes satellised from the self – 
and the revised version of this claim can found in the highly customised and 
tailored experience social media users are subject to. This distance is entirely 
abstract, as opposed to the closing (or pollution) of that distance through the 
instantaneity of global communication. This bewitching sovereignty where 
each is a master at his or her own controls operating their online puppet, ven-
triloquising their identity, is a continuation of a game of personal aggrandise-
ment and narcissism which, in the end, only succeeds via the commodification 
of all online interaction and social relations, into a further retrenchment of 
ego by alienation. No longer is it simply the alienation of the labourer from 
his or her labour since consumption and production become identical rather 
than symmetrical processes. What was once circumstantial consumption in the 
early public sphere, such as the gathering at coffee houses to discuss politics, 
has become the driving force by which these social relations can exist at all. At 
the point which any popular online social utility like Facebook or Twitter make 
the transition to becoming verbs, these replace the terms associated with social 
acts as speaking or writing with a new kind of mouth and hand, the prosthesis 
of communication colonised by a commercial brand and its economic interests.
Online Aggression
Hardly anyone needs to be reminded that the online world can be a hostile ‘give 
no quarter’ environment. Potentially divisive and incendiary topics including 
politics, climate change, religion, gender, and ethnicity can erupt into vitriolic 
polemics, hate speech, threats,20 and a general rancour where civil discourse is 
eliminated in the process. The drive to compete with other users to be heard 
can involve ever more extreme utterances, and such competition may aggravate 
already aggressive attitudes lurking beneath the surface. Although one may 
witness such behaviours on the uncensored 4Chan site or in various subreddit, 
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examples abound on more popular social media sites. Moreover, these utter-
ances and acts of aggression are not consigned to the stereotype of the base-
ment-dwelling troll feverishly tapping away on a keyboard to incite a reaction: 
even public figures such as celebrities and politicians have been known to 
engage in impulsive speech acts on social media that may be little more than 
bullying, insensitive, hostile invectives, indicative of malice or deficit of empa-
thy. In addition, even seemingly well-composed individuals can be baited into 
an online dispute that escalates to the point of making direct attacks and issu-
ing threats. Even when such events disrupt more civil discourse and are met 
with condemnation, it has become ever more the case that the instigators of the 
aggression may castigate the straw-person of ‘political correctness’ as standing 
opposed to freedom of expression.
The traits of narcissism and aggression are combined in trollish or bullying 
behaviour as there may be little regard or reflection by the individual on the 
consequences for one’s online speech acts, and apparent low empathy. Shielded 
behind a screen, and with the unspoken demand to respond with the imme-
diacy with which social information arrives, childlike eruptions can certainly 
be more easily triggered.
These forms of online aggression, tied to competition in an attention econ-
omy and the perceived demands of instant communication, might be traced 
in some cases to a form of impulsiveness emerging out of a heated exchange. 
They may be further facilitated by signs of support for making such utterances; 
namely, in interpreting a large number of retweets or likes as condoning the 
act, akin to receiving applause.21 Such rabble-rousing is certainly not new, but 
social media presents a new platform with a much larger audience where such 
an audience can more easily be measured for proof of support. Pundits and 
propagandists have long understood the value of making use of the media of 
the day to incite crowds using hyperbole, polemic and other forms of eliciting 
pathos to exacerbate divisions with simplistic slogans while demonising the 
Other. And, as lines are drawn on various issues, pitched battles between users 
may rage as each side will have a vested personal interest, and these fights may 
quickly  escalate – particularly as more users get involved as spectators or par-
ticipants who thrive on conflict, using provocation and encouragement to keep 
the flame wars hot.
Studies in online aggression point to a variety of types that define its dimen-
sion, including variables that can be measured on the Message Invective Scale 
including hostility, aggression, intimidation, offensiveness, unfriendliness, 
uninhibitedness, sarcasm and flaming (Turnage 2007). A good working defini-
tion for online aggression would judge such incidents as fundamentally con-
flictual in nature. In terms of manifestations, online aggression ‘can result from 
personal dislike, ideological or political disagreement, racial or religious preju-
dice or bias against a certain group. Aggression can also occur in response to 
a violation of accepted social rules and etiquette or for no apparent reason’ (Di 
Segna Garbasz 1997; emphasis mine).
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The domain of online aggression and hostility involves a cluster of related 
studies that include, but are not limited to, current research on cyberbullying, 
interpersonal studies, computer-mediated communication (CMC), participa-
tory journalism and the digital public sphere. The vast majority of news sites 
that allow for user-generated commentary are considered generally asynchro-
nous communication environments which can be classified as having lower 
human-to-human interactivity due to a lack of contingency and mutuality 
(Burgoon et al 2000). Asynchronous environments differ from synchronous 
ones on the basis of the latter’s capacity for communicative immediacy (such 
as in live chat). In addition, the rates of interpersonal interactivity may show 
differences pending the moderation used by the news sites’ comment section. 
User-generated commentary on news sites generally falls within the interaction 
model of reactive communication (Rafaeli 1988). Interaction can be assumed 
to be more direct where comment sections are threaded, thus allowing for the 
nesting of reaction and reply to a ‘lead’ comment.
The motivations for engaging in online aggression and hostility are multitude 
and specific to a variety of behavioural traits tied to the user. Combativeness 
in the online venue can be said to have some basis in ego defence, which can 
also include indirect ego defence by rising to the occasion in defending another 
person or group for either reasons of personal validation or on account of iden-
tifying oneself with the person or group perceivably under attack.
What generally characterises aggressive online commentary is some form 
of antagonistic statement that will either make direct attack against another 
person, or indirectly by associating a point of view with the other per-
son to demonstrate that the position and the people who hold it are equally 
maligned. Another trend, particularly found in political discussion, is the rep-
etition of talking points and slogans as represented as inviolable truth, thus a 
 rhetorical attempt to shut down further discussion. The person who ritually 
engages in these behaviours to belittle others, to perform malicious personal 
attacks, and intimidate – beyond relying on fallacy, crudity, and sensational-
ism as their weapons – could be defined as possessing lower self-esteem. What 
functions as ego-insulating behaviour is also indicative of a popular online 
trend that emerges alongside the rise in punditry and the media by which pun-
ditry may be spread.
Aggression and Approbation Cues
Many news sites have implemented a means of approving or disapproving of a 
user’s comment with the aid of the social buttons that permit rating comments 
up or down. Some news sites have removed the comment feature due to exces-
sive forms of hostility, flaming and spamming. The costs associated with pre-
moderated structures whereby comments have to be approved prior to being 
made visible can be cost-prohibitive whether it is done in-house or outsourced 
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to a separate company.22 Post-moderated structures rely on users and volun-
teer moderators to flag content that may violate the rules of the comment area. 
Unmoderated structures cost virtually little, but open up the space for all the 
problems moderation seeks to avoid.
Whether comments appear on news stories or on social media that makes 
use of social buttons in showing approbation or disapproval, users can make 
decisions without having to justify them. With the deployment of sophisticated 
botnets or paid trolls, it is not difficult to aggregate a larger number of appar-
ent supporters or objectors to any comment, tweet or post. This may lead to a 
misleading bandwagon effect akin to social proof as opposed to deeper critical 
engagement. On those sites that bury user contributions if their aggregate score 
for approval is too low, such as Reddit, this may lead one to trust the apparent 
democracy of the majority in deselecting the contribution from the visible feed. 
This may be construed as social proof of the value of the contributions.
Social proof generally will direct approbation so that the higher the number 
of thumbs up (or down), the higher the likelihood that other users will contrib-
ute as a gesture of social belonging. In a broadly numerical contest of obtaining 
a large ratio of approval to disapproval, this sets up a competitive aspect where 
the ‘prize’ is the community approval of the user as being credible, witty, truth-
ful or informative. Pending the disposition of the user who does not win this 
‘contest,’ ego injury may result which may further elicit an aggressive response.
Aggressive online behaviour might be amplified by over-investment of ego 
as a result of priority distortion. The perception that the ‘stakes’ in online 
comment contests is disproportionately higher than the reward might be. 
Aggression might result from either the prospect of threat (another user 
criticising or attacking the user) or as an act of confirmation. Both threat and 
confirmation denote passionate involvement, sometimes to the extent that it 
might impair judgement. Catering to an aggrandised sense of opinion entitle-
ment has proven to be prosperous for many news sites given that providing a 
platform that directly engages self-interest is an effective web traffic driver for 
getting more eyeballs on ads. By directly or indirectly playing into the narra-
tive of fierce competition, and in providing ‘rewards’ for ‘victory’ such as earn-
ing a high number of thumbs-up may not only infantilise the space, diminish 
rational-critical engagement, but also enable aggressive competitive behaviours 
among those predisposed to such conflict. What makes the ‘give no quarter, 
win the internet’ game via user-supplied comments a worthwhile pursuit? The 
prize or victory only occurs as a form of temporary self-validation, possible 
intimidation of others, and in potentially gaining an equally fleeting validation 
from the user community.
When taking online news sites as an example, is difficult to assess if reader-
generated opinions today have increased in hostility compared to the past, since 
traditional news media used editors as gatekeepers, thus rejecting letters to the 
editor that were harmful, defamatory or libellous, given the legal responsibility 
of the publication. What problematises effective analysis of hostility levels in 
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opinion is precisely the lack of access to rejected materials. Just as it is unlikely 
for any researcher to acquire the rejected letters to the editor of a newspaper 
from 1918, it is equally unlikely to do so for news sites that may simply delete 
offending comments in 2018. Problematising analysis further, every editor 
will most likely have a different threshold of tolerance for comments that will 
determine what is and is not posted online, partially harmonised to the news 
site’s acceptable standards. This, apart from standardised rules that automati-
cally reject user-comments that contravene hate speech or libel laws, presents a 
variable, relative and flexible number of outcomes depending on the threshold 
of each moderator and how s/he responds to any given user-generated com-
ment situation. One disturbing question emerges: if the assumption that online 
hostility proves true according to a measuring of current trends, how much 
more hostile might it actually be had not the moderator weeded out the worst 
comments?
Contributing Factors
Although there exist several diagnostic tools for measuring aggression such as 
the Buss-Durkee Hostility Inventory (BDHI devised in 1957 and more recently 
modified as the Aggression Questionnaire, or AQ) or Anderson and Bushman’s 
General Aggression Model, none is perfectly suited to obtaining a reliable 
measure of online hostility and aggression given the very nature of interactive 
media itself which is constantly replenishing its textual stock or possibly cus-
tomised to each user to only display relevant content according to the presets 
of an algorithm. In addition, the effect of online comments on readers as a 
means by which it might provoke an incident of conflict may be influenced by 
the ‘digital water line’; namely, the probabilities associated with a user being 
confronted with a provocative comment among currently visible comments 
as opposed to those that have been ‘buried’ or relegated to subsequent pages 
which would involve navigation to said pages not immediately visible.
The optimistic view that online forums bring together like-minded people 
for the purposes of group sociability has been challenged on the basis that such 
online activities might in fact tend toward individualisation in particular cases 
(Hodgkinson 2007). Although broader and more ambient effects constitute 
peripheral considerations, they no less may play a role in exacerbating and 
escalating conflict in the online milieu.
Social comparison information may also prompt extreme disinhibition behav-
iours due to the magnitude of available real-time content. Any gain in online 
social capital may have a brief shelf life, which requires constant renewal or 
escalation to be heard in the clamour of online social competition for attention.
Social media, for some, is a hostile battlefield governed by retaliation and 
initiating either strategies for revenge or instigating conflict, while also a means 
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of building the negative aspects of social capital. Although such behaviours 
may be seen as simply a natural migration of human tendencies from the offline 
world, arguably the number of conflict events online might prove much higher 
than in the offline world on account of virtual distance and the ability to con-
duct attacks anonymously. Virtual distance provides a buffer for the attacker 
or vengeance-seeker, but also reduces confronting any of the in-person con-
sequences of such behaviour, thus making it a far more preferred mechanism 
for the rise in what is now recognised as cyberbullying. Despite a consider-
able and long overdue increase in focal studies on the issue of cyberbullying,23 
there is a conspicuous dearth of studies that deal directly with online hostility 
in comment culture apart from a few notable exceptions that deal specifically 
with what is ambiguously called flaming. Given the lack of access to users’ non-
verbal communication cues, the primary means of evaluating online conflict 
had been through textual analysis. With the rise of rich media, photo and video 
examples of hostility can now also form part of the aggressor’s arsenal.
Understanding online conflict relies heavily on psychological distal and 
proximal causes for aggressive or hostile events. Assessing the users’ textual 
production may provide further evidence and insight by the study of these 
utterances and how they may conform to existing models in understanding 
aggression such as the general aggression, cognitive-social or the cognitive 
neo-associative models. Such methods for understanding online hostility may 
prove highly beneficial in understanding the issue on a case-by-case basis, and 
assist in developing a strategy for conflict assessment, analysis and resolution. 
By adopting a broader socio-cultural and psychoanalytic view of the phenom-
enon as a whole, larger environmental and ambient influences facilitating 
aggressive behaviour can be more effectively considered.
Social media does provide a space for its more hostile users to engage in bad 
behaviour. These behaviours may provide validation and satisfaction to those 
who seek negative attention, or are paid to provoke such incidents. Cynically, 
conflict sells if only because it may result in more participation on the plat-
form where, ostensibly, more users will be subject to ads for longer. To a cer-
tain extent, online aggression in the form of flame wars and acrimonious, glib 
exchanges provides a form of entertainment for spectators. When the ‘combat-
ants’ are high-profile figures, it does not fail to make the news, whether it be the 
feuding tit-for-tat between actor Mark Hamill and US Senator Ted Cruz over 
net neutrality, or Donald Trump versus his many targets.
A curious kind of tribalism may be emerging from a social milieu that was 
so frequently touted as an inclusive, democratising space by optimistic network 
theorists. The spread of fake news, a rise in cyberbullying, trolling, and the use 
of ‘doxxing’ by ideological extremists, points to a new kind of emphasis on both 
virtual territory and using social media to shout down constructive criticism 
and reason, if not also the use of hostile threats against the lives of those such 
individuals and groups target.
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‘Always Be Closing’
For a number of users, the need to be popular and to always be seen ‘winning’ 
in one form or another speaks to some of the unspoken expectations of the 
social media environment. Users may engage in a variety of online persona 
management tactics such as staging and curation in order to present an ideal 
self-stripped of any perceived imperfections or dull moments. Focusing on only 
the glamorous times and the enhanced image does present a warped world sce-
nario on social media where, for some, the environment is heavily populated 
by individuals living fantastic lives of leisure, luxury and adventure. This may 
set up an impossible bar for others to aspire to, and particularly because such 
representations may deviate from reality. Heavy investment of time and labour 
in the curation and representation of the digital self in order to obtain the ben-
efits of online social capital is caught up in the games of an attention economy, 
and its most visible sign is the accumulation of likes, friends and followers as a 
comparative measure. Winning also becomes the object of some online aggres-
sion where the aggressor wishes to be seen as the victor.
In the highly competitive environment of social media where attention is 
critical to increasing one’s stake in the like economy, it should not surprise us 
that aggressive and hostile tactics may also result. Despite the hundreds of mil-
lions of users operating on social media on any given day, attention can be con-
sidered something of a scarce commodity, and if it is not those who choose to 
game the system, others may be choosing to let disinhibition govern behaviour 
in ways that increase risk-taking, adopting a warped world view of the self and 
engaging in hostile acts.
It may not prove difficult at this point to see the implications of a more self-
involved and competitively driven social media space for the pursuit of online 
social capital. If, in fact, there is a significant number of social media users 
following a kind of pleasure principle enabled by the affordances of platforms 
that can deliver regular notification and potential instant gratification through 
multi-casting (and cross-syndicating) content, there will be moments of frus-
tration, disappointment, questioning of self-worth and even anger when things 
do not meet expectations. The fact that we can measure and rank users accord-
ing to web counters sets up the potential for creating hierarchies and engaging 
in value judgement on the basis of these counters.
Marx’s four aspects of alienation, in scenarios where the pursuit of online social 
capital fuses with instances of correlative narcissism and aggression, leads to a 
kind of ‘alienation 2.0’. Consider an extreme case of a social media user whose 
primary goal is to bump up her or his ‘score.’ Does the pleasure gained by seeing 
a change in numbers justify all the effort of production, presence, connectivity 
and deliberate reputation management? Is there a moment of awareness of the 
futility of such efforts, and that said efforts only truly serve the interests of corpo-
rate social media? In the ruthless pursuit of online social capital gain, would said 
user one day acknowledge that these numbers do not represent actual, intimate 
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bonds? In the end, the social media user does not own the product of their 
labour, and the numbers associated with likes and retweets and followers may, in 
fact, be trivial tokens of so much labour time spent in building up these metrics.
Narcissism and aggression are arguably more extreme symptoms of the 
dogged pursuit of online social capital. However, it does call up the existential 
question of what these counters actually mean. What real value do they repre-
sent as they may be little more than a quasi-social version of making one’s bank 
account public, a form of displaying a social media version of class status.
An obsession with analytics – click-throughs, impressions, site visitors, etc. – 
is facilitated by the affordances of our digital technology, and used by corpora-
tions to track and predict, modify and improve operations for the purposes of 
maximising profit. This migration of analytics to online social spaces allows 
users to have a visible output of their presence and efforts on social networks, 
but the danger arises when this also becomes a motivator for engaging in what 
would otherwise be deemed capitalist traits of branding and vigorous competi-
tion, creating what can be more appropriately called a social marketplace. This 
form of transactional model for social interaction that awards or seeks to gain 
‘points’ appears heavily market-centric.
When the social is subject to being measured, and to sometimes viciously 
competitive aspects of seeking attention, those who have stronger narcissistic 
and aggressive tendencies may indulge their worst behaviours. Social media 
may, in fact, bring this out in many users – even those who are otherwise less 
competitive. The ubiquity of social media’s presence, the apparent broader ideo-
logical message of its necessity, and the presence of counters to measure popu-
larity, all work as a confluence of factors to enable and facilitate these behaviours.
Just as it is said of lotteries that one must play to win, the same might be 
said of social media and its highly competitive environment. For those who 
see so much at stake, what happens to those who lose? What of those who, for 
one reason or another, just refuse to play? And for those who ‘win,’ it is largely 
on the basis of accumulation, which is its own form of alienation in the end – 
or at the very least leads to those uncomfortable existential questions of what 
‘winning’ means when such victories are fleeting, and one’s production is not 
owned, serving the ends of the social media corporation.
There is some hope that the continued de-stigmatising of mental wellness 
issues in public discourse can provide some measure of support in understand-
ing the impact social media in its current competition-centred form has on 
self-esteem, and perhaps lead to a call for corrective changes. Moreover, there 
may also be pressure to at least make the devices that are used to access social 
media less ‘addictive.’ For example, a group of shareholders of Apple have peti-
tioned the corporation to do just that. A number of apps have been developed 
that track the amount of time one spends on social media, or in silencing the 
constant and tempting ping of notifications. If the social media environment 
cannot be made less competitive in the short term, perhaps opting for means to 
limit time spent on it may prove of some benefit.
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Main Points
•	The egocentric nature of social media sites that cater to the individual also 
facilitates and actively enables more narcissistic investment in the digital self.
•	The prevailing ideological discourse that privileges individualism and 
competition provides an ideal ground for narcissistic behaviours on social 
media, as well as a focus on accumulating a quantity rather than quality of 
social connections. This may lead to the view of other users as mere objects 
to be manipulated and to provide narcissistic fodder for the user.
•	As social media facilitates self-display and competition for online social 
capital, there may be ambient pressure for other users to integrate narcis-
sistic behaviours in a competition to be noticed and be considered relevant. 
Moreover, narcissistic behaviour may be a dominant social norm on social 
media, and so new users may adopt certain behaviours in an effort to ‘fit in.’
•	Narcissism’s reliance on the Id may result in a larger profusion of grandiose 
claims, and actions that are performed on social media with little empa-
thy or regard for consequences. This is further facilitated by the nature of 
computer-mediated communication environments where there is an appar-
ent buffer against consequences due to distance and the ability to conduct 
oneself under screen aliases.
•	Competition for online social capital in conjunction with more impulsive 
Id-based behaviour can also result in more online aggression as a means to 




Networks of promotion/control slide imperceptibly into networks of 
surveillance/disinformation.
Guy Debord (1988, 74).
This chapter takes up the issue of whether more of us are being caught up 
in a kind of network spectacle whereby all that is digitally networked must, 
by definition, be good – including social life. Moreover, online social capital 
becomes a kind of lure to entice more participation, where obtaining signs of 
approbation through social buttons and incremental increases is built into the 
platform as a means of perpetuating this spectacle. To carry this out, it will be 
important to explore the nature of the spectacle as theorised by Guy Debord, 
applying this to the digitally networked world that he might not have foreseen. 
In having focused on the theories of Marx and Veblen regarding alienation, it is 
time to complete this book’s ‘triad’ by including Debord’s often prescient – and 
sometimes gnomic or oracular – statements on technology and alienation as it 
pertains to online social capital. The goal will be to discuss the movement from 
the notion of the spectacle and simulacrum to that of the social algorithm, 
and in this way provide more of a ‘meta’ understanding of the implications of 
online social capital as it operates on platforms powered by networks and the 
‘digital sublime.’
Neoliberal capitalism, having made technological innovation its exclusive 
instrument, develops more effective ways of perfecting social separation. This, 
combined with the perversion of cybernetics and the compression of both time 
and space in digital environments, gives the illusion of connective immediacy 
and proximity. However, despite the collapse of spatial distances and the ease 
by which connections can be made speedily in larger quantities, the social 
ties may be weak and contingent upon mediating through the devices sold 
by capital. More than simply neutral devices, the devices themselves exist in a 
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spectacular commodification network that promotes their adoption and use as 
the prerequisite for many forms of our social connection.
The network as spectacle conceals the rate of exploitation, or surplus value 
generated by a large prosumer audience, behind a veil of optimism, novelty and 
stimulus. It extols the values of speed, efficiency, convenience, and connectivity. 
Dissolving the nature of labour in digital walled gardens that appear to privi-
lege play and creativity. The network spectacle presents itself as sublime, and 
within its apparatus all who are participants within it are enjoined to support 
and reinforce the spectacle as good, for which there are no other viable alter-
natives. With the lionisation and fanfare associated with the information age 
and the network society, overly optimistic pronouncements about how digital 
technology would revolutionise everyday life have been heavily oversold. There 
is no denying that there have been significant changes in the speed of transac-
tions, connecting more people over larger distances, and even disruptive tech-
nologies in the form of ride-sharing services such as Uber or finding places to 
stay via Airbnb, but ecological, sociopolitical, and economic problems remain. 
Only when these new technologies lose their mythic lustre and become nor-
malised do they present options for real change:
the real power of new technologies does not appear during their mythic 
period, when they are hailed for their ability to bring world peace, renew 
communities, or end scarcity, history, geography, or politics; rather, 
their social impact is greatest when technologies become banal—when 
they literally (as in the case of electricity) or figuratively withdraw into 
the woodwork (Mosco 2004, 19).
Digital representation becomes the active process and product of this milieu, 
a hyperreal environment that subordinates the now impoverished value of the 
non-digital to the production of images that are destined for digital re-production. 
The network spectacle is presented as unassailably good, perfect, and the pri-
mary source of the positively represented values decanted from neoliberalism 
such as efficiency, speed and connectivity. However, it is those very values that 
not only speak directly to issues of exchange value and commodity fetishism, but 
also physically impoverishes those who labour to support the spectacle. In that 
sense, there are those who labour to produce the content via their own digital 
representations who now may have an impoverished sense of the non-digital 
world, which is now subordinate to the aims of the network spectacle (as a kind 
of raw material of experience that must be refined and processed into digital 
content representation); and there are those who labour in the extraction of 
actual raw materials, sweatshop manufacture, and precarious work in the service 
industry to provide the network spectacle with a steady supply of labour time.
Just as the rise of large corporate social media was able to plug in the social 
function into its network, today the network has succeeded in being plugged 
into daily life where sophisticated algorithms monitor online behaviour are 
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then used to serve up more of what users want in terms of what will make 
them happy and comfortable, creating islands or bubbles where competing or 
alternative perspectives never intrude. This kind of walled garden functions to 
channel online behaviours and clandestinely restrict social interactive opportu-
nities. Such ‘matching and pairing’ mechanisms of the algorithm on these net-
works is hardly new, as they are largely based on principles of homophily and 
powered by cybernetic thinking. Such thinking assumes sameness or similarity 
is socially generative and desirable. Today, that principle of group conformity 
is still active, be it in recommender services for products, or in what appears in 
one’s news feed that the network deems ‘relevant’ to the user.
It is the unceasing monologue of the network spectacle in presenting 
what is  good that contributes to generalised separation. As Debord states 
(2000,  28),  the technology ‘is based on isolation, and the technical process 
 isolates in turn.’ More than simply being ‘alone together,’ this isolation and 
separation operates at the heart of production – in this case the production of 
the digital ‘worker’ who is, in effect, reproducing his or her own experience as 
an image to be exchanged on the social market to increase online social capital.
In the very first aphorism of Society of the Spectacle, Debord provocatively 
modifies the first sentence of Marx’s Capital by claiming that life is the accu-
mulation of spectacles as opposed to commodities. This proceeds from a telling 
quote from Feuerbach where illusion’s increasing power over truth inverts the 
relationship between the sacred and profane. This inversion of truth and illusion 
threads through much of Debord’s sustained critique of the spectacle. One might 
immediately point to some of the symptoms of the power and allure of illusion 
in the ways by which social media users may compete for attention and online 
social capital in creating artificial representative images of themselves online in 
visual and textual forms, the rise of fake news that unapologetically appeals to 
belief over facts, or that the incremental increase in various forms of counting 
using social buttons has a direct correlation with perceived human value.
In the place of capital, the spectacle is the social relation between people – 
not mediated by commodities or money, but by images. The images are autono-
mous insofar as they exist separately from the commodities they refer to. It is 
to the extent that one purchases the image of the product as an experience, and 
only receives in exchange the product: the vehicle and not the breathtaking 
winding road, the clothing or technology item and not the fun the image seems 
to promise. The images are perpetuated in a society with all the assumptions 
that they are true aspects of reality, but they are but mere representations of the 
dominant language of spectacular society. The language of the spectacle prom-
ises unification (we can all traffic in the same imagistic references to brands and 
standardised experiences) and delivers separation: from ourselves, each other 
and the world. All of these relations have been inverted, and so our alienation 
emerges from this kind of detachment from the real. That which resides on 
the outside of the spectacle may be seen as a threat, obscured from view, or 
filtered as yet another image. A kind of availability heuristic is empowered by 
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the language of the spectacle, and operationalised by the algorithm’s tendency 
to create filter bubbles.
Examples of the availability heuristic on social media can operate in more 
automated or clandestine ways given the depth to which the social aspect is 
integrated into the platform as part of a high-trust culture that lumps more 
user content according to what is likely to conform to set beliefs, values and 
customs. If we take the example of adolescents in particular who are arguably at 
a very formative stage in social and cultural development in terms of their iden-
tity, they may be treated to online status updates and stories depicting users 
who live a life of constant leisure, glamour, excitement and whose carefully 
curated self-images appeals to unrealistic beauty standards.
The spectacle is positioned in Debord’s work as the social relation between 
people hijacked by capitalism. The accumulation of commodities has been 
demoted by an accumulation of images that refer to these commodities. 
Owning the object being sold, or having and experience is secondary to being 
seen doing so, and documenting it for public display. However, when social 
media users dedicate so much of their time trying to gain online social capital 
by posting images of their possessions or experiences, in some cases the main 
goal of this form of conspicuous display is simply to increase online social capi-
tal in the like economy. Even the most sacred or personal moments may not 
be directly lived as such, and one only needs to think of that person who will 
say that their wedding is not official until it is posted on Facebook, or those 
who rush from one historical monument to the next snapping pictures without 
taking the time to appreciate them. Until these are posted online, they seem to 
have little value.
Debord’s claim is that the world of the spectacle is ideology materialised: 
the correspondence between dominant ideology and individual worldviews is 
enshrouded in a mythology of optimism. The ubiquity of the spectacle and the 
practices that arise in the construction of social software architecture are mani-
fest in unseen algorithms that facilitate connection and use as products of this 
ideology materialised as ‘datapolitik.’ This is supported by the way in which 
economic activity and communications technology are frequently touted as 
neutral, thus insulating both from critique. This effectively naturalises both 
economic and technological discourse as neutral and objective, and the ideo-
logical intent of these is obfuscated by instrumental reason. Debord pushes the 
Marxist line further by claiming that it is not just the producer or labourer that 
is alienated from his or her labour, from other members of their class, and from 
life which has been inverted by a capitalist model to appear as though it were 
the only viable option, but that this also holds true for the consumer. The con-
sumer is caught in this inverted life of the spectacle, capable only of unilateral 
communication by doing the work of the spectacle through constant reification 
of its aims. ‘Behind’ this spectacle is economic determinism and algorithmic 
control that has only its own power and growth as its goal, and thus requires 
that the economy be in a constant state of crisis in order to properly function. 
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This kairotic dimension is facilitated in part by the blurring of the traditional 
binaries of producer and consumer (the ‘prosumer’), the discrete aspects of 
the digital and the continuous field of the analogue, and the subordination of 
the problematic under highly standardised social media software regimes that 
control the flow of social economies online. The social in this way becomes 
a representation by information where power is articulated, reticulated, dis-
tributed and mobilised as packets and segments in multiple bitstreams. Social 
meaning itself becomes vulgarised by the apostate defenders of a technical 
information-theoretic perspective that is focused on developing multiple chan-
nels at the expense of meaning production, which is always secondary.
Baudrillard as Postmodern Interruption?
There are some apparent similarities between Debord’s concept of the spectacle 
and Jean Baudrillard’s concept of the hyperreal. In the hyperreal, the real has 
been condemned to a proliferation of signs and their exchange that seem to 
operate in a world governed by illusion. For Baudrillard, this disconnection 
from the real – due to the way we mediate our experiences– creates a simula-
crum that precedes the real. Our own self-representations of experience already 
point to this simulacrum. In taking a picture of a trip to Paris to see the Eiffel 
Tower and posting it on Facebook, this is a representation of the event of being 
there and seeing the object, but the form-copy relationship is disturbed as that 
‘event’ bears no relation to that distinction, but instead is something other – a 
simulacrum. One might have an idea of Paris, the Eiffel Tower, leisure, travel 
and so forth as depicted through media. This representation has already broken 
an alliance with the real, and as a result we may have a highly mediated image 
of the reality of place and objects that we may seek to recreate and represent by 
placing ourselves in the frame. One might go a step further to say that social 
media itself becomes an environment of simulacra where social relations have 
broken their alliance with what is real about being social, and that others behave 
in ways where social relations become co-opted by the expectations of being in 
these environments that are indexed heavily on increasing online social capital 
through its dominant signs of social buttons. Online social capital itself is a kind 
of simulacrum of capitalist accumulation where the increase in the like econ-
omy is only an apparent resemblance to actual capitalist accumulation (which 
occurs in the background between the social media site and its partners).
Baudrillard’s view of capitalism and consumption practices does not restrict 
itself to speaking only of alienation, since that is to court an unacknowledged 
moralism which speaks more to the alienated moralist. Yet, it is clearly iden-
tified in Debord what the spectacle and economic determinism has made of 
social relations: they are entirely dominated by commodity exchange where 
alienation becomes a central commodity for the society of the spectacle. This 
idea continues to be restated in several forms, or rendered in a manner that 
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suggests that our communication is dominated by a pervasive economic mysti-
cism that both quantises and etherealises social relations. This shares a zone of 
overlap with Debord’s notion that we never acquire the object itself, but only 
its particular manifestation that we hope will bring our desire in contact with 
unity and transcendental reward. Whether we call this failure to achieve the 
oceanic bliss ideal where goods answer all needs, a progression of alienation or 
the slippage of signs in the Lacanian register, we are faced with a deficit on the 
order of meaning, fulfilment and contentment. This deficit is transformed into 
its own meaning, and perpetual lack of fulfilment operates as a principal driver 
in consumer behaviour.
In a system that has co-opted the methods of religious awe and reconstructed 
the real according to its own inverted, self-styled image, both Debord and 
Baudrillard demonstrate that the pursuit of happiness or contentment is itself 
misguided, and this for reasons endemic to a system with its own functional 
logic that is also rife with contradictions and tautologies (such as ‘individual’ 
and ‘celebrity’ that do not have definitional criteria with a stable reference). The 
rampant hyper-capitalism of today continues its progress to achieve its exclu-
sive aim: growth for growth’s sake, and this is also reflected in the dogged pur-
suit of online social capital where one can never have enough friends, followers, 
likes, retweets and up-votes. This growth is achieved through orchestrated cri-
ses, the increase in wealth that is also an increase in wealth disparity, the further 
disequilibrium of a system that seeks to dominate with no other purpose or 
final design than to expand itself.
One of the principal concerns of hyper-capitalism is the continued erosion or 
even wide-scale eradication of community-mindedness. The failure to conduct 
social relations without the intermediary of commodity images makes social 
relations dependent upon an economic determinist model that permits all that 
may be possible in our social relations as customisable preconditions. It is not 
the objects themselves that function as the conduits of social expression, but 
their signs, the broader commodity culture meanings they are burdened with. 
Our social relations become thoroughly infused by commodity culture’s semio-
capitalist code.
The spectacle, powered by capitalist economy, is able to produce the very 
objects that promise connection but actually continue to exacerbate isolation 
and alienation. In autocratic societies such as Germany under Nazism and 
Soviet communism, the one unifying yet alienating product produced to grat-
ify desires was ideology. All productive forces were committed to the produc-
tion of ideology reified in images of the dictator, symbols, and the ideological 
message. In order to make that effective, it required constant reinforcement 
by vertical integration by authority figures and the strategic surveillance and 
detention practices of police. In our spectacular society, we do not need a secret 
police or army to reinforce our obedience: commodities possess an ambient 
regulatory effect that function as proxy conditioners. It is the economy whose 
major productive means and ends is alienation.
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Debord holds to the view that the commodity system will only develop, and 
along with it, alienation. One cannot expect to stage a revolution against it 
from within. This strikes off one of two of Marx’s possible solutions: liberation 
from the economy and liberation from within the economy. ‘Separation is the 
alpha and omega of the spectacle’ (Debord 2000, 25). Although referring to 
exacerbating class divisions, there are other cleavages by which this separation 
unites segmented groups across racial, gender and political lines, thus feeding 
a kind of tribalism that is partially supported by self-selective network connec-
tions and selective exposure. ‘From the automobile to television, all the goods 
selected by the spectacular system are also its weapons for constant reinforce-
ment of the conditions of isolation of ‘lonely crowds’ (Debord 2000, 28).
If, as Debord tells us, life is presented as an accumulation of spectacles, and 
that everything ‘that was directly lived has moved away into representation’ 
(Debord 2000, aph 1), with respect to time scales, we are barred from the past 
since what is presented is merely representational, and these representations are 
convened, manufactured or designed by the spectacle itself. However, one won-
ders if even the present moment can attain to any significant value if it is simply 
a remediation of a representational past that is disseminated by way of images 
that carry the cultural messages via its visual channels. In a telling interview, 
when then-presidential candidate Donald Trump was confronted with an error 
in the statistics he presented about race-based violent crimes, he replied, ‘all I 
know is what is on the internet.’ This kind of chamber or echo-effect of selective 
exposure is highly problematic for a variety of reasons, not least of which being 
that confirmation bias has an impact on decision-making and the possibly nar-
row or distorted worldview one may embrace. When it comes to what people 
choose to believe, this may also be on account of the narrow selective process 
of hidden algorithms. The tautological nature of the spectacle’s ‘truth’ forecloses 
the possibility of seeking beyond it to mount a significant or resonant challenge:
The spectacle proves its arguments simply by going round in circles: by 
coming back to the start, by repetition, by constant reaffirmation in the 
only space left where anything can be publicly affirmed, and believed, 
precisely because that is the only thing to which everyone is a witness. 
(Debord 2000, 19)
Given the emergence of the prosumer, the work of the spectacle is increased, 
as well as its ability to permeate and colonise all social relations as now the 
‘spectator’ can be a more active worker in the proliferation of the spectacle. The 
images by which so many live by, conform to and subordinate their subjectivity, 
are capable of being transmitted much faster and with less need for direct inter-
vention by the state, mass media and advertising. This horizontal form of social 
reinforcement of the spectacle decreases costs for capitalists, and crowdsources 
the reinforcement of these imagistic messages. It further retrenches Debord’s 
claim of a true proletarianisation of the world.
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Baudrillard’s concepts provide some useful connections to understanding 
social media as a simulacrum, but they may fall short of understanding the 
broader mechanics at play in the way the spectacular society operates.
The Integrated Spectacle
Debord had identified two forms of the spectacle, each pertaining to geopo-
litical divide during the cold war. The concentrated spectacle was the domain 
of the Soviet Union where the entire social and political reality concentrated 
power and belief in the celebrated, almost religious figure of the dictatorial 
autocrat. The diffuse spectacle was the domain of Western values, and primar-
ily with ‘Americanisation’ in the lead whereby American values pegged onto 
consumerism, the image of democracy, an image of freedom and the sacred 
value bestowed upon private property and were aggressively exported around 
the globe. In effect, the two forms of the spectacle correspond to two functions: 
the one inbound in its communications, and the other outbound. With the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, to these two forms Debord adds a third: the inte-
grated spectacle, which adopts certain features of the previous two in dialectical 
fashion. The nature of the integrated spectacle is still to concentrate power, but 
to do so in an ambiguous fashion where it remains unclear what the reigning 
ideology might be, who heads up the transnational corporation, and so forth, 
as a kind of apparent decentring of power. Yet, power and wealth continue its 
concentration into fewer hands – even if it may not be as obvious to whom 
those hands belong. In terms of the diffuse spectacle, we still see the aggressive 
attempt to export particular values and ideas, but these are not the outputs of 
production on a global scale, but carried in products themselves. In its diffu-
sion, the integrated spectacle undersigns all social products in such a way that 
what it describes as reality is merely itself.
This integration is total and ubiquitous, making it nearly impossible to assess 
the spectacle as something foreign to reality, as if some external object that can 
be critically analysed; instead, all the tools of analysis that make up the dis-
course are provided by the spectacle. Anything we can say about this spectacle 
is already prefigured by the spectacle’s constraints on our social vocabulary.
There are two examples of the integrated spectacle worthy of mention here: 
one that is concrete and cloaked by the abstract, and the other that is abstract 
and concealed by apparent materiality. The first concerns the economic order, 
the stage of neoliberal capitalism that far more resembles transcendent forces 
united with a distorted Darwinism. Economics appears as a science if only 
because it makes use of models to predict market behaviour (as though a mar-
ket is a hybrid living organism and computer program), supported by a rough-
shod application of mathematics, and spurred on in its enterprise by specious 
and unscientific axioms that point to the unquestionable rationality of human 
beings as calculating agents of self-interest. Tied up with this are hyperbolic 
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values that speak of ‘freedom’ as the greatest of all possible goals, even if the 
economic system does more to control and limit the freedoms of others, and 
justifies growing inequalities in the name of this freedom. Another example 
might be the more abstract notion of the network as a form of social integration 
of activity, and the network epistemologies that become integrated within the 
new so-called ‘digital reality’ of our information age. The materiality of the net-
work can be found in the popularisation of the network architecture, websites, 
and the devices required to access them.
The integrated spectacle would not have prevailed as it has without the steady 
rise of ICTs. It is precisely the entanglement of the integrated spectacle with the 
highly regimented network technologies and their valorisation as the greatest 
public good that leads to the network spectacle. It is useful here to provide 
Debord’s five cardinal aspects of the integrated spectacle to infer how this pro-
gression has since materialised: constant technological innovation, the entwin-
ing functions of the state and economy, generalised secrecy, unanswerable lies 
and an eternal present.
The Integrated Spectacle: Spectacular Innovation
Debord makes only a brief comment on how technological innovation is part 
of the capitalist repertoire and dominated by specialists. There is, of course, 
much more to the story, and one that can be traced to Veblen’s warnings on not 
confusing the interests of technologists and finance. But it can also be seen to 
address how such technology facilitates the increasing power of neoliberalism’s 
gospel of borderless trade, efforts at deregulation, labour-displacement through 
self-service models, microsecond market trading, increased state potential for 
mass surveillance, the extraction of surplus labour through crowdsourcing ini-
tiatives under the guise of ‘community participation,’ the discursive framing of 
the spectacle as being the only permitted answer for which there are no alter-
natives, the obligation to purchase the newest devices at regular intervals, the 
obligation to be connected to the networks and the proliferation of proprietary 
hardware and software as opposed to open source and modifiable forms.
The entwining functions of the state and economy become more readily 
apparent when we consider the current state of neoliberal governments with 
their view that borderless trade, deregulation and creating laws that favour pri-
vate enterprise are all part of a strategy to downshift risk and responsibility 
to citizens (who become ever more viewed as consumers). In terms of social 
media, and its enormous impact on both social relations and economic devel-
opment, there may be very little oversight on how these major online social 
networks operate. Although there are moments of friction, such as in getting 
sites like Facebook to comply with government requests for user informa-
tion, the relationship is far from being a complicated one. Given the benefits 
social media provides for corporations, and as a valuable tool for governments 
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to conduct surveillance, there would appear little appetite for more stringent 
regulation. Both the state and economy have the goal of domination through 
power and wealth as the means of perpetuating more of the same. Markets have 
much to gain in this close relationship with government. As Debord tells us, it 
is ‘the autocratic reign of the market economy which had acceded to an irre-
sponsible sovereignty, and the totality of new techniques of government which 
accompanied this reign’ (2000, 2).
The Integrated Spectacle: Generalised Secrecy, Lies,  
and the Eternal Present
Generalised secrecy points to the fact that such secrecy is less about secret 
services attempting to silence dissent and remove ‘inconveniences’ from spec-
tacular  discourse, but that more agents of the spectacle emerge to perform this 
 function. For example, there are a considerable number of grassroots move-
ments that optimise their use of social media to carry out their agenda in 
 support of the spectacular status quo. In addition, celebrities and specialists 
can become the conduits of these agendas, more powerfully facilitated by the 
size and reach of social media.
The fourth aspect of the integrated spectacle points to unanswerable lies, 
which ‘have succeeded in eliminating public opinion, which first lost the ability 
to make itself heard and then very quickly dissolved altogether. This evidently 
has significant consequences for politics, the applied sciences, the legal system 
and the arts’ (Debord 1998, 13). We might question if this has come to pass 
given social media’s affordances for providing the public with a forum to pro-
vide their opinions. Yet, the mixture of the availability heuristic via algorithmic 
sorting and the coordinated efforts of the vocal few to dominate the online con-
versation may have altered the impact of public opinion in ways that 'dialogue' 
continues to be one of spectacular domination. By adding the use of astroturf-
ing clandestinely operated by government agencies and corporate entities to 
promote various agendas such as climate-change denial or the protection of 
brand reputation in the face of scandal, this fosters an environment that only 
appears to reflect the majority public opinion by sheer numbers of users alone. 
As Jodi Dean (2005) has argued, the mass profusion of opinion symbolises the 
fantasies of abundance and participation very well and thus devalues the con-
tent of political discourse, as well as working against unity.
In the final aspect of the integrated spectacle reside the notion of an eternal 
present and the negation of history. Debord’s statement is worthy of being 
quoted in full:
The manufacture of a present where fashion itself, from clothes to music, 
has come to a halt, which wants to forget the past and no longer seems to 
believe in a future, is achieved by the ceaseless circularity of  information, 
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always returning to the same short list of trivialities, passionately 
 proclaimed as major discoveries. Meanwhile news of what is genuinely 
important, of what is actually changing, comes rarely, and then in fits 
and starts. It always concerns this world’s apparent condemnation of its 
own existence, the stages in its programmed self-destruction (1998, 13).
Debord refers specifically to how the May 1968 movement in France was con-
veniently revised. Taken in other contexts, the control or negation of historical 
facts grants power to those who seek spectacular domination. Politicians, for 
instance, who run on platforms that campaign on nostalgic images and senti-
ments are among numerous examples. Debord points to an almost Orwellian 
historical revisionism where the ‘truth’ of any past event is contingent upon the 
present needs of those in power, even if it contradicts a past statement.24 Even 
politicians who are called to task over statements made in campaigns can read-
ily dismiss or deny those statements and change the conversation by attacking 
the media for engaging in ‘gotcha’ journalism and discrediting the source.25 It is 
also Debord’s somewhat prescient warning that seems to speak to social media’s 
fixation on novelty as dangerous:
When social significance is attributed only to what is immediate, and 
to what will be immediate immediately afterwards, always replacing 
another, identical, immediacy, it can be seen that the uses of the media 
guarantee a kind of eternity of noisy insignificance. (1998, 15).
The negation or revision of history is hardly new, be it the destruction of librar-
ies by various rulers, or the rampant revisionism in the Stalinist Soviet Union 
and Maoist China, or even in the attempts by the previous Harper administra-
tion in Canada to privilege the country’s military history with a view to create 
a vision of glory to be associated with the ruling government’s values. The one 
chief difference with the emergence of social media is its emphasis on novelty, 
and the ability to reconstruct the past – even one’s own. ‘With the destruction 
of history, contemporary events themselves retreat into a remote and fabulous 
realm of unverifiable stories, uncheckable statistics, unlikely explanations and 
untenable reasoning’ (Debord 1998, 16). Perhaps no better proof exists than the 
proliferation of fake news stories.
In this process of revisionism and an eternal present may stand the individual 
who may abdicate personality as ‘the price the individual pays for the tiniest bit 
of social status’ and that it leads the individual to ‘a succession of continually 
disappointing commitments to false products. It is a matter of running hard to 
keep up with the inflation of devalued signs of life’ (Debord 1998, 32). In the 
pursuit of online social capital, the sale of the self is what authenticates value, 
measured in part by incremental social buttons. Engaged in such pursuits, and 
valorised by any number of services that promise for a fee to increase number 
of hits, likes, etc., this in turn transforms the social component into a kind of 
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network of falsification where these numerical ‘values’ hold sway, and online 
users adopt the strategies provided by online social networks to falsify them-
selves in order to compete.
One has only to think here of the ubiquitous presence of digital devices that 
facilitate the recording of events to be consumed as images later. This accu-
mulation of representations of a lived event, leveraged as a status object to be 
trafficked on social networking sites as ‘proof of presence’ is ensconced in the 
practice of self-alienation. These images detach from life and join a ‘common 
stream in which the unity of this life can no longer be re-established’ (Debord 
2000, 2). These images merge into an autonomous image of the world which is 
an inversion of the real. However, in our current informational and communi-
cational predicament of nonlinear processing and self-organising algorithmic 
pressures that determine the representation of online behaviours, the quasi-
dynamical aspect of self-selecting and customisable software has produced a 
closed system where the images and the objects are united and displace life: first 
as a supplement, and then as a ‘master token’ that replicates the very conditions 
of existence as a productive mode of constant mediations.
Debord tells us that the spectacle postures as all society, part of society and the 
instrument of unification. As part of society it is the sector responsible for con-
centrating gazing and consciousness. This sector traffics in the ‘official language 
of generalized separation’ (Debord 2000, 3). The spectacle is not derived from 
propaganda or advertising or mass media. It is the objectified Weltanshauung. 
This is to say that the spectacle is the driving force behind propaganda, adver-
tising and mass media. Debord relegates mass media as a form of equipment by 
which society can be administrated: ‘if the administration of this society and all 
contact among men can no longer take place except through the intermediary 
of this power of instantaneous communication, it is because this “communi-
cation” is essentially unilateral [and the] concentration of “communication” is 
thus an accumulation’ (Debord 2000, 24).
The spectacle is the end product as well as the very purpose of the current 
system of production. The ‘spectacle is the present model of socially dominant 
life.’ It is affirmed even after the choice was already made on behalf of others. 
What might seem like active choice is passive consent. The spectacle presents 
itself as its own justification, the alpha and omega of life. The unity of the world 
was already based on a fundamental separation of reality and image. The spec-
tacle inherent in social life has convinced us that the spectacle is the only goal. 
‘The language of the spectacle consists of signs of the ruling production’ which 
produces signs, while the spectacle produces this negation of life as part of its 
monopoly on appearance: ‘In a world which really is topsy-turvy, the true is a 
moment of the false’ (Debord 2000, 8). What is taken now as being the real is 
only the real as generated by the totalising force of the spectacle. Furthermore, 
the spectacle is the affirmation of appearance and human social life as mere 
appearance. This negates human life, and what truly appears is this negation. 
Social relations become little more than flattened signs in a vicious commodity 
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exchange. The spectacle is the main production as seen in its objects, the alleged 
rationality of the system, and the economic sector that develops image-objects. 
This perspective aligns in part with Baudrillard (1998) in The Consumer Society:
The usage of signs is always ambivalent. Its function is always a 
 conjuring – both a conjuring up and a conjuring away: causing some-
thing to emerge in order to capture it in signs (forces, reality,  happiness, 
etc.) and evoking something in order to deny and repress it … the 
 generalized consumption of images, of facts, of information aims also to 
conjure away the real with the signs of the real.’ (33)
This is a slight deviation from Debord’s idea of accumulated images to that of 
a semiotic system. Debord’s images may imply this semiotic system, one that 
operates in a tautological loop where signs or images function as the basis and 
output of signs and images. For Baudrillard, ‘Affluence’ is, in effect, merely the 
accumulation of the signs of happiness’ (1998, 31). These signs of happiness 
are the mirror image of the signs of ruling production. Affluence takes on the 
role of signifying the bliss to be achieved through hyper-production and hyper-
consumption, both practices tied to a form of labour. This promise of affluence 
bequeathed by the spectacle or the simulacrum, is nothing more than an image 
or sign, and much of it is propagated by the equipment of media. As Baudrillard 
reminds us, ‘[w]hat mass communications gives us is not reality, but the dizzy-
ing whirl of reality. […] So we live, sheltered by signs, in the denial of the real... 
The image, the sign, the message–all these things we “consume”–represent our 
tranquillity consecrated by distance from the world’ (2008, 34).
Between Debord and Baudrillard, there is a similarity on how they view aliena-
tion and the inversion of truth. For Debord, the spectacle is powered by the false 
taken as the true, whereas for Baudrillard the simulacrum becomes a discon-
nected and specialised play of an excess or overabundance of signs constructing 
a new context that plays the role of the real. That is, the simulacrum divests itself 
of all referentials, purging any stable connection between one sign and another. 
Signs become, in the postmodern fatalism of Baudrillard, aleatory. However, 
what Baudrillard may neglect to consider in this excessive production of signs 
is that new non-linear dynamical systems colonise this excess sign production 
and arrange them within a metastable system that allows for flexible production. 
Moreover, the step beyond is to simply unmask the simulacrum (which is neither 
real nor its opposite) to find the true relation, which is alienation itself. Alienation 
exists as a ‘bond’ insofar as it can function as a relation between an individual 
and the world, an individual and the self, and between individuals. The economic 
system, which is based on isolation, exacerbates isolation. Even our technology 
and the technological processes are isolating, alienating, serving to reinforce that 
alienation. The unity is indeed built on separation, and can be pithily expressed: 
‘the spectacle is nothing more than an image of happy unification surrounded by 
desolation and fear at the tranquil centre of misery’ (Debord 2000, 63).
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The optimism and novelty surrounding the opportunities of social media do 
not cease. The dominant language of the spectacle includes the use of social 
media as the means to participating in good faith in the market economy. With 
an emphasis on a false sense of sovereignty, self-expression and novelty, there 
are any number of authors who will proselytise somewhat uncritically on the 
many virtues of social media. Under this effect of the network spectacle that 
dominates online social life, banishing the past, implicitly encouraging disin-
hibition that might lead to more Id-like behaviour, there may be a process of 
infantilisation occurring where the promise of play conceals the reality of social 
media work, and social media is portrayed as something always liberating. As 
an example of such a view, Paul Levinson focuses strictly on the positive:
Adults become children–usually in the best sense of the word–when 
we encounter and adopt a new mode of communication, especially one 
such as Twitter, which with a few keystrokes can open new vistas for our 
personal and professional lives. (Levinson 2009, 139)
Thus in contrast with the more pessimistic views of Lewis Mumford who was 
writing at the very beginning of the era of electronic communications, whose 
statement may very much apply today:
[M]ore commonplace thoughts, events, and scenes, transmitted only to 
keep the deprived senses from starvation, by giving the illusion of life, 
do not deserve such enlargement […] To be aware only of immediate 
stimuli and immediate sensations is a medical indication of brain injury. 
(1970, 298)
The spectacle’s domination over social life appears to demand and privilege nov-
elty, the eternal present, and constant chatter – with a bulk of that chatter being 
indexed on commodities. Equally disturbing is how quickly the transition moves 
from non-alienated subjectivity to alienation in full force as part of represen-
tation. Debord points to this historical progress as moving from being (I am), 
to having (property as defining identity) to mere appearing (I am the image of 
myself, represented in a series of objects, which are also imagistic). What the spec-
tacle demands is compliance and passive acceptance, while it also offers a false 
unity through its techniques of separation, as well as an inverted world stripped 
of complexity, composed of static images of happiness through consumption. In 
a way somewhat reminiscent of Nietzsche’s notion of passive nihilism, the ‘spec-
tacle is the guardian of sleep’ (Debord 2000, 21). The relation between self and 
world is reconfigured through the reduction of the self to mere image whereby 
the ‘acceptance and consumption of commodities are at the heart of this pseudo-
response to a communication without a response.’ (Debord 2000, 219).
Online appearance is one of the most important games of strategy as the shift 
in emphasis from offline significance to online increases. Much is said about 
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maintaining an online presence almost as though the failure to achieve this will 
result in failure as an individual or a business, conjuring a totalising opposition: 
online presence or irrelevance. Capitalising on this zeitgeist are thousands of 
firms dedicated to increasing web presence using many of the strategies of the 
public relations field. Effective web presence is very much part of the spectacu-
lar process of promising a personal transcendence through the unity provided 
by participation. One must be in ‘good faith’ and thus show fidelity through 
online communicative acts that attempt to occupy the digital space with one’s 
representative marks of presence. Behind this is the strategy, itself built on a 
principle of competition—an online pursuit to gain attention at the expense of 
attention being invested elsewhere.
This applied online narcissism requires strict discipline to produce and sus-
tain. Given that such presencing mirrors the principles and strategies of the eco-
nomic market under the spectacle, it has a duty to optimise its exchange value 
in a regime of signs. The strategy involves minimum investment with an expec-
tation of maximum return. Investing the sign of one’s self online does entail 
risk, but also comes with this expectation that the digital realm’s social feedback 
mechanism will increase the value of the initially invested sign. The result is that 
the digital version of the ego takes on an accumulated value much higher than 
that of the initial ego that invested the sign, thus increasing the disparity of value 
between off- and online self, which incidentally increases self-alienation. Much 
of the same logic applies to celebrity culture with regard to the PR mechanisms 
that facilitate the production and inflation of value. The individual can no longer 
live up to the online representation of web presence, and thus finds his or herself 
a slave to it. The intrinsic value of ego is crushed by the spectacular value of the 
representative image. The cult of celebrity and the belief in the easy acquisition 
of prestige has increased in the last century, creating the conditions of trans-
forming ideals into live-in illusions. Some have become their own most fiery 
promoters attempting to market the product of a self that may have not been 
marketable. Devoid of substantive, profound, or significant content (such as 
developing and manifesting talent in some industry like the arts or knowledge or 
craft, etc.), it is simply the act of selling for selling’s sake. This is not particularly 
unheard of given the raft of objects that are devoid of any significant use value.
Much of digital-social relations are modelled on economic transaction. We 
do not enter into human relations without sharing commodities, and thus some 
may be alienated from each another by trading in representative images of life. 
But all of this is over-coded by an economic determinism that is antagonistic to 
life. We are left with desire as lack, as the fantasy, which brings together the two 
streams of psychoanalysis’ study of desire and Debord’s spectacle. The spectacle 
fulfils the need for the fantasy, even if that satisfaction is temporary. Individuals 
become locked into a common cultural alphabet of celebrity gossip and com-
modities in a loop since the spectacle monopolises communication.
The spectacle has two major aims: constant technological renewal and the 
integration of the state and economy. In Debord’s assessment, the state and 
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economy are dominating forces in the spectacle, and there is no public sphere. 
Rational debate would involve access to the past and orientation to the future, 
but as we see in mass media, the past is reduced to the spectacle of retro-philia 
and nostalgia (and so therefore transformed into an image that becomes real 
because all of reality becomes simply an image) and the future simply deferred. 
So, in this way, we live in an eternal present, a kind of epideictic moment. What 
this means is that the only ‘power’ – which is no power at all – is to like or 
dislike the images put before us. There is a lack of critical engagement and no 
shades of grey in the eternal present. The spectacle serves up a constant series 
of images that, like a Facebook post, can be ‘liked’ or ignored. In this movement 
of the commodity to render its own version of the world visible, it is also the 
movement of further estrangement of people ‘among themselves and in rela-
tion to their global product’ (Debord 2000, 37).
It is the trick of the spectacle, to reinvest in reality by providing its inversion, its 
reconfigured conception of it, in order to change our entire social relationship to 
the world so that all our actions are performed under the direction of serving the 
economy and believing with an almost religious faith in the salvation the end that 
is production will provide. The crisis model is wedded to that of capitalist econ-
omy since it operates best by alternation between market highs and lows. It is a 
machine of unstable excesses, a system that can only work by means of overstimu-
lation since the real has long ago become inert and unresponsive. Baudrillard tells 
us ‘if it was capital which fostered reality, the reality principle, it was also the first to 
liquidate it in the extermination of every use value’(1983, 43). Use value is effaced 
and only exchange value remains, even in social relations where the transactional 
model online is conducted by way of signs. The commodities become intangible, 
as they are simply images in the accelerated play of perpetual simulation. Further, 
Baudrillard says, ‘[w]hat society seeks through production, and overproduction, 
is the restoration of the real which escapes it’ (1983, 44). So, salvation and reunion 
with the real is conditional on participating as much as possible in the acts of pro-
duction. Reward can only be gained through this production, but this reward is 
impossible to achieve since it exists only as a transcendental image outside of the 
ability to grasp it. All that is obtained from the image of the real (which is inverted 
in the spectacle) is its impressions, a bit of the glitter and dust from the shaking 
of the angel’s wings. This alienation from ourselves and reality occurs through the 
prism of production’s demands, and so the new opiate of the masses is the myth of 
achieving transcendence at the end of overproduction.
Although Baudrillard also tells us that ‘[w]e become obsessed with the game 
of power, its death, its survival. A holy union forms “around the disappearance 
of [true] power... in fear of the collapse of the political”’ (1983, 45). But what has 
really happened is that the traditional form of the political sphere has already 
collapsed and is replaced by the phantom image of political power. It is now 
economic power, embodied by transnational corporations and the demands of 
overproduction, that prevails.
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Simulacrum? Spectacle? Both or Neither?
Best and Kellner (1999) point to a new stage of the Debordian spectacle as 
the interactive spectacle. Rather than be complicit with Baudrillard’s critique 
that simulation in a postmodern age renders Debord’s concept of spectacle 
moot, Best and Kellner indicate where both terms retain their relevance as 
interconnected.
The relationship between Baudrillard and the Situationists is a compli-
cated one. Although both Debord and Baudrillard were concerned with the 
effects of rampant consumerism and the use of media and communications 
through technological mediation to further the interests of those in power, 
Baudrillard began to break away from the Situationist and neo-Marxist view-
point considering these outmoded. For Baudrillard, the concept of the spec-
tacle no longer applied to a world where the real had been replaced by the 
virtual in a regime of simulacra, and the failure to understand the new post-
modern nature of signs:
Baudrillard sometimes spoke of the ‘spectacle,’ but only provisionally. 
He rejected the term for two reasons: because it implies a subject-object 
distinction which he feels implodes in a hyperreality, and because the 
Situationists theorize the spectacle as an extension of the commodity 
form, rather than an instantiation of a much more radical and abstract 
order, the political economy of the sign, or as the semiological prolifera-
tion of signs and simulation models (Best and Kellner 1999).
For Debord, the issue can be traced in the inversion of appearance and reality 
where the true is a moment of the false, and vice versa, governed by the spec-
tacle. Baudrillard instead advanced the idea that a world of objects becomes 
replaced by a world of signs that no longer refer to the real; all we are left with 
are self-referential signs, serial copies mediated by technology.
And yet the spectacle endures, and social media is a prime example where 
the spectacular nature of consumer society is embedded and integrated into 
what are ostensibly social spaces. Sidebars and promoted content on social 
network sites reflect back a personally customised series of advertisements 
based on algorithmic prediction and selection. Topical news stories become 
bite-sized headline feeds, and these too are preselected and customised accord-
ing to the data collected from each user. Niche social media audiences seek to 
spectacularise their own lives by depicting a life of glamour and decadence, 
carefully curating personal images using filters and other software enhance-
ments. Distinctions between labour and leisure, social and commercial space, 
marketing and speaking, and identity construction and self-branding become 
ever more blurred. Moreover, social media is seen by ever so many as not only 
a necessity and inevitable, but as inherently good.
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It appears in the society of the spectacle that a life of luxury and happi-
ness is open to all, that anyone can buy the sparkling objects on display 
and consume the spectacles of entertainment and information. But in 
reality only those with sufficient wealth can fully enjoy the benefits of 
this society, whose opulence is extracted out of the lives and dreams of 
the exploited (Best and Kellner, 1999).
The interactive spectacle reflects a change in the audience. No longer the pas-
sive viewer that consumes content in the old hypodermic model of mass media, 
the audience become active producers of content while still remaining consum-
ers. In this way, Best and Kellner signal that the distinction between passive 
object who consumes and the active subject who produces media content is 
effaced, and thus shows fidelity to Baudrillard’s claim that the subject-object 
dichotomy is at an end. Yet, at the same time, this interactive activity online is 
still structured, coded and dominated by the network owners. If, say, Facebook 
still controls what content is visible and engineers its user interface to skew 
discourse in favour of producing more usable data that can be commodi-
fied, we are still operating within a society of spectacle. Social media’s use of 
automated prompts, recommendations, reminders and suggestions effectively 
guide or manipulate social behaviour with a goal to making it productive and 
thus profitable to the network owner. The interactive spectacle differs from the 
traditional spectacle by way of one of Baudrillard’s key insights of a thoroughly 
cyberneticised communication platform of command and control, albeit 
cloaked in the spectacular discourse of social play, positivity, the sale of experi-
ences, and the enticement to compete for personal gain and instant celebrity 
status by leveraging potential popularity.
The Social Algorithm as the Successor to the Simulacrum 
and the Spectacle
Key to understanding the social trend toward online self-disclosure would be 
the refinement of the interactive media environment (IME) that facilitates real-
time exchanges which increase the possibility of online feedback with respect 
to possible immediate gratification for utterances made. Feedback is essential 
to mechanical devices that rely on external or internal processes to supply cor-
rective information. The cybernetic aspect of feedback, coupled with Shannon’s 
mathematical theory of communication, is an important factor in preventing 
entropy. However, when the same feedback mechanism model is applied to the 
social domain of online interaction, what is presented is a crude mechanistic 
analogy that presupposes an inherent mechanistic process to social interaction 
by virtue of the fact that it is being conducted digitally. This is evidenced by the 
reliance on the conduit metaphor embedded in the mathematical theories of 
communication that suffuse all machine-mediated language (Day 2001). And 
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yet, at the same time, the architecture of social media software underwrites 
this mechanistic process through its largely invisible methods of organising 
information. For example, Facebook’s algorithm determines on the basis of 
‘relevance’ and quantitative inputs what information is presented to each user 
(thus ‘personalising’ each user’s experience) according to estimated relevance. 
‘Top stories’ in one’s news feed speaks to a concealed sifting and organising 
process that is algorithmically determined. Users are encouraged to fine tune 
this feedback mechanism by providing added inputs; i.e., to click on a tab that 
gives the user an option to remove posts by certain users from appearing in 
the ‘top stories’ in the news feed, but also through the more quiet collection of 
data in tracking each user’s navigation, browser cookies and what buttons they 
interact with. Left on its own, the algorithm will continue presenting stories on 
the basis of its most current calculation of user inputs. In the same way, ratings, 
rankings and likings are additional inputs that function as feedback mecha-
nisms to ‘personalise’ the user experience. What is not seen, however, are the 
stories that have been selectively omitted from the news feed. The choice func-
tion with respect to information in such cases becomes largely hidden from the 
user who provides indirect feedback to the site by clicking on particular users, 
postings, links and images. In essence, the user is not making direct choices 
about what content is visible, nor are these choices being made on the user’s 
behalf transparent.
Algorithms for information sifting and content display decisions might have 
‘resolved’ the problem of a user being presented with too much social media 
information, and assist in focusing on what the user would find more relevant 
on, say, a Twitter feed. The personalisation of the user’s experience that is fur-
nished by input-determined activity is part of the algorithm’s ability to record, 
process, and produce a particular output commensurate with specific inputs.
Despite the highly personalised appearance of a user’s news feed, we are 
not dealing with a simple correspondence of one-to-one user communica-
tion. Instead, the social relations would best be visually depicted as a complex 
array of Venn diagrams (the overlap zones representing shared information 
content). One user’s input does result in a feedback response in the form of 
the news feed (organised according to relevance in its sequence). However, 
user input does not stop at simply providing the user with organised content: 
the social software itself prospers from these inputs to better construct a large 
data-portrait of usage trends which can be applied as a corrective model to 
refine the algorithm. These inputs will have value if they are taken over a longer 
period of time to show trend-based changes for each user, and for large groups 
of users according to how the demographic pie is cut up (for example, the sum 
of all inputs among 15–17 year olds in urban areas may suggest that these users 
favour stories about kittens rather than puppies).
At bottom, the algorithm mechanistically determines online social activity by 
taking on the choice or selection function for all displayed information. Users 
are then more likely to engage with the information selected, thus reinforcing 
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the idea that the algorithm is a useful predictive tool for online social activity. 
The sequence of events that emerge from algorithmic selection to user interac-
tion, at first simply a sequence, transforms into a causal relationship on the 
basis of ad hoc inputs that are designed to appear as though anterior to selec-
tion. This is aided further by user inputs that confirm the selection. In a way, 
this is a game of forced choice within a restricted number of options. Or, just 
like a video game where the options are limited by the programming: one can 
shoot, run or hide, but there is no option for negotiation or any other action.
Since social media infrastructures are predominantly owned, designed and 
operated by corporate entities, it should come as no surprise that said digital 
environments will reflect capitalist biases either explicitly through the com-
modification of data or implicitly through the sift-sort-separate algorithm that 
treats social relations as an economic problem. Debord’s claim that the spec-
tacle controls all that we see, and how we can see it, is reflected physically in 
architecture – a point which Debord himself initially expounded but seemed to 
abandon in his later works. Transpose the idea of physical architecture in urban 
planning to the social software architectures of the web in the move from the 
analogue to digital conceptions of space, and we may come to view this new 
social space as effectively deterministic in much the same, ostensibly neutral 
or obscured, way. However, the one trick the spectacle must perform is that it 
must both be totalising as well as supplying the myth of freedom; that is, it must 
be totalising without alerting the public that it is.
Network Spectacle and the Alienation from Self
What is troubling in this age of social software is how social connectivity may 
actually function as a barrier to self-reflection. When so much emphasis is placed 
on self-promotional activities, chasing after numerical benchmarks for social 
approbation, and the steady increase in screen time spent in this digital environ-
ments, one may pose the question: what time is left for critical self- evaluation? 
Ultimately, we may need to question if beneath all this ostensible social activity 
there is not a further entrenchment of alienation from the self. The interactive 
image of the social may prove to be anti-social or non-social in character.
The neoliberal ideology has been successful in decanting itself in everyday 
discourse so that its objectives have been naturalised. This in itself lionises the 
individual who can attain wealth and celebrity effortlessly, to become a hero by 
means of the ideals of self-reliance and a surreptitious war of the one against 
all. The individual in this climate, mediatised by the ubiquitous devices of the 
web and their carnivals of frivolity and banality, pandered to by means of exces-
sive perks of ‘customisation’ and ‘personalisation’ to render all uniform fea-
tures with the appearance of individualism, has had to embrace a mercenary 
or ruthless character of self-promotion and selfishness. There is little to no self-
reflection involved in this behaviour: only an urge to succeed at all costs and 
The Network Spectacle 129
to envy the entitlements of others by voting for populists who preach an end 
to welfarism and unionism. The Id is well catered by a steady flow of violent 
sport spectacles, convenient consumerism abetted by wireless technologies, 
and the transformation of the political process into a game of aggression and 
hostility where campaign debates increasingly take on the form of a wrestling 
match with repetitive slogans where the object is to be perceived as wittier, 
more polemic than the opponent.
The spectacle enchants as it enchains. It dominates and dictates while dol-
ing out tiny, inconsequential pleasures. Social activity operates as a mimicry 
of economic activity. Production of the online self functions as an agent of 
separation in a field thoroughly disposed to processes of segmentation. Socio-
technological activity is already an embodiment and reflection of spectacular 
ideology. The misery and fear of the digital social order is camouflaged by the 
fabric of rapid, giddy communication and the pursuit of readily available nov-
elties. This flash-migration of alienated discontents moves from one digital 
milieu to another, their time subtracted from self-reflection in the need to per-
sonalise or customise new network profiles. Before them is a diffuse catalogue 
of icon-identities little different from a catalogue of consumer items on display. 
The network analyst, topographically viewing these migrations, measures the 
symptoms and activity migrations.
It is the image of the social that governs social relations on social media, 
a newly organised territory by which the dictatorship of the mobile device 
reveals its authority in a network of flows that make social relations possible. 
Just as physical architecture can be said to be inherently ideological, so too can 
software architecture that has as its goal the compression of space: ‘The society 
which eliminates geographical distance reproduces distance internally as spec-
tacular separation’ (Debord 2000, 167). In Debord’s analysis, the more space 
and time become compressed into commodity-space and commodity-time, the 
more the individual is alienated from space and time itself, those becoming 
foreign. One has only to note how space and time are reconfigured by Facebook 
in terms of ‘timelines’ where one can record the moment of one’s birth (now 
underwritten by Facebook as a colonisation of individual history, its absorption 
of the individual into its own spectacular enclosure) or in the use of geoloca-
tion software that converts space into places, a map of commodity sites where 
particular products and services can be purchased.
A new abundance arises in the form of social labour, itself a disguised ver-
sion of commodity time, whereby ‘the concentrated result of social labour 
becomes visible and subjugates all reality to appearance, which is now its prod-
uct’ (Debord 2000, 50). In the spectacle’s total occupation of social life, it is 
the spectacle that reconstitutes itself at every interval of social interaction. The 
earth, now stitched together in the most abstract form of social relations as 
mere images in network flows, becomes a global market. Every action or pro-
duction has its goal in the growth of the spectacle, which is the image of the 
dominant economy and its motivation to grow for growth’s sake.
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By representing themselves as leisurely individuals, social media users 
engage in an emulative exercise of reproducing situations that may not accord 
with offline reality. As the spectacle serves a purpose of maintaining a program 
of perfecting separation, it does so through an illusory reunification: in this 
case, all being ‘equal’ in the happy banality of social media that speaks in a 
single voice, that being the univocal expression that justifies the current eco-
nomic society. It is the spectacle itself that grants meaning to every individual 
user’s ideas, feelings and experiences. This can be observed in the collection 
fetishism that motivates the taking of pictures of travel and social events that 
are taken solely for posterity and in service of display as a form of conspicuous 
prosumption. This type of alienation may replace the motivation for achieving 
recognition in an offline world. For some users, an experience may be consid-
ered a non-event unless it is uploaded to social media. The intrinsic use-value 
of the experience is demoted to the exchange-value that can be generated for 
the purposes of social capital. However, it is the false use-value of posting the 
content online for gaining validation and approval by others that appears to 
satisfy a social need. In reality, the representations of experience and the self, 
now digitised, take on a kind of autonomous reality.
We might characterise such autonomous images of the self as posted online 
with an appeal to Goffman’s (1969) distinction between expression and com-
munication. For Goffman, expression occurs in simply being present, whereas 
communication is tied to a message that is made with intention, such as a writ-
ing or a vocal message. Although social media users are not perpetually pre-
sent, their representations are in the form of the accessible profile page that will 
continue to express on their behalf. The initial act was one of communication; 
that is, a user constructed a profile and posted content such as a personal photo 
and an ‘about’ section, expressing the individual on the individual’s behalf.
The false and spectacular unity afforded by social media allows for the traf-
ficking of social value as homogenised units, while at the same time inscribing 
the users’ new relationship to space and time as an abstract image of the spec-
tacular society where commodities reign. These homogenised units of appro-
bation, such as the thumb-icon, effectively represent a sign or token of social 
worth. Or, to quote Veblen (1919):
to sustain one’s dignity – and to sustain one’s self-respect – under the 
eyes of people who are not socially one’s immediate neighbours, it is 
necessary to display the token of economic worth, which practically 
coincides pretty closely with economic success. (67)
Spectacular Digital Labour
If social capital, however construed, is a formal cause, its final cause is desire, 
the material cause is nature in the form of the devices and networks, and the 
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efficient cause that realises the telos of the capital is labour. Desire, on the other 
hand, is the ‘goal’ of social capital insofar as the individual or group seeks grati-
fication according to the demands of desire as a motivational force; that desire 
may be satisfied by achieving a certain level of status.
Social labour is measured by the objective value of time just as economic 
capital can be measured as accumulated labour time. As Veblen recognised, the 
upper classes found labour irksome, and thus preferred unproductive uses of 
their time as a mark of their status. If social media is cast as a leisure activity, 
it would then fall under the domain of unproductive time; however, the actual 
labour being performed does benefit the network and its affiliated advertis-
ers, and the quantity of time expended checking in, posting new content, and 
managing one’s profile does suggest it is not exactly leisure. As Debord tells us: 
‘All the consumable time of modern society comes to be treated as a raw mate-
rial for varied new products which impose themselves on the market as uses of 
socially organized time’ (Debord 2000, 151).
The alienated labour of social capital occurs in the unwaged space of self-
development writ digitally, much of it contrived for a market audience of other 
entrepreneurs of the digital self. The user, in conducting labour under the aus-
pices of social entertainment, never truly owns the manicured profile or the 
digital self-portrait as much as ‘rents’ a workspace. Nor does the user own the 
representation directly for it is the alienated product of the projected ego ideal 
that can never be fully integrated in the actual self. Neoliberalism’s devolution 
of risk in the form of extreme responsibilisation of subjects assigns all the duties 
of ownership without the benefits. The user performs his or her labour only 
ostensibly for the self, but the online self is little more than an accessory and 
an access point for the advertising narrative and the appearance of enjoyment 
that is essential for the network to promote itself. Social media has true own-
ership of the tools and the space in which social interactivity occurs, and it is 
contingent upon its subscribers to supply their own content and generate the 
appearance of enjoyment that indirectly performs the function of advertising 
the network to others whilst also maintaining the belief in its social value in the 
form of constructed communities.
Just as industrial capitalist production fragmented the life-world of the 
worker, informational-capitalism abetted by neoliberalism fragments the 
social-world of the prosumer in a new regime of compressed and discrete 
time as actual fragments in the form of the tweet, the status update, and social 
buttons. Social time becomes commodified as discrete intervals of quantised 
social value. The production is no longer indexed on goods, but on the capital-
ised subject whose digital representative must maximise positive attention as 
expressed through quantifiable measures.
The stated advantages of a decentralised entrepreneurial model of content 
production and consumption via sharing and collaboration does not result in 
a return to the pre-industrial practices of craft production. Instead, the sys-
tem of desire in economic expansion as a quantitative one simply fragments 
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labour which is still under the domination of the network. Whereas the 
shift ‘ transformed human labour into commodity-labour into wage-labour’ 
(Debord  2000,  40), the labour of the entrepreneurial subject is effectively 
 pittance or unwaged labour. This continues to be in the service of the more gen-
eral economy: ‘The economy transforms the world, but transforms it only into 
a world of economy’ (Debord 2000, 40), to which the now unwaged, entrepre-
neurial social capitalist continues to serve under the illusion of self-direction, 
and without institutional supports. This allows Facebook to substantially profit 
from users seeking to increase their status through production in a hyperactive 
environment governed by competition: ‘surplus labor is transformed by relent-
less technological activity, and the means of virtual production produce abuse 
value’ (Armitage 1999, 3). 
If the network spectacle is certainly an instance of the ‘world of vision’ trium-
phant, inverting the relationship of truth and illusion, what else can numeric 
social capital be but yet another symptom of the positive assumptions tied to a 
drive to accumulation that follows a similar logic to capital? Would it not also 
be the spectacular production and proliferation of images by which social rela-
tions are mediated that the promise of ‘social riches’ by accumulation is what 
partially drives increasing social media participation as a kind of reward? By 
giving it a standard measure, the social quantified can better align itself with 
other markers of wealth such as money.
All that appears on social media is good, and all that is good appears on 
social media. Even those offline experiences might seem to require validation 
by their conversion into photos, blog posts, status updates so that they may be 
conferred with a value by other social media users engaged in similar acts of 
conversion from analogue experience to digital representation.
Main Points
•	The artificial economy of online social capital, which resides within the very 
real economy of social media sites, is a product of the network spectacle 
where the network discourse and epistemology dominates.
•	The network spectacle inverts the relationship between truth and illusion, 
moving from being to having to mere appearing. Much of social media’s 
production is caught up in a relay circuit of images that come to replace 
the real.
•	The network spectacle controls the space in which the discourse occurs, as 
well as the discourse itself. The networks themselves are seen as positive or 
value-neutral. Discourse that is critical of the networks still uses the lan-
guage of the network, and is generally subsumed within its logic.
•	Online social capital becomes but an image of the economy, while the net-
work itself converts the all that is social into economic terms. This creates 
the conditions of a totalising economic determinism with its ‘virtues’ of 
The Network Spectacle 133
growth for growth’s sake, competition, and the endless pursuit of the signs 
or images of happiness.
•	The network spectacle via social media promises unity, but only provides 
separation. It is a unification of all users as being alienated from each 
other and themselves as they pursue mere images that are largely devoid 
of meaning.
•	Ideological domination of space can now be automated, courtesy of sophis-
ticated algorithms that sustain the spectacle’s ceaseless monologue of itself. 
What is made visible or relevant is pre-selected on behalf of the algorithms 
that deliver the spectacular discourse.

Conclusion
The accumulation of online social capital is largely economic in nature, and this 
results in the exacerbation of exploitation, alienation, conspicuous prosumption, 
online narcissism and aggression linked to capitalist circuits of the platforms 
of social media. The end result has been the solidifying of a spectacular soci-
ety under the power and control of networks. By bringing together historical 
and contemporary theories, and drawing from a few salient examples on social 
media, it may appear that we are left with a bleak conclusion. The use of critique 
to explore and reflect upon phenomena represents only half its purpose; the other 
half is to indicate what can be done to ameliorate the situation. At this point it will 
be helpful to put all the components together to provide the full picture:
1. Social media sites monitor and convert our social interactions into the 
commodity of data, which is then sold to advertisers in the form of space. 
Both the social media site and the advertisers sell back the commod-
ity to the users in the form of ‘experience.’ The raw data is processed or 
refined into curated data by a sorting algorithm where content visibility 
is controlled internally. The data itself has a use value, which is then con-
verted into an exchange value when it becomes part of the marketplace for 
advertisers to purchase.
2. Users on social media commodify themselves while slotting their data 
into the convenient compartments of a social media profile, while also 
doing the work of the social media site through the production and con-
sumption of content. In their social exchanges, this produces more data.
3. The rate of production and consumption by which to extract more surplus 
value from users is increased by increasing the incentives to participate 
and compete for online social capital. The integration of social buttons 
to share and measure online social capital, in conjunction with notifica-
tion alerts, has resulted in both the increase of data collected and more 
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eyeballs on adverts, which then justifies the social media site charging 
more for advertising opportunities. As the network continues to grow, the 
sum total of data can also increase or be better optimised through refine-
ment of demographics or segmentation.
4. By dangling the promise of social validation and online display of social 
‘wealth,’ users can get caught up in pursuing a growth for growth’s sake 
mandate to increase their visible scores. A social marketplace emerges 
that aligns with the ideological values of competition and entrepreneurial-
ism. Social interaction becomes more of an exchange value unified by the 
‘price’ as reflected by the number of likes, followers, retweets, etc. These 
values have no standard basis as a unit of currency, and cannot be directly 
converted into other forms. In the competitive pursuit of increasing the 
‘score,’ some may opt to purchase illicit services, or otherwise adopt strat-
egies for optimising accumulation.
5. This accumulation for its own sake is based on predatory and primi-
tive capitalist market logic and principles, and may require a significant 
amount of temporal and labour investment. Ever more surplus value is 
extracted by the social media site in this process whereas users pursue 
accumulation of a resource that is based in a simulated economy.
6. Apart from exploitation, users become subject to alienation as social inter-
action becomes more of a competitive game rather than having intrinsic 
value unto itself. Acquiring more likes takes precedence over the more 
traditional forms of social capital, such as skills sharing or community 
building. Social interaction online becomes subsumed as exchange value 
in this simulated economy, as social relations become ever more colonised 
by capitalist values. Users become commodities in these exchanges; apart 
from providing the data and content, users give proxy support for con-
sumer products and services via conspicuous acts of display.
7. While users are engaged in acts of accumulation through their labour, 
alienation results from their spending more time working to develop 
and manage their online selves as opposed to collaborating with others 
or reflecting on the self. Self-reflection is short-circuited by the constant 
pressure to produce and consume social media content, while the filter 
bubble provides a carefully curated vision of the world that is not com-
plete, thus contributing to alienation from the world itself. As market-
based competition is rife, acts of narcissistic investment and aggression 
become growing symptoms in this environment.
8. Demand for online social capital outstrips supply in the attention econ-
omy. Despite growing number of users and more time spent by users, the 
increase in competition to accumulate more online social capital speaks 
more toward scarcity or to possible inflationary pressures where the value 
of one’s measurable online social capital becomes devalued as expecta-
tions for higher scores increase.
9. As the network spectacle maintains this social capitalist enclosure, it forti-
fies and accelerates all aspects of alienation by controlling the discourse 
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of what people can see, say, or do as prescribed by the affordances of the 
network. Real inequalities become concealed, while more time and effort 
is put into ‘winning’ the social capital game through conspicuous acts 
of prosumption. Not only does the network spectacle aid and abet this, 
but the popular excitement in the prevailing discourse enables this mar-
ket-based logic, with a wide range of products and services designed to 
increase one’s accumulation potential. This is further embroidered by the 
entrepreneurial narrative, where success stories are disseminated about 
those users who leverage their online social capital to become wealthy 
influencers who market products and services on social media.
10. The acceleration of the symptoms of alienation are produced by the very 
features of the social media platform (notification services and social but-
tons that include counters), in conjunction with an overarching ideology 
that encourages and enables online social behaviours to be indexed pri-
marily on the act of accumulation.
11. User production and consumption is rationalised by the appeal of a stand-
ard measurement to compare the apparent value of each user in order to 
make judgements on social value, which is code for marketable value and 
potential. There is no way to win the game as the purpose is growth for 
its own sake, but one can easily lose by simply not playing. The enormous 
pressure to compete is tied up with the obligations to maintain a presence 
online and be perceived as relevant. Given the privilege on immediacy, 
novelty, stimulus and an eternal present, this labour is perpetual.
12. Capitalism prospers by these games of online social capital as it has suc-
ceeded in concealing an increase in social labour time behind the appear-
ance of games, play, and social interaction. While within the users’ world 
of the social marketplace, the outer walls are that of a social factory where 
users continue to consume and produce more, giving freely of their time 
and labour while being paid in ‘experience,’ access, and the potential to 
win at a largely inconsequential game patterned on capitalist accumu-
lation. The users have no ownership of their own content, and are fur-
ther alienated in being offered limited choices in how they perform their 
labour. The end product is more data, more commodification of social 
life, and more advertising.
13. The user’s pursuit of online social capital is a circuit nested within the 
larger capitalist circuit. The use of sophisticated algorithms automates this 
process…
A Model of Online ‘Social Capitalism’
The clearest winners in the highly competitive games for accumulating online 
social capital are not the users, but the social media sites, and secondarily the 
advertisers who are sold the data commodity in colonising online social space. 
There is something shrewd about the integration of social buttons that provide 
138 Social Capital Online
incentive for users to get caught up in increasing scores that are, by and large, 
of only nominal value as opposed to the very real value of capital produced by 
these competitive activities and accumulated by the social media site. If it were 
just a kind of video game, then perhaps it could be argued that the users partici-
pate for the pleasure of playing; however, there is so much more at stake when 
more substantial human values of social validation, relevance, or even one’s 
employment are in play. For many users, these are not just numbers attached to 
their profiles and posts, but measures of their worth socially and economically.
There is something patently alienating about converting the human need to 
be social and reducing it to a viciously competitive game that emulates market-
based logic and instrumental rationality. Furthermore, making it the basis of 
commodification for profit is exploitative. By enjoining users to voluntarily 
commodify their experiences and compete for social value through these kinds 
of numerical rankings not only results in alienation from self, world and oth-
ers, but can exacerbate social and economic inequalities, provide incentive to 
narcissistic and aggressive behaviours, and have an appreciable impact on self-
esteem. Some users may attempt to accumulate more of this resource through 
outright commodification of themselves in portraying on social media lives that 
are not in line with reality, focusing on moments of leisure, luxury and other 
forms of consumption through conspicuous display. In emulating capitalism, 
and valorising consumption as a form of high social value, users empower the 
real capitalism that exploits and alienates them in these online social venues.
Beginning with the internal capitalist circuit from within the social media 
site, the user’s labour, which includes both production and consumption of con-
tent (as consumption does require labour to click or interact with the content 
which then cross-syndicates it across the network while also providing data), 
is surplus value. By creating incentives to for users to compete, this potentially 
increases time spent on the platform while also increasing data capture. This 
raw commodity of data is further processed into the commodity form. The 
user also contributes to self-commodification through the conversion of expe-
rience into content, which is then caught up in the cycle of online social capital 
accumulation. While in that cycle, it is part of a broader social marketplace 
where the content vies for attention and the accumulation of ‘likes.’ These likes 
or other forms of numerical markers of accumulation may then be leveraged 
for the accumulation of more of the same, or for potentially for other purposes 
linked to social standing or employment. The social reproduction of labour 
occurs in this circuit as more social interactions are multiplied in the produc-
tion and consumption of content, which is further data mined by the social 
media site, but also leveraged by the users for more online social capital. As 
more labour time is consumed in this process, the more production of content 
leads to the production of data.
The larger enclosing capitalist circuit involves the conversion of user data into 
a processed commodity that is sold as space to advertisers, and thus becomes 
the main revenue point for the social media site. The social media site then acts 
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as a broker between the advertisers and the social media users in selling back 
the product of the commodity as experience.
In this relation between the circuits, the user is a commodity point, as is the 
content the user generates. Online social capital becomes real capital in this 
dual process of commodification. The user’s labour time functions to serve the 
interests of the site's advertising space under the pretext of further ‘experience.’ 
So, the user pays in time and labour, and is paid in ‘experience’ while being 
given the incentive to participate in the competition to increase the in-platform 
‘currency’ of online social capital.
Remedies
Although it is beyond the scope of a single book to provide a remedy, we can 
gesture to a few possibilities for resistance, but it is important firstly to rule out 
those solutions that are overly simplistic or untenable.
Perhaps the most simplistic solution of all is to simply unplug from social 
media, to abstain from its use. Inasmuch as this may appeal to a kind of com-
mon sense view, it fails to acknowledge a position of privilege from which such 
a view derives. Those who are established academics, celebrities or hold signifi-
cant positions of institutional power can afford to abstain from the use of social 
media entirely if they so choose. Many others who are not in such positions do 
not have the luxury to simply unplug, and particularly those who are attempt-
ing to establish themselves in a given field, or for those whose opportunities 
and employment depend on making use of social media. Moreover, those who 
lack in social opportunities due to distance, ability, or degree of marginalisation 
can ill-afford to simply dismiss social media. The position of privilege that has 
the choice to unplug is akin to the same kind of class divisions we see in offline 
life, such as in the ability to choose not to endure long hours at the work place, 
an arduous daily commute, or having to shop at a discount grocery store out of 
financial necessity. Being able to unplug from social media is more the privilege 
of those who belong to what Veblen would call the leisure class, but also for 
those who occupy positions of institutional power.
It can be tempting for some who embrace the unplugged view to consider 
social media entirely frivolous, and certainly they may draw some inferences 
in this book to confirm their own views given the largely negative social and 
economic effects covered in this book. Such a view seems to cultivate a kind of 
naive romanticism of a ‘better time’ before the rise of social media. This nostal-
gia neglects the fact that there is no empirical evidence to suggest that societies 
are more narcissistic, aggressive or frivolous – the only difference is that there 
is more opportunity to express such behaviours to a larger audience, and that 
we now have a digital archive that records what once went little recorded. To 
assume otherwise is to make a causal argument that social media has a strongly 
deterministic impact on human behaviour, and would qualify as a fallacy. We 
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can say that social media has had an appreciable effect on behaviours, as any 
new medium does in reshaping social and cultural contexts, but having an 
effect is quite different from declaring an absolute determinism. Although we 
have covered mostly the negative social consequences of social media in this 
book, social media has also provided a number of benefits despite and some-
times in resistance to capitalist control of major social media. As a tool, it has 
united otherwise disparate groups and been effective in mobilising for social 
justice. Social media has been instrumental in raising awareness of an emer-
gency situation, such as in times of a natural disaster or in locating abducted 
children. Its real-time affordances have also been useful for users to detect and 
intervene when another user is expressing suicidal ideation. Social media has 
been a tool for organising progressive resistance, such as the massively attended 
Women’s March in response to the inauguration of Donald Trump.
Resistance is not futile, but simply unplugging is not a satisfactory answer. 
If we take the Institute of Network Cultures, founded by Geert Lovink, and 
their release of the Unlike Us Reader, they do not advocate for simply walking 
away from social media, but in creating alternatives that are not corporately 
controlled. Their solution is to bring together artists, theorists and other practi-
tioners to engage in the critique of new social media in working towards a truly 
open, democratised, and people-centric form of social media. This is but one of 
numerous examples where groups have united to move from critique to action.
This solution is but a half-measure. What is needed is to resolve a great num-
ber of issues pertaining to exploited social media labour and a reconfiguration 
of what online social capital could be, returning to the forms of open com-
munity exchange and sharing that granted the concept more lustre before the 
emergence of the like economy. In the end, our task remains to confront those 
entities that perpetuate exploitation and alienation, remaining critical of social 
media and demanding fairness and transparency. We must accept that social 
media is not going away anytime soon, nor are its plethora of problems.
Devising solutions can only be based on what we know matched against a 
current state of affairs, and any efforts to be anticipatory would be specula-
tive at best. As we know, social media is in constant flux. A corporation such 
as Facebook is highly flexible and adaptive, and they have the money and the 
human resources to find new ways of integrating itself into our social lives in 
order to turn a profit and keep its users appeased.26 I am choosing to close 
this book by offering a few general potential solutions, possibly idealistic, as 
a point for further discussion as we continue to engage in robust critique of 
social media phenomena. Some of these are far from new, but bear reiterating.
1. Education: Critical Digital Media Literacy
Given the ubiquity and significance of social media in everyday life for a sig-
nificant portion of the world’s population, critical digital media literacy ought 
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to be introduced earlier in public education curricula. It is hoped that this 
will cultivate more critical consumers and producers of social media content, 
some of whom may one day be in a position to help shape the social media of 
the future.
There are several entwined issues in our usage of social media that deserve 
our attention and should become part of a broader discourse, be it the psycho-
logical implications of how social media is used, critical issues pertaining to 
labour and exploitation as we enter into a ‘new collar’ disruptive economy, how 
we understand community and extralocal issues, how the democratic process 
itself may be endangered by filter bubbles, astroturfing efforts – just to name a 
few. Social media has a presence in every aspect of many people’s lives, politi-
cally, legally, psychologically, socially, economically and even at the level of 
our physical health. One of the many benefits of increasing our critical digital 
awareness is that it may lead to a groundswell effort to ensure some principles 
of fairness, accountability and transparency.
2. Legislative Change in Terms of Data–Ownership  
and Control
The extraction of data from social media users, app-adopters, and site visitors 
has become normalised in everyday web usage, and is a significant business 
practice. From the use of cookies in browsers to the use of location services for 
better understanding our behaviour, data collection feeds big data in terms of 
improving predictive software and the delivering advertising to ‘enhance’ our 
online experience. In most cases, there are laws whereby social media and other 
sites have a legal duty to inform us that our data is being collected, either by a 
notice on our first time visit to a site, or as part of a user agreement such as a 
terms of service. At bottom, however, the general idea is that we ‘pay’ for these 
services by trading our data, from which site owners may profit in selling that 
data or engage in data-pairing with targeted ads based on the data profile that 
has been created using algorithms. The notion that we could receive a ‘cut’ for 
the sale of our personal data is simply not on the table.
Seemingly progressive attempts to gain control over our own data have had 
mixed results. The European Union’s ‘right to be forgotten’ law would seem to 
empower individuals to make requests to have certain sites naming them not 
appear in search engine results. Although this may seem a good idea, it has 
also been used by public figures seeking to revise their own public image to 
remove scandalous events from the public record. In this way, the right to be 
forgotten may conflict with a right to know. Moreover, we might argue that this 
only obfuscates data, not permanently deletes it. In addition, it does nothing for 
how data is used by social media to target users with advertisements, nor how 
the algorithm will use this data to control what is made visible in a newsfeed 
or Twitter stream.
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One possible solution would be legislative changes that allow for better dis-
closure on precisely how one’s data is used. Social media users, for example, 
ought to have access to how the data provided has led to algorithmic decisions 
beyond vague statements of ‘according to your interests, location, and demo-
graphic information, these ads and content were chosen specifically for you.’ 
This disclosure should also make clear to whom this data is being sold, and 
even provide a choice for users to conceal portions of their personal data from 
algorithmic sorting.
3. Legislative Change in Terms of Digital Labour
Given the expansive growth in, and reliance upon, digital labour in of terms 
non-routinised cognitive labour, labour crowdsourced from the general intel-
lect, and routinised digital support labour (online tech support, for example), 
better protections may be required. Recognising all digital labour as labour 
should be considered under all laws pertaining to the labour laws of the land, 
including provisions for overtime pay, leaves, right to form unions, minimum 
wage, eligibility for state-run retirement and unemployment benefits, and 
workplace safety.
With respect to social media-based digital labour performed by those hired 
as employees on salary or on contract to manage a social media account, fair 
labour laws should apply. Moreover, there ought to be an acknowledgement 
of the precarity of such positions, and a further recognition of the intellectual, 
cognitive labour that is employed to perform these tasks to deliver persuasive 
experiences on behalf of the company that hires such people. It goes without 
saying that companies should not be permitted to rely on unpaid internships to 
occupy these key public-facing roles.
When we consider social media users who are not employed by any com-
panies to perform marketing or support duties, there needs to be an acknowl-
edgment of the general labour being performed by users. As they continue to 
contribute to the circulation of data in communicative capitalism, we may need 
a new accord with social networking sites to dispel the old canard that our 
labour is compensated by access to the service.
4. Cracking Down on Botnets and Click Farms
We have since seen what can happen when social media and comment boards 
become flooded with a well-orchestrated botnet, or when ‘political action 
groups’ attempt to astroturf the web to persuade a populace that there is more 
support for something than there actually is. Such efforts qualify as propaganda, 
and more stringent efforts are required to prevent the gaming of social media. 
In order to achieve this, there has to be international consensus in recognising 
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the problem and in taking steps to put a stop to it. This, of course, is a major 
hurdle. With ongoing allegations of covert state-sponsored social media botnet 
and astroturfing campaigns emerging out of Russia, the US and Turkey, both 
domestic and foreign-directed, this will prove a very daunting task.
We have also to consider those who have little option but to work on click 
farms under wretched working conditions. These are not industries any person 
of conscience ought to support. Better detection software with full cooperation 
by major social media companies is required to put a stop to troll farms such 
as those operated by the Internet Research Company (IRA), and to develop a 
mechanism for the proper sourcing of information provided online, such as 
making clear that particular messages are arising from coordinated political 
action committees, etc.
5. Social Media as Public Utility
Social media sites will claim that displaying advertisements to users is the price 
paid by users to have access to the features of the social media site. And, certainly, 
the costs of running a major social media site are not trivial. Less convincing may 
be the justification for the ownership and control of user content.
The creation of a publicly-run, non-profit online social media network to be 
promoted as an alternative can be considered, but would have to be done care-
fully to avoid legal wrangles of anti-competition laws. In such a case, existing 
laws governing the provision of national broadcasters could be repurposed for 
this initiative. The question of where funds would be acquired to launch and 
maintain such an initiative remains an open one. It would in essence be funded 
by taxes and either operated by a government or – possibly more ideally – by 
an arm’s length body that would receive funding as a subsidy, and fall under 
a nation’s telecommunications laws. The one downside of such an idea would 
be that it would tie users to a site that might only admit citizens of that state. 
Opening up such a site for global access might present conflict between different 
nations’ respective laws and would raise serious questions from taxpayers who 
might feel as though they are subsidising free access to citizens of other nations.
There are a few examples of social media that are non-profit. The example of 
The Fossil Forum is but one of many online forums that runs on donations to 
keep the proverbial lights on. Not every forum has to run ads in a sidebar, nor 
allow corporate sponsors to occupy the space by posting adverts.
6. Third-Party Algorithmic Sorting
Algorithmic sorting for what content becomes visible to users ought to be 
under a trusted, third-party regulatory framework. The objection might be that 
making the ‘recipe’ public would result in unscrupulous people being better 
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able to game the system. In the earliest days of search engines, what appeared 
in search results on the first page was determined by a very simple algorithm, 
compared to the ones that function on search engine giants like Google and 
Bing today. In those early days, the artful manipulation of back-linking could 
artificially inflate the visibility of a website, and thus give it a higher priority in 
returned search results. These would be cautionary tales in whatever algorith-
mic ‘recipe’ is adopted in this case.
Although this solution may go some length to make social media companies 
more accountable in how they deliver visible content, as well as how much of 
the content is linked to advertising, the one major legal hurdle would be patent 
protection: social media companies carefully guard their algorithms as propri-
etary, and might argue any attempt to open the proverbial black box and permit 
a third-party regulated service to manage the algorithm might have detrimen-
tal effects in terms of data security, site functionality and logistics, and poten-
tially making the social media sites less competitive or capable of attracting 
corporate ad buys.
A compromise, however, is possible as there already is an existing model 
used by some sidebar advertising services. As algorithms are only as good as 
the data that feeds and refines their processes to deliver more relevant output, 
providing options to social media users to choose with a click if they wish to see 
more or less of particular kinds of content may help better customise and tailor 
a user’s environment by granting the user more control.
7. Ending ‘Metrification’
Urging existing social media companies to remove the numeric counters from 
social buttons is another possible solution. Although this may not resolve the 
issue of competition in the attention economy, a stronger emphasis on engage-
ment and sharing without counters, and not using these to inform the algo-
rithm that may be indexed on what is popular, may reduce social herding and 
the evaluation of other users simply based on numbers.
What would happen if there were concerted pressure to dismantle the ‘like 
economy’ by removing all these counters? It would not prevent corporately 
controlled social media companies from continuing to extract surplus value 
from its users, nor the use of other forms of social buttons, but it might remove 
the emphasis on accumulating likes and engaging in numeric comparison with 
other users. Quantification would still run in the background, within the social 
media algorithms that will still deliver content on the basis of numeric popu-
larity, but it might help in getting more users to use a more quality-based crite-
ria for evaluating user-generated content and reduce a capitalist-inflected kind 
of competition on social media. And, perhaps, the incentives to participate 
would take on a whole new direction. The likelihood of major social media 
companies to even consider removing that feature is virtually nil as it is so 
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thoroughly integrated as a strategy for higher user participation and in their 
business models.
With that being said, assuming social media companies might see good 
reason in discontinuing visible counters, this would potentially render the 
business model of exploitative click farms irrelevant. This would not, how-
ever, undermine the use of botnets to carpet social media with bulk content 
designed to alter the behaviours and opinions of potentially susceptible users 
who might mistake a very high proportion of one-sided content as representa-
tive of a majority view. In that case, the quantity aspect is embedded rather than 
visible as a metric.
The removal of visible social counters may, however, reduce overall demand 
on the black market for those services that provide clicks, even if it would not 
put an end to those services entirely as long as there is some residual demand.
Admittedly, this is not an exhaustive list, and some of these suggestions may be 
naive and idealistic. However, as I have argued in this book, there is a very real 
need to continue critically addressing these issues and to question if there are 
other ways by which we can enjoy online social capital in a different way with-
out being caught up in the games of capitalist-inspired accumulation, which 
only seem to result in alienation in one form or another, and which only serves 
to increase competitive rather than collaborative social activity, while it is the 
social media sites that continue to profit.
If the promise of social media is to unite us, to provide for equal communica-
tive exchange free from creating a system of winners and losers, we know that 
the use of visible metrics implies hierarchy, and invites comparative valuation 
based on those numbers. Social media perhaps ought not to be a space where 
‘winning’ is the goal, but actual socialising. The alternative where we ‘metrify’ 
our social relations is far too reminiscent of capitalism’s values, and reinforces 
the network spectacle by playing into a strange fantasy game based on accumu-
lation, but a game that has very real human costs.
Can we reimagine social media as truly communicative without capitalism? 
Can social media users reclaim the space as one that encourages conversation 
without becoming a kind of competition for popularity and artificial gain in a 
like economy? I, for one, would like to hope so.

Notes
 1 For the purposes of clarity, the use of ‘metrification’ in this book is used in 
a more general sense to denote the conversion of non-numeric qualities to 
numeric quantities, and not in its more specific sense of the metric system 
of measurement.
 2 Also concealed in this process is the very real costs of these networks, gen-
erally borne by exploited labour in the extraction of rare earth minerals or 
the expanding (and exploitative) service economy in the developing world, 
the reliance on employed labour to perform coding and network mainte-
nance, the use of unpaid interns, etc. For a more in depth focus on how 
information technologies contribute to ecological crises, see Maxwell and 
Miller’s Greening the Media (2012).
 3 Despite several attempts, from psychometric data to social network analy-
sis, there has yet to be any definitive validation for consistent measurement, 
which is yet again impeded by a lack of consensus over the term and its 
scope.
 4 Small town networks have their benefits and disadvantages. Despite the 
potential for stronger ties, it can also result in stagnation if there are so 
few new social, material and knowledge inputs that are usually imported 
with new members. The strong ties and inward-looking aspects can also 
present barriers to newcomers. In this author’s practice in local government 
consulting, one community stakeholder put it very pithily: ‘you aren’t really 
from here until you have at least one grandmother in the local cemetery.’
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 5 For the duration of one week in January 2012, Facebook conducted an 
experiment on nearly 700,000 users, without their informed consent, to 
observe and measure how altering the content available to users on the 
basis of mood or sentiment might affect the mood or sentiment of the users. 
The authors of the study (Kramer et al 2014) claim that informed consent 
was already established by the users’ agreement with Facebook’s Data Use 
Policy. However, as James Grimmelman (2014) points out, apart from the 
low threshold of what is considered legal consent in this instance, there are 
lingering questions about funding, harm, and research-based ethics clear-
ance. In essence, the ‘study’ was far from merely observational, but was an 
experiment that relied on manipulating the emotions of users without their 
knowledge. If Facebook’s image relies on providing a high-trust culture net-
work, this experiment would seem to contradict any such claim.
 6 In particular, the work of danah boyd appears to focus primarily on youth 
cultures and the benefits of social media for this demographic.
 7 As of 27 June 2017, Facebook’s number of users has more than doubled to 
2 billion users since 2012. Despite Facebook’s attempt to use more sophis-
ticated methods for purging fake accounts, botnets, and click farming, it 
would be reasonable to assume that it remains a challenge.
 8 And, indeed, some examples of social media production do gain a new 
and different value for posterity, such as the Library of Congress’ move to 
archive select tweets.
 9 Other sites, such as klout.com, give a rank value on one’s social presence, 
although it is unclear on what they base their methodology on to arrive at 
these values.
 10 There are some notable exceptions, but they are exceptions. Offline activity 
spurred by online interaction will more generally lead to the consumption 
of products and services through online recommendations.
 11 In a 1990 interview with Antonio Negri in Futur Anterieur, Deleuze muses 
that ‘speech and communication have been corrupted. They’re thoroughly 
permeated by money.’
 12 On this point of our energy footprint, Mark P. Mills, CEO of the Digital 
Power Group, says that an average iPhone consumes about 361 kilowatts 
a year, whereas a regular fridge consumes about 322 kWh (Mills, 2013). In 
the US alone, over 70 billion kWh were consumed annually as of 2014, rep-
resenting about 2 per cent of the total energy consumption of the country. 
This is spread out over 3 million data centres and ‘cloud farms.’ What we 
might keep in mind here is that the energy being supplied is not all coming 
from renewable sources, but also heavily drawing upon oil, gas, and coal – 
all finite resources.
 13 Whether intentional or not, the invocation of ‘empowerment’ is imbricated 
in the neoliberal-informationist discourse alongside ‘mobility’ and ‘choice.’ 
Fogg touts the optimistic benefit of MIP, but may not have considered some 
of the assumptions in how empowerment is actually deployed, under what 
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conditions of more etherealised command and control, the disempower-
ment of cognitive labour in the development of apps, vendor-based devices 
that restrict choice and the ways in which data harvesting more empowers 
corporations for targeted advertising and predictive marketing.
 14 It should be noted, however, that the veracity of the list of named politicians 
and celebrities could not be confirmed, and that it would not prove difficult 
for someone to engage in the mischief of setting up a profile account for 
another person.
 15 Initially, the experiment was designed to run for seven days, but was in 
future iterations cut down to five, and now down to three due to the increas-
ing expression of anxiety over the exercise from one cohort to the next. 
Certain exceptions were made, such as if the use of social media was for 
emergency, family, school, or work-related reasons.
 16 A Google search for Instagram food photography delivers numerous results 
of tips on how to take better photos of food, with sources ranging from BBC 
to the New York Times and numerous blogs.
 17 One can imagine such a scenario. An episode of Black Mirror portrayed a 
speculative future where one’s online social score determined one’s oppor-
tunities (or lack thereof).
 18 It is important to sound a note of caution about the mobilisation of the 
term narcissism and how quickly it becomes pathologised and gendered. 
As Elizabeth Lunbeck’s book, The Americanization of Narcissism argues, 
Christopher Lasch had performed an unbalanced and selective reading of 
the psychoanalytic literature, focusing only on the negative aspects while 
dismissing the form of ‘healthy narcissism’ explored by Heinz Kohut. More-
over, Lasch generalises narcissism to society at large, and does not acknowl-
edge that Otto Kernberg’s more negative portrayal of narcissism was mark-
edly gendered and seemingly opposed to feminist approaches.
 19 Work by Jean Twenge, J.D. Foster, S. Konrath et al. have employed meta-
analytical approaches to determining that there has been an increase, at 
least with respect to sampling among college students. However, we must 
exercise caution here when we migrate such observation to a digital milieu: 
to make overarching claims that suggest that people are more mundane, 
narcissistic, exhibitionist or any other quality must take into consideration 
that the participatory nature of SNSs and microblogging now facilitates a 
means by which people can digitally document their lives with more ease. 
That is, the underlying attitudes and behaviours of people may not have 
changed, but we now have the digital documentation to see these more 
clearly.
 20 Examples of this disturbing behaviour, many of which target women and 
promote rape culture, are far too numerous. As of this writing, I read about 
Emily Vance who posted a video of herself urinating on an American flag. 
Although such an act may be deemed offensive by some, it is not illegal, and 
she was engaging in free expression. As a disproportionate response, angry 
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social media users have sent her death and rape threats, and even threat-
ened to do harm to her family. Similar threats against women and their 
families have occurred in response to advocating for female empowerment 
or against those who have investigated the military to expose the extent of 
sexual assault in the ranks.
 21 I draw the term ‘applause’ from the very poetic description Elias Canetti 
provides in his book, Crowds and Power, where he calls the breaking of 
windows in a riot as the encouraging applause of objects.
 22 An earlier attempt to automate pre-moderation relied on keyword filters, 
but this provided little barrier for users to bypass by engaging in creative 
spelling so that certain expletives and racist terms could be posted.
 23 The topic of cyberbullying is deserving of its own extended treatment, and 
so we can only signal its existence here as part of a broader discussion of 
aggressive online behaviours.
 24 For a contemporary example, there is no shortage of tweets by President 
Donald Trump on a wide range of issues where he blatantly contradicts 
himself, and may have done so strategically to play to what his team rec-
ognise as his foundational support base. His pre-campaign tweets and his 
presidential tweets are by far the most contradictory.
 25 Or, as a strategic operation that has been performed in the past, intention-
ally releasing ‘sourceless’ rumours to the media one wishes to discredit, 
knowing that they will print it, and then legitimising the claim that the 
media is ‘fake news.’
 26 As of this writing, Facebook’s Mark Zuckerberg made a public pledge to 
get a billion people to buy into virtual reality devices. Such devices allow 
for the integration of AR (augmented reality) and may prove a much more 
invasive method as it colonises our sense perception of space as something 
that is commercially linked, in ways much more advanced than the location 
services of Google Maps that may privilege sites for consumption. It may 
not be a far step from being constantly ‘logged in’ to Facebook even without 
a device. If Facebook uses AR to deliver purely commercial experiences on 
a perpetual basis has very serious ideological implications on how we can 
understand space.
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SOCIAL CAPITAL ONLINE 
What is ‘social capital’? The enormous positivity surrounding it conceals the instrumental economic rationality underpinning the notion as corporations silently sell consumer data for profit. 
Status chasing is just one aspect of a process of transforming qualitative 
aspects of social interactions into quantifiable metrics for easier processing, 
prediction, and behavioural shaping. 
A work of critical media studies, Social Capital Online examines the 
idea within the new ‘network spectacle’ of digital capitalism via the ideas 
of Marx, Veblen, Debord, Baudrillard and Deleuze. Explaining how such 
phenomena as online narcissism and aggression arise, Faucher offers a new 
theoretical understanding of how the spectacularisation of online activity 
perfectly aligns with the value system of neoliberalism and its data worship. 
Even so, at the centre of all, lie familiar ideas – alienation and accumulation 
– new conceptions of which he argues are vital for understanding today’s 
digital society.
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